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Abstract 
This is a thesis on the artwork as 'Material Complex'. The written element is a critical 
enquiry into the ideal of totality and homogeneity for artistic production, and a 
critique of this ideal as orthodoxy. I consider the idea of aesthetic judgement in 
relation to its ideological investment, and challenge the idea of normalised readings 
for its assumption of universality via an understanding of individual perception as 
practice. Although I realise the impossibility of escaping an eventual collective 
(aesthetic; ideological) intelligibility, I argue that the motivation to do so nevertheless 
produces criticality. I am starting from the position that the judgement of an artwork 
is produced in the performance of a Hegelian sublimation (Aufhebung) of its 
conflicting material elements. I stage the ideological import of this sublimation via 
Christian Metz. This focuses the enquiry in the first instance on audio-visuality. The 
thesis thus commences with a cross-reading of Sergei Eisenstein's position on 
montage with Roland Barthes' ideas of the symbolic and signifying. I develop this 
critical trajectory in the second part, where I theorise my viewing of Robert 
Smithson's film Spiral Jetty and of Andrei Tarkovsky's film Stalker via Julia Kristeva 
and Jean-Fran90is Lyotard respectively. Thereby I identify the method of 'collage-
montage' and, in a critique thereof, I advocate 'temporal-collage' as a strategy that 
provokes, through its deliberate non-resolvedness, complex individual productions. 
The last part of the thesis tests this strategy on concurrent contestations of the 
network age in dialogue with concerns of '70s Conceptual Art. In conclusion I come 
to propose 'timespace-collage', produced continually in 'subjective ideality'. The 
concerns of the text element are informed by, and developed in, my studio practice. 
Here I am working with sonic and visual material to produce complex expressions 
that provoke a sensorial practice rather than an intellectual judgement. 
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9 - 13 
This introduction offers an insight into the motivation and methodology of this 
research project: my art practice, questions of aesthetic orthodoxies of ideality and 
totality and their ideological investment. The main theme of my critique is staged 
through the notion of 'sublimation' (a Hegelian 'Aufhebung'): synthesising and 
condensing conflicting material elements (e.g. image and sound) and their sensory 
perception into an objective totality. Initially I stage this problematic via the film 
theorist Christian Metz. In particular I take up the argument developed in his 1975 
essay 'Aural Objects', which acts as an entry point into this enquiry. Metz' argument 
that hierarchical differentiations between sound and image in audio-visual 
articulations produce normalised readings and signal a greater ideological interest, 
read within a Hegelian ideal of totality, frames the motivation for my research. The 
conjunction between phenomenology and structuralism, which according to Metz 
lies at the basis of any perception, and which gestures towards Hegel's aesthetic 
theories, delineating as they do the conjunction between a structural, historical, and 
a phenomenological judgement, is shown to inform the general methodology of this 
project. 
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Introduction 
This research project begins in my studio. There I work with sonic and visual 
material toward an artistic expression, which does not work along fundamental 
givens: my practice does not support a pre-determined relationship between sound 
and image, nor does it produce a homogenised conflation of the two. Rather, my 
aim is to produce audio-visual work as 'Material Complex', which escapes and 
challenges prejudices of material perception, whatever they may be, and which 
questions the sublimation of one sense to an other. In saying so, I am setting out 
with the idea that there are prejudices of perception and that these involve certain 
hierarchical judgements, which flatten-out and neutralise the complexities of a 
work's material combinations. 
A hierarchy between visuality and sonicality, or between different materials and their 
sensory perception in general, is an idea that, in the terms of film theorist Christian 
Metz, signals a greater ideological issue. In his 1975 essay 'Aural Objects', originally 
titled 'Ie per9u et Ie nomme' (,the perceived and the named', my translation), he 
discusses the idea of a preference for the substantial, the visible and tactile, which 
he identifies as primary senses above smell and sound, which are thus qualified as 
secondary and attributal.1 He locates this valuation within a notion of stability and 
ephemerality of image and sound respectively, and articulates the source and 
consequence of such a prejudice for the production and theorisation of film on a 
cultural and ideological level. I draw on Metz' claim and adopt his theorisation for my 
investigation into the artwork as material complex. Thus my project entails a 
sensibility to the ideological interests and cultural prejudices of valuation. It is from 
an awareness of the power of ideology, and its hierarchies of perception, that this 
1 In this essay Metz correlates this hierarchical order with a capitalist orientation in the West. 
He talks about a 'primitive substantialism', which according to him, reflects the Western 
philosophical tradition since Descartes and Spinoza. This tradition, to him, is apparent in the 
subject-predicate structure particular to Indo-European languages, where the noun of the 
sentence orientates and determines the predicate, which is thus sublimated to this noun. He 
identifies the visual as the stable and primary, the noun, whilst the sonic is its changing 
attribute. Metz argues this hierarchy with regard to its construction and consequence for the 
production and theorisation of film-making. I understand that a similar sensibility can be 
argued for audio-visual art practice, or practices of any material combination, in general. 
I understand the original title of this essay, 'Ie pergu et Ie nomme', to foreground the 
distinction between a semiotic account and an experiential engagement. I argue that the 
differentiation between 'the perceived' and 'the named' clearly marks out a distinction 
between a culturally coded, named, understanding of the (visual) thing as sign, and a 
contingent production (of the sonic) in a perceptual process. I develop the criticality of such 
perceptual processes in relation to art via Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva later on in this 
project. 
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research takes a look at materiality and attempts to formulate a critical strategy to 
produce 'complex' artworks, which reveal and challenge concurrent ideological 
determinations.2 
Following Metz' discussion I focus on the centrality of cultural and ideological 
prejudices for the production and perception of audio-visual work, and place these 
issues at the core of my project. I also pick up on the epistemological question of 
structuralism or phenomenology that is implicit in his differentiation. In this I emulate 
Metz when in 'Aural Objects' he states: 
It seems to me that the semiological project in its entirety, because of its initial anchoring 
in a concern for the perceptible signifier and its perceptible transformations, defines itself 
in a certain way as the continuation of phenomenological inspiration. (Metz, 1992a, 
p315)3 
Throughout my project both methods, structuralism and phenomenology, are played 
with, for and against each other, in the quest to understand in their correlation the 
ideological force that prejudices production, and to survey the challenges to a 
systemic valuation that an experiential perception can pose. 
I contend that the notion of prejudices connects ideology to the subsuming dynamic 
of one material within the other and identifies it as the driving force behind the 
hierarchies involved in material production and perception. I am referring back to 
Metz here and presume with him that there are such hierarchies and that these are 
culturally determined. From here my project follows a Hegelian (dialectical) 
trajectory in suggesting that the notion of domination, of one material over the other, 
is motivated by the ideal of a homogenous expression: an ideal totality, which 
dialectically supersedes each individual expression in the quest for a higher order 
2 When considering the artwork from a perceptual angle, as this project attempts to do, and 
when acknowledging that there is no such thing as an isolated sensory perception, then, we 
can argue that any artwork includes more than one sensory material and presents thus a 
material complex. Consequently any artwork can be subject to this research. Therefor, this 
project is one about material complexity in general rather than audio-visuality in particular. 
However, in the first instance, my focus stays on audio-visuality. It is audio-visual practices 
that are initially investigated for their specific combination of two different materials in the 
production of a work of art. Only later in the project, when extending its premise into the 
digital realm, and considering digital re-evaluations of materiality and subjectivity, do I open 
the discussion to include material complexes in general. 
3 Throughout this text, wherever more than one essay, book or article has been published by 
the same author in the same year I use the convention of adding a letter to the date in order 
to distinguish between them. The alphabetical order of these letters relates to the 
organisation of my bibliography. 
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exposition.4 This supposition locates the first assumption concerning the hierarchical 
organisation of sound and image philosophically. The idea of a progressive ideality 
identifies the material hierarchy in objective terms. This makes apparent why 
material differentiations present themselves as an issue to me in the first place. I 
argue that ideality understood in relation to an (objective) progressive drive, directs 
any (subjective) experience, and thereby limits the scope of experientiality to an 
intended ideality and its ideological remit. 
The notion of an ideal totality, I argue, suggests that for something to be considered 
a successful artwork, heterogeneous complexities have to be overcome, and one 
homogeneous whole -one medium or one hybrid medium- has to be conceived. An 
amalgamation of -sonic and visual- material has to be produced that can be read 
together as one totality, rather than ceaselessly presenting the viewing and listening 
subject with incongruous material complexes. Whether this homogenisation takes 
place on the material expression -intentioned by the author- or in the process of 
perception -produced by the audience- is a different, but related issue, which 
importantly links the notion of homogeneity/totality back to the correlation between 
material and the subject producing and perceiving it: audience and author in his/her 
ideological and cultural milieu.5 Consequently it is apparent that the investigation of 
the artwork in terms of its material complexity involves a consideration of subjectivity 
also: the role of the subject producing and perceiving the work, as a totality, or as an 
incongruous complex, is a critical issue of this project. 
An evaluation of the relationship between different materials and their mediatic 
arrangement as heterogeneous or homogeneous, and in extension the declaration 
4 In his Berlin Aesthetic Lectures of 1820s Hegel sketches out the notion of an ideal state of 
beauty at the moment where art has overcome in sublimation (Aufhebung) the 
Widersrpilchlichkeit' (the antagonistic contradiction) between inner necessity and outer 
appearance, and has resolved the Idea, the content and form, its configuration of sensuous 
material in one total expression. He states that 'art has to harmonise these two sides and 
bring them into a free reconciled totality.' (Hegel, 1979, p70) In his terms the Ideal of the true 
unity of necessity, articulates an aesthetic synthesis in the sense of a coherent whole that 
resolves any incongruity between material elements, rather than exposing their 
incompatibilities, for the purpose of a stable sense of actuality as a higher order 
manifestation. Thus his aesthetic judgement outlines a dialectic, progressive, motion of 
sublimating (two) complex elements for the purpose of one ideal and objective totality. 
5 Which one of the material dictates the terms of composition I understand to be at least 
potentially variable. However, following Metz, in the context of current Western practices and 
discourses of perception and production, at least, I understand it to be vision, which 
organises sound to its demands of expression and perception. I understand that for 
expediency we privilege that which gives us everything at once within a clear frame of 
reference -vision- over that which happens in time and is less controllable in terms of its 
spatial expansion and hence its totality -sound. 
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of 'ideality' and 'totality', and the subject making this evaluation, collective or 
singular, evokes the notion of aesthetics. Aesthetics as a method of material 
judgement, analytically works on the sensations of perception, and organises them 
according to concurrent ideological and cultural values. Aesthetics juxtaposes the 
experiential with a frame of reference and thereby, I argue, controls its 
phenomenological aspect in a structural order. I understand the hierarchies along 
which the materials are amalgamated as aesthetic choices, which we produce or re-
produce in our perception, as aesthetic subjects, and which are driven by concurrent 
ideological interests. Central to this research is the pursuit of autonomy of 
production in the perception of the artwork. In this articulation, individual agency of 
perception and the collective determination of such individuality, in an objective 
totality, are perceived to be in constant struggle with each other. The notion of 
aesthetic judgement enters this struggle between material and subject. It points to 
the foundation of their duality and evaluates them both.6 
In order to clarify the relationship between an objective aesthetic judgement and the 
singular perception of the artwork's sensory material, this project investigates the 
complexity of audio-visual combinations initially, and later opens its scope of 
research to consider a wider realm of artistic practice in respect to notions of 
material complexity. It does so by observing and theorising materiality as an issue of 
perception. I debate material production and correlating conceptions of aesthetics 
and subjectivity via my individual perception of particular artworks. Thus I attempt to 
formulate a critical art practice, which challenges the aesthetics of an ideal 
combination and its ideological interests. The aim is to articulate a strategy for an art 
practice, which does not settle in a homogenised reading, but instead continually 
unsettles a combinatory totality via an individual and generative perception. 
My practice exists in various contexts: single screen, projected and monitor based 
video works and audio-visual installations in the gallery space, sound pieces on CD 
and radio, as well as in the form of textual contributions to magazines and 
conferences.7 In every instant the aim is to contest the apparent homogeneity and 
6 Here I acknowledge the difficulty of investigating and challenging aesthetic orthodoxies of 
production and perception due to the viewing and listening subject being always already an 
ideologically involved subject. My project is staged in acknowledgement of this difficulty in 
chapter one via Louis Althusser's notion of the subject as 'spontaneously' and 'naturally' 
ideological (Althusser, 1993, p4S). 
7 Another venue for my single screen video work is the commercial television (aesthetically 
though I am thinking of Mainland European rather than UK television). Television, like radio, 
is a means of distributing the work into the living room, the domestic space. There, I believe 
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consensual intelligibility of the artwork, and to challenge the limitations of a 
naturalised and conventional perception via a material complexity. Totality and a 
consensual (narrative) sense are kept at abeyance, and the material artwork is re-
formulated as a space of engagement, where the contingent perception produces a 
temporary individual (narrative) sense. In principle my practice aims to provoke the 
viewer and listener to expand the work in his/her imaginative perception and to 
produce an always-temporary and 'site-specific', in other words contingent, 'reality' 
thereof. In this continuous action of perception, I understand the subject to be 
contesting fixed descriptions of materiality -aesthetics- and subjectivity -identity-
alike, and to thereby continually question any concurrent ideology invested therein. 
a spirit of inattention can be plugged into, where imagination proliferates more easily than in 
the environment of the gallery and its aura of concentration and deference. 
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In this first chapter my research in 'Art as Material Complex' is initiated via an 
investigation of the audio-visual combinations proposed by the Russian film-maker 
and theorist Sergei Eisenstein. His theories of a 'montage of conflict' and a 'montage 
of attraction', serve to introduce and formulate a hypothesis on the relationship 
between the aesthetic appearance of a material composition and its ideological 
intent. Also, his montage theories make possible an initial consideration of the role 
of the subject vis-a-vis the material complex that is the artwork, and the cultural 
specificity of any such engagement. In particular, I discuss the dynamic of 
Eisenstein's dual motion of montage; 'nonsynchronisation' and 'orchestral 
counterpoint'. I stage my interest in the first motion, and pronounce a critique of the 
second. Subsequently, in consultation with Roland 8arthes' ideas on the semiotic 
and the symbolic, I develop my agreements and disagreements to formulate a 
hypothesis for an alternative strategy of a complex material practice. 
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Introduction 
In this first chapter I introduce my investigation into the artwork as a complex 
material assemblage by considering the audio-visual assemblage of film. The desire 
for complex configurations of sound and image arises from my studio practice. It 
reflects the concerns staged in the introduction regarding the sublimation of sound 
and image according to material hierarchies, articulated as aesthetic judgements, 
which neutralise the work's material complexities for the benefit of a homogenous 
totality. To stage my argument, I posit the interests of my practice vis-a-vis existing 
audio-visual theories and practices concerned with the interplay between sound and 
image. In the first instance, I introduce this investigation via Sergei Eisenstein's 
theories of audio-visual montage. I base my choice on Eisenstein's lasting influence 
on art film and video making, his sensitivity toward sound, as well as his critical 
relationship to narrative conventions.s 9 In the course of this investigation I critique 
8 I understand Eisenstein's theories, perhaps more than his actual works, to have influenced 
and still today, at least indirectly, to influence the practice and discourse of art- film and video 
making. This is particularly apparent in reference to work from the 1960s and '70s, the time 
of the first film-makers' coops in New York and London. The theorists and film-makers from 
these decades, in their concern for formal material composition and pace, pay direct homage 
to Eisenstein's montage and its dialectical materialism. Here I am thinking particularly of 
American film-makers, who subsequently influenced British and Continental Europe's artistic 
output and theoretical discourse. In this sense, I understand the compositional formalism and 
montage dynamic of work's by among others Maya Deren, Kenneth Anger, Stan Brakhage 
and Jonas Mekas, to pay tribute to this connection, which, on the other side of the Atlantic I 
understand to resonate in work by David Hall, Gerry Schum, Jan Dibett, Peter Kubelka, 
Chris Marker, etc .. This connection is reflected, I argue, in the Marxist concerns of film theory 
in the '60s and '70s. Most notably this connection is articulated in the writings of Christian 
Metz, Peter Wollen, Laura Mulvey, Peter Gidal, etc .. 
I contest that it is only recently, in what can arguably be considered as postmodern 
practices, that the prior focus on material processes has lost its supremacy in favour of an 
emphasis on film and video as media rather than material. In other words the focus has 
shifted from the manipulation of material to the manipulation of content and context. I contest 
this shift in focus is apparent in the work by artists such as Douglas Gordon and Annika 
Larsson. Gordon's re-working of Hitchock's Psycho, and the subsequent trend of re-cycling 
material from mainstream films, and Larsson's high-production-value-aesthetics which evoke 
fashion shoots and life-style-advertisements, take the focus away from the relationship 
between the material, which is the principal interest of materialist montage, and instead 
opens a relationship with the work to the media industry of film and video making. 
I understand my own video work to sit in-between these two influences. My practice is 
sensitive to the visual and sonic material as materiality, and pays attention to issues of 
composition and formal arrangement, even if in critique of an Eisensteinian montage. 
However, at the same time, I am aware of my work in relation to the context of a film 
industry, and also acknowledge a televisual influence, even if a European rather than 
American output. 
9 My consideration of narratives in relation to Eisenstein's montage does not aim at 
investigating narrative theories, or a particular narrative sense. Rather, I read his writing 
against conventions of narrative production as a critique of conventional modes of sense 
production. I employ the term narrative to denote sense-making processes in general, rather 
than in relation to particular systems of narrativisation. The investigation of narrative vis-a.-vis 
Eisenstein's montage theories is, then, an investigation into sense processes: collective or 
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the ideological investment of his theory of montage via Roland Barthes' ideas on 
sense and artistic production. Eisenstein and Barthes set the stage for the written 
aspect of this project. I critically evaluate their ideas on materiality, spectatorship 
and the role of the artist, to stage my concerns. Their writings enable me to produce 
a methodology for the evaluation of audio-visual practices in regards to their 
aesthetic parameters and their ideological investment.1o 
Throughout my project I discuss how ideological dynamics either produce the 
material complexities as homogenised expressions or act as enablers of less 
certain, more temporal and individual experiences. Whilst critiquing the first for its 
implicit Hegelian ideal totality, I search art history for instances of the latter, and 
undertake to ascertain and debate their criticality and radicality in relation to 
concurrent valuations of materiality. 
In my own practice I strive to develop audio-visual artworks that forge a dynamic 
and complex non-totality. My project aims at developing the practice and 
theorisation of complex works that forge temporal and individual experiences, rather 
than pursue an objective totality. As a corollary, in the course of trying to articulate 
such a heterogeneous strategy and its conceptual objective, my research 
investigates perceptual prejudices and hierarchical processes of production and 
perception, which determine material assemblage in the guise of a concurrent 
aesthetic. Such an investigation involves the consideration of an aesthetic demand 
for totality/harmony and meaningfulness, consensual sense, and brings with it 
reflections on subjectivity also. 
I show how harmony/totality and meaningfulness, sense, are easily re-produced and 
thereby re-affirmed in the negative as disharmony and meaninglessness, nonsense. 
My project aspires to propose a material complexity not in direct opposition to 
consensual sense and totality and therefore neither easily rendered total and 
meaningful through a dialectic reversal, nor marginalisable as irrelevant and 
individual; generative or analytical, rather than a consideration of a particular narrative 
meaning or convention. 
10 I am then, at least initially, focusing my investigation into the artwork as a material complex 
on audio-visuality. However, I demonstrate in subsequent chapters, how the concerns 
highlighted in this initial investigation are transferable to a wider realm of art practice. In this 
sense, the central issue of this project is neither the material particularities nor the 
relationship of sound and image per se. Rather, I aim to pursue an investigation into the 
ideological dynamics that order artistic production and perception in a more general sense: 
intention, sensation and its valuation in an aesthetic judgement. Audio-visuality is merely the 
particular concern of my practice, which allows me to begin this investigation. 
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meaningless nonsense. Instead, I aim to critique a nominal idea of sense and totality 
per se. 
I first argue the danger to criticality posed by the 'trap of the negative', in reference 
to the dialectic dynamic of Eisenstein's montage. Working through Eisenstein's 
theories of 'montage of conflict' and 'montage of attraction', I focus on their dialectic 
dynamic. I show how his audio-visual montage is based on the dual motion of 
'nonsynchronisity' and 'counterpuntal orchestration', which, in a conflictual/dialectical 
move, work towards the film as an ideal totality. 
In relation to this, I contest Eisenstein's montage theory with reference to his desire 
for directing or 'attracting' the audience towards an intended reading. His ideas of 
attraction and persuasion enable me to point towards the ideological interest and 
teleological character of his 'total montage'. I argue that, according to him in 
montage, the listening and viewing subject is encouraged to participate and produce 
the work against existing ideologies and in terms of a 'true' meaning. The state of 
'trueness', I contend however, comes out of a 'new' but nevertheless ideologically 
determined ideality of the author's intention. 11 
I present that, although challenging a concurrent aesthetic system, and thus 
questioning an ideological notion of the (politically) real of the time, Eisenstein 
replaces rather than eradicates the notion of a shared and thus nominally 
11 Ideality is understood and argued in the whole of the project in the sense of the Hegelian 
notion of Idealitat of an 'ideal objectivity', which for him decides the beauty of art as an 
absolute beauty. In the introduction to this research project I have presented how Hegel's 
aesthetic formulates a conflictual relationship between discord and harmony and how his 
judgement of the beautiful, his aesthetic theory, depends on the ideal resolve of the two. 
(Berlin Aesthetic Lectures of 18205, 1979, p70) In turn, the desire to resolve discord and 
achieve harmony, is the driving force for artistic production. In the 'Tatigkeit' (production) of 
an expression the 'Widerspruch' (antagonistic contradiction) between discord and harmony 
can be overcome in sublimation (Aufhebung) , and an ideal objective state can be reached, 
which is understood as ideal spirituality. In practice this ideality is never achieved but 
remains forever a process of production. Hegel understands the drive for this relentless 
production to lie in the hope to achieve freedom from our animalistic needs, through the 
overcoming of the inner necessity (the animalistic needs) by an outer appearance which is 
the appearance of perfect beauty of an ideal objectivity in spirituality. Although an objective 
ideality is never really achieved, as a motivation, it marks the production of the artwork as a 
progressive and intentional production and its ideology as an ideology of totality. The notion 
of its objectivity proclaims the idea that there is a shared world history in which the subject is 
fully realised as a spiritual ideality constructed and aimed at in such a relentless Tatigkeit 
(activity) between the Widerspruch (antagonistic contradiction) and its Aufhebung 
(sublimation). In relation to this, my research project aims to articulate an artistic production 
which challenges such an ideal art practice and its judgement. However, at the same time I 
am aware of the influence aesthetic theory has on my evaluation of artistic expression. 
(Vorlesungen in der Asthetik vol. 1 - 3, 1980) (my translation of Hegel's terminology). 
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naturalised reality. I argue that his production is ideological, and show how in its 
method it is dependent on a particular political, historical and geographical 
context/identity of the subject viewing the work. 
Implicit in this critical analysis of Eisenstein's montage theories in relation to sense 
and totality is an investigation of the subject producing and perceiving the work. His 
(inter-) active subject of montage, I argue, is not an autonomous subject, but is an 
aesthetic subject in the sense of a collectively determined subject. Aesthetics is 
involved here as a rationalisation of sensorial experience in a systemic judgement. I 
am critically investigating the appropriation and manipulation of aesthetic 
vocabularies and subjectivities in relation to Eisenstein's audio-visual montage. I 
acknowledge, via Louis Althusser, that we are always already aesthetic and 
ideological sUbjects.12 I concede thus that when challenging Eisenstein's subject for 
its ideological pre-determination there is no subject position outside ideology: We 
are always already socially determined, even in our singularity. Hence, my proposal 
for an autonomous and singular subject perceiving the artwork as a material 
complexity understands and works with this equivocation. However, even if this 
fundamental collectivity renders futile my trying to achieve a critical singularity that is 
not in a dialectic relation to the collective, I argue throughout the project that the 
motivation to do so nevertheless articulates a criticality. 
Eisenstein theorises montage according to the properties of the ideogram. His 
adoption of a linguistic concept facilitates my discussion of his theories in relation to 
the idea of vocabularies of perception, and their arrangement of differences and 
similarities. The ideographic concept of his 'montage of conflict', and later Barthes' 
evaluation of Eisenstein's montage as a symbolic semiotic, enables me to make a 
link between the experience of audio-visual combinations and referential systems 
(vocabularies) of reality. In this sense, my investigation into the homogenising 
12 In his book Essays on Ideology, Louis Althusser, before going on to discuss the 
interpellation of the subject in ideology, informs the reader that: 
In order to grasp what follows, it is essential to realize, that both he who is writing these 
lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefor ideological 
subjects, (a tautological proposition), i.e. that the author and the reader both live 
'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology in the sense in which I have said that 'man is an 
ideological animal by nature.' (Althusser, 1993, p45) 
Following him, I acknowledge the position of the viewing and listening subject as an always 
already, ideological subject, 'spontaneously' and 'naturally' so. However, rather than letting 
this inevitable and 'spontaneous' position hinder my articulation for a beyond, I use it to 
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strategy of montage questions the value and status of reality and its relationship to 
materiality and the subject.13 I recognise in the notion of a 'reality of experience', a 
structural and a phenomenological worldview situated vis-a-vis each other; one 
determining a 'reality' of the world through prior knowledge and ideological intent, 
the other producing an experientially 'real' world in a continuous process of 
determination. Both these philosophical methods are employed throughout the 
project, in order to, between them, find a useful re-assessment of materiality and 
subjectivity beyond an ideological and cultural pre-determination. 
In particular, in this chapter, the formal aspects of montage are investigated via a re-
consideration of its semiotic status by Barthes. Barthes identifies Eisenstein's 
montage as a symbolic semiotic, and pursues the critique thereof via a notion of 
'signifying' that points to a phenomenological 'accent' at the limit of the work's 
structural meaning. This notion of 'signifying' allows me to discuss the material 
complex that is the artwork in reference to a limit of (structural) meaning. I adopt 
Barthes' ideas of the 'accent' and the 'filmic', which are, according to him, posited 
against such limits. For Barthes from such accents the work extends beyond its 
structural identification into an individual experience. I propose that it is at this 
junction between structural meaning and the notion of its own limits in experience 
that a preliminary discussion for the criticality of montage can take place, and where 
the staging of a possible alternative strategy for audio-visual practice begins. I argue 
that the location of the accent provides me with a point from which to cross-examine 
the material composition and its subject to re-assess notions of aesthetic 
judgements and their ideological investments. In this sense a consideration of 
Eisenstein's writing read via Barthes' critique thereof, provides me with a framework 
in which to position and develop my ideas on material combinations of sound and 
image. 
Eisenstein's Audio-Visual Montage; issues of form and motivation 
I start this investigation by considering the moment when the development of sound-
film urged a re-assessment of a solely visual montage practice. This point of entry 
enables me to reason the use of formalist film theory as my initial focus of 
position my provocation exactly. It is not the identification of the individual as ideological, but 
the nature of that ideological identification, which I aim to re-negotiate. 
13 The status and appearance of a concurrent reality becomes a particularly pertinent issue 
in the later chapters of this project. 
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investigation. The formalist making of film from 'within' the material, in relation to its 
processes, cutting splicing, exposure, development, etc., (rather than as a 
transcription of a literal narrative), I argue, lends itself to this research into the 
hierarchies of perception, which determine material combinations. I contest that the 
formalist sensitivity to material specificity and process implies a careful 
consideration of every element of a film. This specific emphasis, I argue, aids me to 
elucidate aesthetic processes and their ideological investment and is thus useful for 
my investigation into the artwork as a material complex. 
At the beginning of the 20th Century, at the dawn of sound film, S. M. Eisenstein, V.1. 
Pudovkin and G. V. Alexandrov produced ideas about working film as sound and 
image in relation to each other. In 1928 they wrote a 'Statement [on Sound]', which, 
I argue, manifests their sensitivity to material particularity: 
THE FIRST EXPERIMENTAL WORK WITH SOUND MUST BE DIRECTED 
ALONG THE LINE OF ITS DISTINCT NONSYNCHRONIZATION WITH THE 
VISUAL IMAGES. And only such an attack will give the necessary palpability which 
will later lead to the creation of an ORCHESTRAL COUNTERPOINT of visual and 
aural images. (Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov, 1992, p318) 
Their statement makes apparent their passionate belief that the coming of sound-
film is vastly significant for the development of montage. The notion of sound and 
image in 'DISTINCT NONSYNCHRONIZATION' articulates their acknowledgement 
of the singularity of each material. They do not want sound as an 'adhesive' to the 
image. They feel that this would destroy the particularity of visual-montage, which 
seeks not to show, but to construct at the cut, in-between the frames, the expression 
of the whole film. They do not want to see sound destroying their method of film-
making. Rather, they want to work with sound so as to develop and further 
complexify montage as the guiding principle of film form. Montage is the general 
strategy used by all three authors to combine the diverging parts of a film. For my 
investigation I particularly focus on Eisenstein's theories of a 'montage of conflict' 
and a 'montage of attraction' .14 
14 As stated in the introduction, I argue this emphasis on the basis of Eisenstein's theories' 
lasting influence on art film and video production. It is crucial to note here however that I am 
not considering his film work but his film theories. I contest that the political, historical and 
geographical particularity of his films hinders a critical investigation of the aesthetic and 
conceptual interest of its production. By contrast, I understand his theories to be transferable 
to current contentions of material production. 
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Eisenstein famously describes montage as a material strategy of combining the 
diverging parts of the film, the shots or frames, by juxtaposing them. In his text on 
'The Dramaturgy of Film Form' he announces: 
I should call cinema the 'art of juxtapositions'... because it shows not facts but 
conventional (photographic) representations ( ... ). For the exposition of even the simplest 
phenomenon cinema needs juxtaposition (by means of consecutive, separate 
presentation) between the elements which constitute it: (Eisenstein, 1998, p36) 
Thus Eisenstein theorises montage film as the 'art of juxtapositions', because, in his 
terms, film shows nothing but conventional representations which only achieve their 
real expression in their relationship to other such representations. It is, according to 
him, therefore, not in the individual elements, but in-between them, that the 
cinematic phenomenon is constituted. The juxtapositions of shots or frames provoke 
another understanding of the material presented in either shot, from the 'conflict' that 
arises in their collation. In this sense, I argue, his montage theory focuses on an 
immaterial in-between. 
This emphasis on an immaterial in-between, a third term, I understand to be re-
stated when Eisenstein writes: 'montage is not an idea composed of successive 
shots stuck together but an idea that DERIVES from the collision between two 
shots that are independent of one another (the dramatic principle).' (Ibid., p95) The 
strategy of so constituting the whole film is posited by Eisenstein in reference to 
Gestalt theory, where the whole is thought of in relation to each part: Each frame 
or shot, creates, in juxtaposition with another, more than what would be available 
to the audience within one shot, and in the total of juxtapositions the film produces 
more than what is presented in the sum of its frames.15 The whole of the montage 
film is accordingly not produced as a chain of frames but as 'chains of association' 
originating from between the frames (ibid., p36). 
In relation to the invention of sound cinema, the invention of sound 'married' to the 
picture track and 'synchable' to its image, this emphasis on juxtaposition suggests 
new ideological as well as material challenges to Eisenstein's eXisting montage 
15 For this correlation of terms I am referring to Eisenstein where he writes that 'it has been 
said: The whole is more than the sum of its parts. It is more correct to say that the whole is 
something else than the sum of its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, 
whereas the whole part relationship is meaningful.' (Eisenstein, 1977d, p17) 
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theories.16 In this sense, reflecting on Eisenstein's method of montage, at the advent 
of a technological novelty -sound film- affords me a great starting point for my 
speculation on art as complex combinations.17 I claim that the problems that arise 
for the artist working as a 'montageur', when 'adding' an extra material to his/her 
practice, in this particular instance when adding sound to film, and thereby 
complicating the dynamic of his/her material juxtapositions, offers an opportunity to 
evaluate montage in terms of its claims to complexity. 
All three authors of the 'Statement [on Sound]', are fearful of the American 
development of synch sound film as a commercial venture. They understand such 
sound film to support the illusion of one reality, which, in their terms, asks no 
questions about its ideological construction. They understand 'talking films' to simply 
add sound to a visual object or movement, making it seemingly more 'real', more 
'naturalistic'. They distrust the simple realisms that they see to be thus constructed. 
The source and ideological foundation of this distrust is made apparent in a quote 
from Eisenstein's essay on the cinematographic principle: 
Both in painting and sculpture there is a periodic and invariable return to periods of the 
establishment of absolutisms. Displacing the expressiveness of archaic disproportion for 
regulated "stone tables" of officially decreed harmony. 
Absolute realism is by no means the correct form of perception. It is simply the 
function of a certain form of social structure. Following a state monarchy, a state 
uniformity of thought is implanted. Ideological uniformity of a sort that can be developed 
16 The introduction of 'married' and 'synch' sound to cinema highlights issues at stake in the 
aesthetic valuation of sound and image vis-a-vis each other. I note a distinction here 
between synched and married sound. Married sound does not necessarily have to be in 
synch with the image, but is simply fixed on the sound strip of the picture track. By contrast 
synch sound faithfully accompanies the action of the visual. This lack of autonomy, I argue, 
confounds, if not entirely prevents, the juxtaposing strategy of montage. I argue further that 
the difficulty to define sound in terms of shots, or frames, consequently produces another 
difficulty to propose a juxtaposing montage of the sonic material. This brings to the fore the 
issue of having to, in some way, define sound-shots (horizontally and vertically defined sonic 
units) in order to be able to juxtapose them to visual shots. The difficulty of such a 
delineation of sound in turn forces me to re-think the juxtaposing dynamic per se. Thus, the 
introduction of sound, I argue, necessitates a re-evaluation of the 'visual' principles and 
~rocesses assumed in visual montage also. 
7 The consideration of art practice, parallel to the advent of a technological innovation, I 
argue, offers an opportunity to re-think artistic criticalities, and permits an evaluation of 
broader issues of materiality, subjectivity and their aesthetic framework. As a starting point it 
is particularly valuable in respect to a concurrent situation of digital innovation. Thus 
similarly, later in this project, I re-assess audio-visual work with regard to the development of 
digital technology. I understand technological novelties to provide an opportunity to re-
evaluate the ideologies that drive these innovations and the correlations thereof to changing 
notions of subjectivity: author- and audience-ship. 
22 
pictorially in the ranks of colors and designs of the Guards regiments. (Eisenstein, 
1992a, pp131-32) 
In parallel to the passionate articulation of a 'distinct nonsynchronisation' in the 
'Statement [on Sound]', this quote reveals at the basis of montage a sharp critique 
of the institutional investment of uniform and single realities that its authors 
understand synchronised audio-visual work to construct and support. Eisenstein, 
Pudovkin and Alexandrov are wary of what they call the 'wrong' use of sound. For 
them this wrong implies an attributal use of sound; one which supports the 
expression of the visual but which carries no autonomous articulation, and is hence 
unable to complicate the visual. In a critique of such a wrong use of sound they 
propose the development of a sound-montage that is worked according to the 
principles of visual-montage, which can then be juxtaposed to that visual-montage, 
establishing an audio-visual montage. In this way sound as well as vision presents 
complex articulations that work in conflict with each other, not resolving but 
complicating vision even. They understand that sound, which is denied its 
autonomy, undoes the invention of montage, and renders film an uncritical 
'satisfaction of simple curiosity' (Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Alexandrov, 1992, p361). In 
their terms such film shows a normalised reality and verifies 'pictorially' the 
absolutism of that 'reality'. In other words such film presents a tautological sense of 
the real as absolute. Instead, they desire a film which questions the veracity of any 
such absolute 'real' and its ideological investment. 
I understand this critique of attributal combinations to imply that any audio-visual 
practice which does not treat the elements involved in its expression with 
'disjunctive' consideration, but instead subsumes one material to the other, 
produces synthetic conjunctions which render its composition a simplifying 
representation. 18 The criticality of such a practice, I argue, is forgone in favour of the 
18 As an illustration of the ideological difference between film as a simplifying synthetic 
construct, or as a complex montage piece, I am thinking of Howard Hawks' film Criminal 
Code (1930) in comparison to Sergei Eisenstein's film Battleship Potemkin (1925). Both films 
deal with an instance of rebellion against an establishment. The first presents the uprising 
and discontent of a prison population in an American prison, the other deals with the rising of 
the people in Tsarite Russia. Whilst the first represents the revolt through talk-tracks and 
'audible objects' (synched door slamming, etc.), along the lines of what Eisenstein and his 
colleagues term a 'naturalistic' use of sound, added to the image-track, the second 
constructs a sense of uproar through the juxtaposition of independent image and sound 
tracks. Both films convey meaning, but the way in which it is produced differs crucially. In the 
terms of a formalist critique, Hawks, constructs a pictorial representation of revolt. He 
portrays a simple realism. The viewer reads the quasi reality of the film as an absolute reality 
and enjoys it as a spectacle, from outside the material. By contrast, Eisenstein's material 
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satisfaction that lies in easy intelligibility and relies on the belief in an absolute real 
(a consensual sense). Eisenstein's montage theory articulates a challenge to such 
an absolute reality. Conversely, in my own practice, I am trying to work on the 
relationship between material elements -sonic and visual- towards complex and 
heterogeneous articulations that provoke through their absence of absolute 
meanings a rethinking of material and conceptual certainties and corresponding 
notions of sense and subjectivity. 
I argue (along with Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov) that sound, taken as an 
attribute, cannot be worked through autonomous processes of montage. Thus, it 
cannot complexify the material relations of a film. Attributal sound instead, flattens 
out the montage of the visual even; tying over the cuts, and presenting film as a 
series of easy correspondences ('chains of frames'). The synching of the sound of 
the voice to the movement of lips, or the sound of steps to the visuals of moving feet 
enables the easy intelligibility of the material expression as a sealed unit.19 The 
material becomes representative. It presents the viewer with its literal content, rather 
than focusing the audience as viewers and listeners in-between the material, on the 
conflict, at the cut, sonic and visual, at which an audio-visual montage is being 
constructed through 'nonsynchronisation'. I contest that at this nonsynchronous 
conflict, in the absence of easy correspondences, the audience is forced to engage 
conceptually, in Eisenstein's terms, the audience is producing chains of 
associations. This notion of a nonsynchronous production from which an immersive 
and active subject position is evoked issues the main focus of my critique. In the 
next part I go on to develop my argument from this initial understanding. 
Issues of Perception and Conceptualisation 
The process of montage, according to Eisenstein, demands our attention in-between 
frames, visual and sonic, where there is no synchronisation but complex 
polemic draws the audience into the film. He does not represent an absolute whole, but 
instead demands the viewer to produce the film from between the shots in a conceptual 
engagement. I contest that his nonsynchronised elements don't offer a pictorial rendition, 
and in the absence of such clarity force a material engagement. 
19 I am using the notion of synch sound in a general sense to include not only literally 
synched sounds but also those sounds of the sound-track which are fitted to the visual 
without clear synch points such as atmos-tracks and other environmental sounds. They are 
not 'spotted on' but are nevertheless held in place by the image's co-ordination of a linear 
(narrative) development. 
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juxtapositions.20 The collision between montage parts produced in such complex 
juxtapositions presents an absence which provokes (re-)engagement in association: 
the moving lips that find no vocals beg for an imaginary dialogue to be produced by 
the viewer, the sounds of steps that have no corresponding picture challenge the 
imagination of the listener. I understand the absence of easy correspondence to put 
demands on the imagination of the viewer. Such absence also poses questions 
about any possible presence of the meaning as a consequence of a (teleological) 
narrative. I understand Eisenstein's criticism of synchronisation to imply that a 
seamless relation between vision and sound does not complicate the visual 
expression through absence, but 'resolves' it, gives it what it demands: the vocals to 
the lips, the sound of steps to the feet. In Eisenstein's terms it at once grants the 
satisfaction of 'seeing' the whole and disables any other reading, thereby affirming 
the absolute veracity of what is seen. His understanding of absolute presence and 
'engaging' absence, I contest, describes the distinction between sense produced in 
a tautological narrative, synched film production, and sense produced in an (inter-
)active narrative, montage film production. (My use of the term narrative does not 
imply a focus on plot line and denouement, but pertains to the processes of sense 
production.) 
20 The fact that sound, at least non-musical sound, sound not organised within bars or 
equivalent systems, does not present itself in actual frames (delineating a clear vertical and 
horizontal unit), which can be juxtaposed as clearly as images, points to structural thinking 
as a prerequisite of the montage-project. Eisenstein's push for an audio-visual montage must 
necessarily suggest that he perceives sound as frames, as structural units. By contrast, if we 
take Eisenstein's view, American film treated sound so easily as an attribute, rather than 
push for a complex sonic montage in juxtaposition to the visual montage, because they 
employed no such systemic valuation. This presents me with a paradox. It seems that in 
order to articulate a critical use of sound as an autonomous artistic material, according to 
Eisenstein's montage principle, one needs to formulate a structural identification of sound. 
One needs to be able to reflect on sound as a 'cell' in order to free it from its dominant 
context: the visual. 
I understand this process in relation to accousmatic music, which undertakes a 
phenomenological reduction of sound to its 'pure state'. Accousmatic music divorces sound 
from its source-distinct attack, the starting point of a sound, in order to prevent a structural 
identification with its (visual) source and to enable its working compositionally as an 
autonomous unit. In his Guide des Objets Son ores, Pierre Schaeffer at la Recherche 
Accousmatic, (Guide to Sonic Objects Pierre Schaeffer and Accousmatic Research, my 
translation) Michel Chion describes the accousmatic reduction of sound produced in order to 
systematise it sonically, as an 'objet sonore' ('sonic object'), rather than in relation to its 
(visual) source. 
I further evaluate the paradox of this structural identification of montage-sound as cell later 
on in the chapter via Barthes' notion of a semiotic symbolic. I also more tacitly evaluate this 
paradox throughout my project in the juxtaposition of a structural and a phenomenological 
methodology. 
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According to Eisenstein, synchronisation pre-empts the productive imagination of 
the viewer, and pre-determines their reading through pre-existing signs: . lips to 
speak, feet to walk, and in so dOing hinders a re-assessment thereof. In his terms, in 
the synthetic production, there is no conflict between the individual shots, and the 
reality represented remains singular and solid. I am interested in the status and 
conceptualisation of this absolute real of the synthetic film in relation to the 
associative reality of the montage film produced through the juxtapositions of its 
shots, posited as montage 'cells'. However, I do not position the result of either film 
practice as sense or nonsense, but identify either sense according to its processes, 
understood as narrative processes. 
Instead of producing an absolute reality, a consensual narrative sense, through 
material correspondence, Eisenstein situates at the point of this nonsynchronous 
junction, the idea of an 'unexpected' 'fourth dimension' of the film. I am referring in 
particular to his essay on 'the Unexpected' in the Japanese Kabuki theatre, which 
largely informs his montage strategy. In this text he discusses how Kabuki does not 
combine but juxtapose its expressions in a 'monism of ensemble'. He expresses his 
admiration for this technique by stating that 'the Japanese have shown us another, 
extremely interesting form of ensemble -the monstic ensemble. Sound-movement-
space-voice here do not accompany (nor even parallel) each other, but function as 
elements of equal significance.' (Eisenstein, 1977e, p20) Thus these elements 
display no differentiating hierarchy. They forge no perspective of perception but 
produce a non-differentiated simultaneity of sensation. Adopting this characteristic 
from Kabuki, he promotes that the materials, sound and image, in montage too do 
not accompany each other (as in 'parallel ensembles') but are elements of equal 
significance. He argues accordingly that the nonsynchronous cuts of the film, 
produced as monistic ensembles are 'non-perspectival', in the sense that they are 
non-hierarchical combinations which produce unexpected junctions. 
I understand his use of sound and image as elements of equal significance, to 
propose the film as a model of 'simultaneity'. And understand this simultaneity to 
imply that for Eisenstein there is no surveying differentiation: there is no one 
perspective, which determines perception to privilege one material over another. I 
argue this suggests that there is no linear thread, which works toward one 
(teleological) narrative sense. Instead, the narrative is the process of a simultaneous 
production which achieves a conceptual sense, at the cuts in-between the material. 
For Eisenstein there is no formulation of a hierarchical differentiation, which 
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constructs the experience of the perceived material and guarantees it through its 
demarcation by the choice of a controlling perspective. 'In other words, in our new 
perspective -there is no perspective but a multitude of 'unexpected junctions' 
(Eisenstein, 1977c, p82). 
According to Eisenstein, in its multitude of unexpected combinations, the montage 
work demands a sensorial engagement; the film is sensed rather than viewed. 
Instead of "I see" or "I hear", the notion of "I feel" is being provoked (Eisenstein, 
1977a, p71). I understand the "I feel" to suggest that nonsynchronous combinations 
push the work into an experiential realm where the subject produces the film in an 
emotive perception, rather than according to a conventional (linear narrative) 
reading. The monistic treatment of the material of the film or theatre is thus identified 
not as producing one consensual meaning. Rather, as Eisenstein states: 'The film-
frame can never be an inflexible letter of the alphabet, but must always remain a 
multiple meaning ideogram.' (Ibid., p6S). 
I am interested in the potential for flexible and multiplicitous combinations that he 
alludes to via a nonsynchornous, monistic complex, in critique of a linear absolute, 
produced within the overall narrative drive. However, the association with the 
systemic quality of the ideogram, I contest, frames the multiplicity. Eisenstein 
specifies these multiplicities when he goes on to say that they can only ever be 
posited in particular juxtapositions. Since in his terms, 'an ideogram acquires its 
specific significance, meaning and even pronunciation ( ... ) only when combined with 
a separately indicated reading or tiny meaning -an indicator for the exact reading-
placed alongside the basic hieroglyph.' (Ibid., pp66-67) Although working with a 
sensorial rather than an intellectual reading, Eisenstein is interested in an 'exact 
reading'. He achieves this through a strategy related to this statement: 'Orthodox 
montage is montage on the dominant, i.e. the combination of shots according to 
their dominating indications.' (Ibid., p64) In other words, montage film works its 
multiplicity within a guiding principle that brings the juxtapositions, their perceptual 
and unexpected conjunctions, to a (consensual) ideological significance on the level 
of the whole film. 
His insistence on exact meaning, I argue, restricts the actual multiplicity of such 
combinations. The engagement by the audience is revealed not to be truly 
multiplicitous, but to be directed, not linearly, as in synch-sound film, but 
nevertheless teleologicaly, according to a particular intention. By adopting the notion 
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of the ideogram, the flexibility of the material is subordinated to a sense of context 
and to the purpose of signification. Any notion of multiplicity, I argue, thus comes to 
be identified in relation to the limit of that context and purpose of signification, and 
thereby looses its potential for 'true' multiplicity. 
Going back to the very first quote of this text, from the 'Statement [on Sound]', in 
which Eisenstein and his colleagues outline their manifesto for an audio-visual 
montage, I understand this limitation on flexibility in relation to the identification of 
the second step of montage: 'the creation of an ORCHESTRAL COUNTERPOINT of 
visual and aural images.' (Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Alexandrov, 1992, p318) I thus 
recognise montage as a dual motion; moving between NONSYNCHRONIZA TION 
and an ORCHESTRAL COUNTERPOINT. This duality of montage allows me to 
distinguish between the motion of nonsynchronisation and the move towards the 
whole film in an orchestral counterpoint. This distinction offers me the opportunity to 
in part agree with Eisenstein, but to identify the limitations of his overall intent also. 
Further, I am able to argue the usefulness of either action in relation to the 
development of my conception of the artwork as material complex. 
I contest that the first step, the nonsynchronisation of the individual elements of 
montage, allows, at least hypothetically, for a conceptual and (inter-)active 
production of the material by the viewer who is in turn identified as a singular and 
experiential subject. The method of NONSYNCHRONISATION, I argue, critiques a 
systemic reading according to an absolute authority. Instead its incongruous 
juxtapositions foreground the production of the significance of the material from a 
perceptually and sensorially individuated experience. In this sense the first step of 
montage provokes the idea of a conceptual narrativisation of the material from the 
cut, in-between the frames. Thus I understand it to question the notion of a linear, 
consensual narrative reality, determined by the connections made in relation to a 
nominal aesthetic judgement. I wish to pursue the potentiality of montage as an idea 
of 'unexpected junctures' produced in the multiplicity of material juxtapositions. In 
this regard, nonsynchronisation inspires my own practice. However, I understand 
the second step of montage to confine this criticality within a specific intention of 
unexpectedness. 
I contend Eisenstein's method of ORCHESTRAL COUNTERPOINT in conjunction 
with the earlier mentioned desire to combine the nonsynchronic 'shots according to 
their dominating indications.' (Eisenstein, 1977a, p64) This conjunction reveals a 
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clear intent and ideological directive motivating the second step of montage. The 
counterpuntal method does not negate the idea of an absolute reality, but rather 
persuades the audience towards a particular outcome. This outcome might be 
different from the 'naturalistic real' of American sound film, but, I argue, it is no less 
teleological, singular and solid. I contest that the counterpuntal method pursues an 
organisation of the 'nonsynchronic' material towards the experience of the film as a 
total film. I contend that the intention of directing the viewer in-between the shots 
'according to their dominating indications' gives the experience of this total film a 
notion of 'the' ideality expected. Thus I understand that although the first step proves 
useful to me in my attempt at articulating the artwork as material complex, the 
second relativises this complexity in its insistence on perceiving the whole film as a 
total and ideal, 'exact reading'. 
In the next part I stage and debate these understandings, and evaluate them 
through an exposition and discussion of this counterpuntal use of the 
(nonsynchronous) material in montage in relation to the notion of the ideogram. 
Thus I consider the orchestral counterpoint as 'synthesis' and discuss it in relation to 
'nonsynchronisation', and vis-a-vis (American) synch-sound film, which Eisenstein 
identified as the 'synthetic' production of uniform and single realities. 
The Synthesis of Counterpuntal Orchestration versus Nonsynchronisation 
In Eisenstein's essay on 'The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram', in 
which he develops his particular ideas on the future of audio-visual combinations, he 
explains in detail the 'collision' that marks the relationship between the individual 
'cells' -visual and sonic shots- as montage, and the dramatic principle, which 
ultimately brings about the concept of the film as a whole. 
If montage is to be compared with something, then a phalanx of montage pieces, of 
shots, should be compared to the series of explosions of an internal combustion engine, 
driving forward its automobile or tractor: for, similarly, the dynamics of montage serves 
as impulses driving forward the total film. (Eisenstein, 1992a, p134) 
This quote demonstrates the dual dynamic of montage, moving between 
'nonsynchronisation' and 'orchestral counterpoint': one refusing a representational 
relationship within and between sonic and visual material shots, the other working 
this nonsynchronous material toward the appreciation of the total audio-visual film. 
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Eisenstein insists that his 'total' film is distinct from the 'total' American (narrative) 
film. He proposes that the dynamic between nonsynchronous parts leads to a 
harmony of an order that is not representational of a simple reality, supporting a 
uniform reading, but rather provokes as 'a dynamisation of the inertia of perception-
a dynamisation of the 'traditional view' into a new one.' (Eisenstein, 1998, p94) 
Eisenstein explains the dynamic complexity of montage's harmony through an 
identification thereof with the ideographic character of hieroglyphs. In his terms the 
single elements of a hieroglyph can be substituted by the notion of his 'cells', the 
sonic or visual frames or shots, understood as molecules of the whole. By 
juxtaposing these cells he forms the montage film according to the workings of an 
ideogram. (I noted this identification earlier. I do find it crucial to reconsider its 
relevance in light of his notion of conceptuality, however.) In this sense, I read the 
following passage describing the ideogram as a description of audio-visual montage. 
The point is that the copulation (perhaps we had better say, the combination) of two 
hieroglyphs of the simplest series is to be regarded not as their sum, but as their product, 
i.e. as a value of another dimension, another degree; each separately, corresponds to an 
object, to a fact, but their combination corresponds to a concept. From separate 
hieroglyphs has been fused -the ideogram. (Eisenstein, 1992a, p128) 
I understand Eisenstein to suggest that the combination of diverging material, in his 
counterpuntal method, is not a material combination, but a conceptual combination. 
He does not undertake a synching of the nonsynchronous material, but rather 
effects a conceptual synchronicity. The mute image of moving lips is not simply 
furnished with a voice. Rather, another sound, for example a musical crescendo, 
might give the movement of the lips a conceptual synchronicity. Such a 
counterpuntal orchestration of sound and image does not present a combination, but 
proposes combinations through its context and arrangement. Consequently, the 
harmony of the counterpoint, is not a material but a conceptual harmony, produced 
perceptually by the audience. In Eisenstein's essay on the 'Synchronization of 
Senses' he stresses that 'it is important to keep in mind that our conception of 
synchronization does not presume consonance.' (Eisenstein, 1977c, p72). 
According to Eisenstein the dissonant collisions find harmony in their conceptual 
perception without becoming consonants in their material experience. I argue that 
this suggests a conceptual narrativising: proposing sense and harmony as a 
conceptual process rather than a representational quality. However, the actual 
dissonance of the montage collisions, I argue, remains relative to the film as a 
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whole. Consequently, the scope of the conceptual (narrativsing) process, I contest, 
is delimited by the setting of the film as a totality. 
I am interested in this contradictory relationship between Eisenstein's enticement to 
perceptual conceptualisation, and the ideological totality of the film, which, I argue, 
acts as a (narrative) directive and limits the scope of any conceptualisation within its 
frame of reference. Although I find his motivation to work against the inertia of 
'traditional views' useful, I remain critical of his intention to establish a 'new' tradition. 
Eisenstein's model for film is the 'cinematographic ideogram,:21 Its parts are 
diverging (nonsynchronous) depictions of an object or fact, which in combination 
produce an expression which is more complex, more advanced, than either part. 
The notion of a 'value of another dimension', I claim, reveals the dialectic character 
of such a conceptual description (Eisenstein, 1992a, p128). The synchronic whole is 
the synthesis of a higher order, produced conceptually between two cells or shots 
positioned as thesis and anti-thesis. Out of their conflict arises the montage film as a 
superior level of expression. This identification of montage as a dialectic dynamic, 
plus the notion that its harmony is not a material but a conceptual harmony, I argue, 
confirms Eisenstein's montage as aspiring to a Hegelian ideality; a spiritual rather 
than a material ideality.22 The progression towards such an objective ideality, I 
contest, is in disagreement with the notion of 'multiplicity'. Instead, the ideographic 
21 Eisenstein's use of term 'ideogram' is a key-element for my employment of his theory and 
work in audio-visual practice. It enables me to stage my idea of the artwork as a material 
complex vis-a-vis his dual notion of montage: at once producing my affiliation with his idea of 
'nonsynchronisation', which in accordance with Saussurian linguistics I understand as 
working on the level of 'signifier', whilst also enabling me to criticise his notion of the 
counterpuntal use of the material, as 'signified', into the film as ideogram, as 'sign'. I 
elaborate on this identification through Barthes' (linguistic) criticism of Eisenstein's montage 
later on in the text. From the specificity of Eisenstein's position vis-a-vis language theories, in 
this research project, I attempt to articulate a different approach. 
22 Despite this identification of montage as working along the lines of a Hegelian dialectic, 
however, I argue that the functionality implicit in the ideological directive marks montage 
towards a Marxist dialectic also. Eisenstein's films do not aspire to beauty in the sense of an 
objective, spiritual ideality beyond a human 'Mangelhaftigkeit' (lack). Rather, they are 
propaganda pieces, which mark the individual as part of the collective, and the collective as 
a necessarily political and material collective. The ideality of montage on that level is a 
political ideality. I am unsure whether this articulates yet another paradox, or merely presents 
the interdependence of materiality and spirituality, and the inevitability of their reversal. It 
appears to me at this stage that Eisenstein's montage films, understood as a particular 
realisation of conflict, conflictual at once materially and in terms of their content, necessarily 
display both, a Hegelian and a Marxist dialectic; at once promoting a 'higher order' and 
placing it within the material. The question that comes up here is whether or not the artwork, 
due to its spiritual foundation, remains always in conflict with a Marxist functionality, even 
when 'portraying' its aims? This question remains at the periphery of my investigation. 
However I consider it nevertheless interesting in terms of my investigation into the status of 
the artwork as a dialectic modality. 
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description identifies Eisenstein's approach to film form as a conflict between 
existing homogeneities and budding heterogeneities, which in their dialectical 
relativity, however, forever articulate homogeneous wholes. 
Eisenstein states that 'by the combination of two "depictables" is achieved the 
representation of something that is graphically undepictable.' (Ibid., p128) I am 
interested in Eisenstein's notion of an undepticable as it suggests to me the idea of 
multiplicitous productions in individual experience. I further aim to pursue the 
potentiality of this elusion of representation, and the implied suggestions of an 
experiential, conceptual component in the montage film. However, I maintain that 
the identification of this undepictable within the progressive drive towards a spiritual 
ideality, refutes an unchallenged multiplicity and limits an experiential individuality. 
The nonsynchronous conflicts 'are impulses driving forward the total film', which is 
not their sum but crucially, still, a perceived whole product (ibid., p134). The conflict 
between the depictables, the cells, as staged by Eisenstein, is an ideal conflict. It is 
overcome in the construction of the cinematographic ideogram as a conceptual 
synthesis. This synthesis, I contest, is found in the 'proper' perception, a perception 
according to the ideological directives impressed by the montageur in relation to the 
montage film as a whole. 
According to Eisenstein, the montageur works from the 'dominant' within a frame, or 
the 'guiding-shot' within a sequence, and influences the audience to experience the 
whole film according to his intentional (ideological) directive. Eisenstein is very clear 
on this point of direction when discussing his 'montage of attractions'. For him film 
and theatre are not media that are 'revealing the playwright's [director's] purpose'. 
Rather, they produce sense in the 'agitation through spectacle' (ibid., p31). In this 
articulation I understand him to affirm his disagreement with 'American' realism. His 
films do not reveal but produce. However, I argue that the intent of their production 
is not truly multiplicitous in the sense of being open to contingent and autonomous 
productions by the audience. I contend that the moment of multiplicity is staged in 
order to be manipulated by the author. Thus I argue, his films are not (tautologically) 
'real', in the sense of producing a narrativising representation, but they are 'real' 
according to his (authorial) intention. For Eisenstein, the first task of cinema is the 
'influencing of the audience in the desired direction through a series of calculated 
pressures on its psyche.' (Ibid., p35) He works the openings between the 
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nonsynchronous cells, according to his intent, towards the conceptual organisation 
of the parts into a total, persuasive whole: the ideographic film.23 
Eisenstein uses films as propaganda tools. His montage films intend to persuade, 
away from a concurrent ideology of realism, but not away from an authorial ideology 
per se. His work might question the hierarchy between sound and image as 
employed and re-affirmed by American sound film. However, I argue that the 
material autonomy he is proposing is a false autonomy, subordinated and thereby 
relativised, to the greater scheme of the film as an ideographic sign manifesting his 
intended totality. I argue that the potential opening between the cells of montage is 
limited by its total production as an ideogram. The stress on context implied in such 
a linguistic identification hinder a truly open production: the ideographic identification 
signals the cultural and ideological context, which delimits the multiplicity of 
perception.24 The ideogram entails a teleological progression towards 
communication, and thus stresses the (ideal) objectivity of its material combinations. 
I argue that the 'ideographic' drive towards an orchestral counterpoint invites the 
undepictable back into depiction through a negative assessment thereof. Absence of 
depiction between the frames comes to be identified as the negative to its presence 
in the shot, the cell, and is immanently redeemed as conceptually present in relation 
to the total sense of the ideographic film. Thus, rather than opening up 
representational meanings to infinite re-assessments, Eisenstein's 'undepictable' 
proposes another form of closure; a conceptual rather than material one, but 
crucially still one closure.2s This closure, I argue, again negates heterogeneous 
23 I concede that I am developing an argument for multiplicitous productions motivated by 
intent. However, I argue that this intent is not bound to an objective (ideal) totality of form. 
Rather, it is motivated towards the contingent production of the artwork. 
24 Later on in this chapter, I consider in more detail the issue of cultural specificity implied in 
the lingUistic, formal and propagandistic premise of Eisenstein's strategy. Throughout the 
project, I consider the paradox between the relevance of a cultural specificity, and the desire 
for a global expression. These ideas hinge on the acknowledgement of the subject 
perceiving and producing the work as an ideological and aesthetic subject, which is singular 
only in relation to its position as an always and already collective subject. 
25 This distinction itself I construe to be problematic given its dependency on a sure notion of 
materiality. My emphasis on the ideological valuations, which determine a particular material 
reality, staged earlier via Eisenstein's criticism of simple realisms produced and affirmed in 
synchronic film making, make apparent that the differentiation between the material and 
conceptual is not clear-cut. I develop and contest this distinction in subsequent chapters, 
when an investigation into the technological developments of the digital surveys and re-
assesses concurrent aesthetic notions of the material and the immaterial. In this sense, later 
on in this thesis, I probe the definition of a material and a conceptual practice vis-a.-vis 'new' 
notions of materiality introduced via the aesthetic and ideological parameters of digital 
technology. 
33 
complexities in favour of single realities, representing unified truths in accordance 
with their respective ideological circumstance. 
Thus I argue the cut is never 'felt' as an absence, and hence does not evoke a 
sensorial and individual engagement. Instead, the absence it creates is a 
representation of absence rather, which is 'filled' in relation to the (ideological) 
narrative concept of the film. The dialectic sublimation of Eisenstein's montage 
theory enables me to critically consider this Hegelian method of dialectic thinking per 
se in order to contemplate the aesthetic judgement and ideological investment 
involved in such a sublimation. The issue foregrounded thus is one about dialectic 
'inevitability'. I am motivated by the question of whether or not it is possible to work 
from sonic and visual nonsynchronous juxtapositions toward an undepictable that is 
non-recuperable: an undepictable that is not representationally undepictable but 
experientially undepictable.26 
I am interested in the notion of an undepictable that engages the subject's 
imagination beyond consensual meaning making processes, without affirming these 
in a dialectical opposition. In other words I want to propose the notion of an 
undepictable that escapes recuperation. In my attempt to meet this problematic, I 
am working from Eisenstein's montage strategy and gauging the criticality and 
usefulness of his notion of an undepictable to my project. My attempt to articulate a 
position, vis-a.-vis his project subsequently leads to a continued critique thereof. 
As regards his 'ideographic' totality I disagree, not with the logic of his argument, but 
with the necessity of narrative collectivity, consensual sense processes, as a call for 
a critical practice. The nonsynchronous conflict however, which produces an 
undepictable I want to pursue further. I believe that the notion of a graphically 
undepictable, which Eisenstein positions at the fusion of its 'cells', in the 'form' of the 
film, allows me to extend the criticality of audio-visual montage beyond its 
26 I am juxtaposing the notion of representation of an 'undepictable', with the notion of an 
affective and particular experience which is 'undepictable'. One formulating a structural 
description, the other achieving a phenomenological 'fallout' (falling out of the structural 
order). With the notion of representation or experience, of an undepictable, I argue, 
Eisenstein's montage theories continually interrogate the relationship between a) a 
phenomenological and a structural perception, and b) the tension between the subject as an 
individual or a collective subject. I understand that my investigation into the artwork as 
material complex necessarily highlights and considers this conjunction of subjectivity. I am 
problematising the duality of the subject having a private and non-reflexive experience in 
relation to a shared representation (sense) throughout this thesis. 
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harmonious return. I want to exploit the term undepictable, and query its production 
for an open, multiplicitous and individual perception of the material arrangement as 
complex. My motivation to formulate a strategy for an art practice that works as a 
material complex without admitting itself to consensual harmony, either of a 
conceptual or a material kind, ensues from the dilemma staged via Eisenstein's 
montage. The seeming futility of this attempt, I understand rather than frustrating the 
production of complex artworks, presents the motivation to produce such work 
exactly. I acknowledge this futility, and at the same time acknowledge it as a 
motivation to produce work, which continually remains a provocation rather than an 
(objective) realisation. 
Thus I continue my interest in this undepictable, and re-evaluate my agreement with 
nonsynchronisity in the next part of this chapter. I recognise here that my position of 
affiliation at the point of nonsynchronisation, identifies my practice within structural 
criticism, whilst my non-affiliation with the synthesising dynamic signals a criticism of 
structuralism's dialectic quality via an experiential, phenomenological, engagement. 
I pursue my investigation from an acknowledgement of this dual position. 
Art as Conflict 
The discussion of Eisenstein's montage-film so far has revealed at its basis a 
dynamic concept of contradiction between the incongruous part, and its relationship 
to the aesthetic [linguistic] system it is positioned in through the identification of 
montage as an ideographic principle. What I recognise as the most crucial issue of 
debate is the dynamic nature of the conflict that characterises and produces this 
dynamic, and which provokes a desire to overcome its oppositionality in the 
production of a harmonious consensual sense. 
In the 1929 essay 'A Dialectic Approach to Film Form', Eisenstein, following Marx 
and Engels, explains this dynamic concept of antagonistic opposition within the 
notion of a 'dialectic materialism'. In his terms, such conflictual mechanisms 
between the parts and the whole, hold in all fields of (artistic) material production. 
According to Eisenstein it is, then, not only the audio-visual montage of film but any 
'thing', and art in particular, that is based on a dynamic concept of conflictual 
oppositionality. For him 'art is a/ways conflict' (Eisenstein, 1992b, p138). 
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Eisenstein understands the world at large according to his 'montage of conflict'. He 
describes the world as a constant struggle of conflictual expressions and their 
resolution in a higher order synthesis of consensual sense, which is immanently part 
of a conflictual situation yet again. Talking about the antagonism implicit in such a 
conception, Eisenstein states that: 
The foundation for this philosophy is a dynamic concept of the things: 
Being -as a constant evolution from the interaction of two contradictory opposites. 
Synthesis -arising from the opposition between thesis and antithesis. 
A dynamic comprehension of things is also basic to the same degree, for a correct 
understanding of art and of all art-forms. In the realm of art this dialectic principle of 
dynamics is embodied in 
CONFLICT 
as the fundamental principle for the existence of every artwork and every art-form. (Ibid., 
p138) 
According to Eisenstein's 'dynamic concept of things' the artwork is a continuous 
'Being' rather than a finished project. In his terms conflict produces the artwork in 
constant 'evolution' rather than as fixed object. His artwork is continually produced in 
the 'interaction of two contradictory opposites'. In agreement with the texts 
discussed earlier, these contradictory elements are the material cells of a work, 
which produce at their unexpected junctures what is graphically undepictable. That 
this dynamic is the fundamental principle of every artwork, I argue, suggests that the 
undepictable, which arises out of this conflictual opposition, too, is a fundamental 
principle of every artwork. In this sense, the dynamic quality that drives this 
continual production, provides me with the undepictable that I want to pursue. 
However, his 'Being' is not simply a continuous production but a progressive 
development: the notion of a dialectical, higher order, synthesis marks this 
development as a purposeful ideal. 
In order to critique Eisenstein's progressive purposefulness, and to formulate the 
provocation for an unlimited undepictable, I turn to Roland Barthes. In particular I 
consider Barthes' critique of Eisenstein's montage films vis-a-vis my critique of his 
montage theories as staged so far. The notion of 'Being' tacit in Eisenstein's 
dynamic concept, I argue, compares to Barthes' ideas of 'signifying', in the sense 
that they both highlight a perceptual engagement. Thus in the next part of this 
chapter I parallel Eisenstein's conception of '[montage] art as conflict' with Roland 
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Barthes' notion of 'art as signifying'. I compare the perceptual dynamic suggested in 
Barthes' 'signifying gaze' with Eisenstein's 'dynamisation of the 'traditional' view'. 
This affords me a clearer identification of the methodological and ideological status 
of Eisenstein's 'dynamic concept of things' and allows me to scrutinise this 'conflict' 
in order to extend its outcome beyond a dialectical return. 
In his essay 'The Third Meaning', Barthes discusses Eisenstein's work in reference 
to its montage strategy. Barthes concerns himself with the still image in Eisenstein's 
films. He considers the dynamic concept within the individual frame. He discusses 
the individual images in relation to what he considers a first level semiotic meaning, 
a second level symbolic meaning, and finally a third level of meaning in the 'filmic' 
where, according to him, sense is made in a singular 'signifying' practice. This text 
will become central to my argumentation against the counterpuntal method and in 
favour of nonsynchronous practice provoking the perception of an undepictable. I 
adopt and extend Barthes' critique of Eisenstein's theories of montage within the still 
image in relation to a theory of the moving image. Barthes' mode of critique, the 
notion of 'art as signifying', developed beyond the still image, aids me to stage my 
argument for a singular and nonsynchronous art practice and against a 
counterpuntal method of combination. However, in order to stage Barthes' ideas vis-
a-vis Eisenstein's theories of the moving image, I am in the first instance not 
focusing on this particular text, but turn to other texts in which Barthes outlines the 
notion of art as signifying in a more general way. This aids me to position Barthes' 
ideas of 'signifying' in the still image, alongside Eisenstein's ideas of 'conflict' 
between moving images, and helps me to situate my practical ambitions in relation 
to both methods. 
Barthes versus Eisenstein; beyond the conflict of montage, towards the 
artwork as a signifying complex 
In his essay 'Right in the Eyes' in which he considers the gaze within artistic 
production, Barthes comes to pronounce that 'the arts in general derive from 
signifying.' (Barthes, 1991, p237) He comes to this acknowledgement via a 
consideration of the gaze, specified as the perceiving mechanism of art, in relation 
to the recognition of a sign. In the text, elaborating this problematic, he states that: 
A sign is what repeats itself. Without repetition there is no sign, for we could not 
recognize it, and recognition establishes the sign. Now Stendhal notes, the gaze can say 
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everything but cannot repeat itself, "word for word". Hence the gaze is not a sign, yet it 
signifies. What is this mystery? It is that the gaze belongs to the realm of signification 
whose unit is not the sign (discontinuity) but signifying [signifiance], whose theory 
Benveniste has proposed. In opposition to language, an order of signs, the arts in 
general derive from signifying. (Ibid., p237) 
Barthes, following Benveniste, identifies art's making of meaning beyond the realm 
of the 'sign' in the process of 'signifying,.27 This quote presents his differentiation 
between a (collectively) readable sign, and an experiential moment of signifying, 
which according to Barthes falls outside shared language, and rests in the realm of 
a singular perception. In this sense, the gaze is an action, a continuity that cannot 
repeat itself, and hence cannot produce what it sees as a sign: collective and solid. 
Rather, it is forever signifying; producing itself continually. The concept of a 
continuous signifying, similar to Eisenstein's philosophy, also expresses a 'dynamic 
concept of the things'. Rather than trusting the solid state of the 'thing' as a sign, it 
urges on beyond its (linguistic) categorisation: 'its space of action is located beyond 
appearance: it implies at least that this "beyond" exists, that what is "perceived" 
(gazed at) is truer than what is simply shown.' (Ibid., p240). This sensing of a 'truer' 
reality, I argue, resonates Eisenstein's distrust of simple realisms. However, 
Barthes' 'truer' does not arise from 'the interaction of two contradictory opposites' 
(Eisenstein, 1992b, p138). Rather, it rises, as a matter of perception, out of the 
material. Although this perceptual beyond is still set in opposition to a structural 
recognition, I argue, Barthes' oppositionality is not necessarily antagonistic. Thus it 
offers a means to critique Eisenstein's conflictual oppositionality, and its consequent 
resolution in a consensual (narrative) sense. 
For Barthes too, however, art identified as signifying, at once elaborates a systemic 
position and swiftly negates it. I argue that Barthes 'beyond', staged in structural 
terms, remains necessarily in relation to the 'shown', leaving any elaboration or 
criticism of its suggestion in the structural realm. However, I understand Barthes' 
dialectical relation to be more critical of its own method than Eisenstein's, and thus 
more useful to my project of elaborating the possibility of a experiential beyond in 
the material complex. The continuous production of signifying is structural, its 
substance however, refers to the field of the signifier and not to signification. It is 
perceptual rather than formal, and implies a continual motion of 'non-resolving' 
production (deferral of meaning), without inSisting on an orchestrated, consensual, 
27 Emile Benveniste Problemes de Linguistic Generale vol. 1 & 2, 1966 & 1974 
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second step of (re-}organising the nonsynchronous material, the cells, into a total 
sign, a total film. Referring back to an earlier footnote in which I identified 
Eisenstein's notion of nonsynchronisation, in accordance with Saussurian linguistics 
to be working on the level of the signifier, I can now, within Barthes' semiotic project 
propose nonsynchronisation as a continual signifying action of non-resolution. This 
affirms my interest in the first step of montage, the nonsynchronous juxtapositions. 
However, this identification also re-stages my disagreement with the counterpuntal 
use of its diverging parts in relation to the whole of the film. Rather than allowing the 
subjects to produce the work in their individual perception, Eisenstein's montage 
formally guides the signifying of its conflict by 'exercising emotional influence over 
the masses' (collective audience) (Eisenstein, 1998, p35). The intention to 
'influence', delimits the nonsynchronous moments of conflict within a purpose. Thus 
Eisenstein's conflictual signifying is idealised and arrested vis-a-vis consensual 
sense. 
By contrast, Barthes understands signifying to declare 'a field of infinite expansion in 
which meaning overflows' (Barthes, 1991, p237). There is, according to him, 'an 
object (or an entity) whose being inheres in its 'excess", beyond structural 
Signification (ibid., p238). He calls this variously: the grain, the punctum, the accent 
or the filmic.28 In every instant the terms describe aspects of the artwork at which the 
material escapes the collectively signified reading, and comes to exist continually in 
the subject's individual experience thereof. It is particularly in his book Camera 
Lucida, in reference to the photographic image, that he investigates the artistic 
production at the limit of structural meaning. In the introduction to this text, he 
describes looking at a photograph of Napoleon's younger brother, Jerome. He 
focuses on Jerome's eyes and writes how he could never communicate to anybody 
their hold on him: 
Sometimes I would mention this amazement, but since no one seemed to share it, nor 
even to understand it (life consists of these little touches of solitude), I forgot about it. My 
interest in Photography took a more cultural turn. (Barthes, 2000, p3) 
28 In his essay on the 'The Third Meaning' (where Barthes acknowledges the theoretical 
influence of Julia Kristeva's notion of the 'unsayable'), Barthes calls this location of material 
configuration an 'accent' and the 'filmic' ('Third Meaning' in The Responsibility of Forms, 
1991, p41 ff). In other essays he refers to these locations of signifying as the 'grain' or the 
'punctum' ('Musica Practica', in The Responsibility of Forms, 1991, p261 ff; and in Camera 
Lucida, 2000). I use the term 'accent' in acknowledgement of these other locations. In the 
next two chapters, Kristeva's notion of the 'signifying practice of the text' develops this 
articulation of a structural critique at the limits of structuralism. 
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This articulates a something in the photograph -or in extension in the artwork at 
large- that is not reducible to a systemic representation and hence to the 
categorisation and organisation of its units for communication. This 'something-
point' of material configuration produces continually an absence of all structural 
(consensual) meaning, which leaves Barthes alone in his appreciation of the image, 
the artwork. This 'solitude', I argue, opens up the possibility for every meaning. 
According to Barthes, the 'punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole- and also a 
cast of the dice. A photograph's punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also 
bruises me, is poignant to me).' (Ibid., p27) Such an accent '-subverts not the 
content but the entire practice of meaning.' (Barthes, 1991, p56) It is where the work 
is signifying: provoking sense processes in the field of the signifier without ever 
attaching them to a signified. Thus, for Bathes, art identified in this way is always 
and continually signifying, never proposing a complete sign. 'I do not know what its 
signified is, at least I cannot give it a name, but I can clearly see the features - the 
signifying accidents of which this heretofore incomplete sign is composed.' (Barthes, 
1991, p42). In his terms at the accent (the punctum, the grain or the filmic) the sign 
is incomplete and continually involves the subject in its realisation. Signifying 
defined as such a process of provisional and continuous realisation declares the 
space of art as an active space of meaning making: a space of infinite production in 
perception. I argue that in signifying there is neither collective sense nor nonsense, 
Rather, it challenges the dialectical oppositionality between sense and nonsense 
and proposes 'non-sense' as phenomenological sense, instead.29 
I propose that in principle Barthes' accent, is comparable to Eisenstein's notion of 
the undepictable. However, whereas Barthes' accent enables an infinite production 
in perception, the directive quality of Eisenstein's montage theory undermines such 
a perceptual infinity. I articulate and confirm this idea via Barthes' and Eisenstein's 
different valuation of repetition. Whilst Barthes denies the artwork repetition 
29 I am using the term 'non-sense' here via Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In a collection of his 
essays brought together in the book Sense and Non-Sense, Merleau-Ponty articulates 'non-
sense' not in reference to rational sense, as its nonsensical opposite, but rather describes 
with it a sense that comes out of 'sensation'. Non-sense, then, is sense produced by a 
phenomenological subject, who exists in the world produced continually through his/her 
sensorial existence in it; a priori outlining a 'life world' and 'intersubjectivity'. In this life world 
the intersubjective subject produces sense through sensory motor actions towards this 
world. According to Merleau-Ponty, these motions are motivated by doubt, rather than 
knowledge; sensation rather than rationality - and so, I argue, is the idea of signifying. 
Merleau-Ponty's ideas of doubt and uncertainty driving the human relation to his/her life-
world and the consequent notion that he/she makes sense of this world, and him/herself, as 
non-sense, is particularly articulated in the central essay of Sense Non-Sense, 'Cezanne's 
Doubt' (orig. 1945). (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a) 
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understanding it to be instead, like the gaze, a signifying continuum, Eisenstein 
understands repetition as central to montage. Repetition and rhythm, for him, being 
the 'dramatic principle', which intensifies the conflict toward the organisation of a 
counterpuntal whole. I argue that the issue of repetition marks the fundamental 
distinction between their projects and allows me to formulate a clearer criticism of 
the limit of Eisenstein's 'conflict' and consequently the limit of his undepictable. 
Repetition Destroys the Expanse of Signifying 
Comparing his theories of montage with concurrent techniques of musical 
composition, Eisenstein quotes from Rene Guillere's essay on the 'Jazz Age' to 
express his affiliation with the new aesthetic of musical structuring through 
repetition.30 He suggests that 'modern esthetics is built upon the disunion of 
elements, heightening the contrast of each other: repetition of identical elements, 
which serves to strengthen the intensity of contrast.' (Guillere quoted in Eisenstein, 
1977c, p80). This strengthening of 'the intensity of contrast' is, according to 
Eisenstein necessary to progress to the synthesis that is the total film. He 
appreciates Guillere's notion of repetition as a key principle for the dynamic concept 
of montage. The montage film as a whole is created through the repetition of 
colliding juxtapositions. Repetitions serialise the conflicts between incongruous cells. 
Such serialisation creates the 'dramatic principle' of the montage film; intensifying 
the conflict and propelling it towards a higher order resolution in synthesis. 
For Eisenstein, then, the repetition of contrasting juxtapositions, establishes the 
intensity of the work and ultimately leads to the 'overcoming' of that (intense) conflict 
in the total film. In this sense repetition stabilises the film, which 'is almost invariably 
derived from a struggle of opposites, linked by the unity of conflict.' (Eisenstein, 
1968, p157) Montage affirms a system of signifier and signified, working between 
difference and similarity. Their repeated duality, I argue, sutures meaning in the 
ideographic sign that is the film, which consequently offers a consensual (narrative) 
meaning. 
I believe the difference of opinion, between Eisenstein and Barthes, with regard to 
the status of repetition, lies not only on a formal level, concerning material repetition, 
but rather highlights an important conceptual difference. With the disclaimer for 
30 Rene Guillere, 'Jazz Age', in Le Cahier Bleu, No 4, 1933 
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repetition in the artwork I understand Barthes to describe his idea of art as a 'true' 
temporality, an infinity, beyond the structural project, working continually at its limits. 
If the sign needs repetition, in order to attain solidity, and the artwork at the accent is 
denied this stabiliser, then the accent can never be a sign but is forever signifying. 
By contrast, I understand Eisenstein's embracing of repetition to affirm his work as 
producing a stable sign. I argue that repetitions support the intentions of the author 
to intensify the 'dominant effects', which formulate the attraction of montage. This 
identification clarifies the dynamic philosophy of 'montage of conflict' not to produce 
an actual non-perspectival infinity. Rather, the perspective, understood as a 
perceptual hierarchy, is produced via the ideological directive of the author, 
supported and solidified by repetition. The montage film's conceptual synchronicity 
is rendered actual, in the sense of effectual and consensual, in this authorial 
insistence. It is realised by the audience, assumed as an ideological audience, 
perceiving the total film according to dominant effects of the author's ideological 
intent. I contest that as a consequence of this intensified directive, Eisenstein's 
undepictable does not propose an accent in the sense of Barthes; it does not 
present an actual undepictable. Rather, the focus on repetition confirms Eisenstein's 
montage as intentional, working towards the recognition of a certain undepictable. 
To verify my articulation of Eisenstein's undepictable as a certain undepictable, I 
turn to Barthes' text on 'The Third Meaning'. Thus, I elaborate Barthes' notion of a 
third level of meaning at the accent, in relation to his notion of a symbolic (collective) 
sense in Eisenstein's still imagery. From there I query the notion of an undepictable 
at the cut, vis-a.-vis this symbolic and this third meaning respectively. This re-
assesses the undepictable in Barthes' estimation of the accent and in relation to the 
semiotic project, and brings my articulation of Barthes' signifying dynamic of the 
artwork in direct contact with Eisenstein's dynamic of conflict. 
In his text on 'The Third Meaning' Barthes differentiates between three levels of 
semiotic meaning. The first level semiotic is identified as a primary semiotic: 
informational and intentional of communication, establishing a denotative level of 
meaning. The second level by contrast describes a plane of symbolism. Symbolic 
referentiality is not achieved in the sense of the meaning of the primary semiotics 
[where signifier and signified refer to each other horizontally in the making of a 
readable message - according to the Saussurian definition of associative relations 
of the parts to each other]. Rather, as an elaborated science the symbol refers to 
context and origin at once [horizontally and vertically - according to the Saussurian 
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definition of syntagmatic relations in which the relation of the part to the whole is as 
important as the relation between parts].31 The science of the symbol considers 
material configuration and (semiotic) placing as a whole, and comes to signification 
through its totality. Barthes understands this symbolic level as a double 
determination, at once expressing an artistic intention as well as performing a 
translation of a common lexicon of symbols into material configurations. The 
symbolic level thus designates the viewer/listener as an individual recipient, whose 
individuality however is defined in relation to the collective he/she is a part of. The 
viewer and listener understands the work at once through his/her perception as an 
autonomous subject, and also reads it through the cultural lexicon he/she is defined 
by. But then, Barthes describes a third level of meaning produced continually at the 
earlier mentioned accent in the process of signifying. 
I am not certain whether my reading of this third meaning is justified -if it can be 
generalized- but already it seems to me that its signifier possesses a theoretical 
individuality. For on the one hand, this signifier cannot be identified with the simple 
Dasein of the scene; it exceeds the copy of the referential motif, it compels an 
interrogative reading -an interrogation bearing precisely on the signifier not on the 
signified, on the reading. not On intellection: it is a "poetic" apprehension. (Barthes, 
1991, p43) 
For Barthes, Eisenstein's still images cannot be identified as producing such a 'third 
meaning'. For him Eisenstein's imagery does not include an 'interrogative' accent. 
By contrast, in that he defines Eisenstein's art as a system of displacements and 
substitutions, he understands it through his ideas on symbolic semiotics. This 
definition elucidates Eisenstein's frames as working on a diegetic, historical and 
ideological symbolism (the symbolic origins of its visual and sonic cells), displacing 
them from their symbolic origin (in a process of 'vertical uprooting') and soon 
reconstituting them in relation to a new symbolic meaning. 
I employ Barthes' theories of the accent in the still image not in relation to (the 
actual) images represented, Eisenstein's cells, but in relation to the conceptual 
associations produced in-between these cells. Eisenstein claims that at the cut a 
non-representable, associative undepictable, is produced by the engaged subject. 
This proposal seems comparable to Barthes' notion of a singular understanding 
produced at the accent. However, as a consequence of my articulation of 
31 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 1986, p122 
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Eisenstein's montage theory as producing a total film via its ideological context 
(propaganda), I contend that his undepictable does not produce a 'third meaning'. It 
does not propose an 'interrogative' accent. Instead, it works on a dynamic of 
displacement and substitution of the symbolic semiotic: nonsynchronisation leading 
to a conceptual displacement of the signifier, which eventually, through substitution, 
in a counterpuntal arrangement is lead to a 'new' signified, expressing the 
undepictable as another symbolic sign, hence rendering it depictable. Ultimately the 
serialisation of such symbolic displacements and substitutions articulates the whole 
film as a 'new' symbolic sign. In this sense my identification of Eisenstein's dialectic 
dynamic of montage as a structural progression that moves towards an ideal 
(objective) totality, is affirmed within the context of Barthes' symbolic semiotic. Its 
material strategy is identified at the level of a symbolic signification of the whole, 
where meaning is made in the totality of its context, and recognition is forged via 
repetition: the serial displacement and substitution of symbolic signifiers. In this 
sense Eisenstein's films force one perspective; a symbolic hierarchy and orientation. 
I believe that this identification of Eisenstein with the symbolic, and the symbolic as 
presenting one perspective, forging one signification, undermines the promotion of 
Eisenstein's work as provoking continually a multiplicity of productions. In this I 
follow Barthes, who, in reference to the single image, suggests that thereby 'we see 
that Eisenstein's "art" is not polysemous: it selects meaning, imposes it, belabors it' 
(ibid., p45). I contend that, due to Eisenstein's focus on the cut, the conflict between 
cells (the still images), not only the potentially polysemous relations within these 
images but also between these images in time is 'belabored' and 'imposed' upon. In 
this sense Barthes' evaluation applies to montage theory as a theory of the moving 
image not only to the single still frame. 
Consequently I argue that the context of the symbolic is the signifying realm of 
Eisenstein's montage film. The absence between frames is not really an open 
absence rather, it is a recognisable absence whose potential ambiguity is resolved 
through the symbolic signification of the context (the collective of the audience and 
the film as a whole). Understood in this way, montage articulates a structural 
absence between differences, resolvable within a dynamic of similarity, articulated 
through the lexical system of the film. Thus I contend that Eisenstein's films are 
artistic productions of equivalences, for which comparison (to the vertical and the 
horizontal simultaneously) is the leading dynamic. His films are, then, maybe not 
conventionally narrative and perspectival (according to a dominant ideology and 
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supporting a concurrent hierarchy of material valuation/aesthetics), but they 
nevertheless express the investment of an ideological and consensual, narrative 
sense. 
The intentional ideology of Eisenstein's undepictable as a representation of 
undepictability rather, I argue, renders the undepictable produced in the conflict of 
montage an aesthetic undepictable rather than an experiential undepictable. It is 
identified immanently within the system of its validation. I contest thus that the cells 
of montage, in collision, do not perform their collision course to infinity but to an 
infinite end. This 'end' is intended by the artist and is qualified by the symbolic 
circumstance of the viewing and listening subject and the work. Eisenstein's material 
dissonance is an aesthetic articulation of 'irregularity', which 'shall evoke in the 
consciousness and feelings of the spectator, reader, or auditor, that same initial 
general image which originally hovered before the creative artist.' (Eisenstein, 
1977d, p33). This confirms the authority of the artist, and assumes the subjects as 
(symbolic) aesthetic subjects, who follow authorial conventions. In this sense the 
nonsynchronous moments in Eisenstein's montage theory are clarified as 
discernible, symbolic, 'irregularities', which are re-aligned, via the overall symbolic 
context of the film, to produce a consensual (narrative) closure: the film as objective 
ideality. 32 
I contest that the 'simple gratification' of synthetic realism, which Eisenstein along 
with Pudovkin and Alexandrov, in the 'Statement [on Sound]', criticised for its 
advertisement of one naturalised reality, is replaced through a symbolic realism. The 
material elements -vision and sound- may remain dissonant, the readings in-
between the frames, at the cut, however are assured as consonances through the 
classification of the material in relation to its particular symbolic lexicon, as well as 
through the identification of the viewer/listener in his/her affiliation to such a lexical 
register. This symbolic frame of reference foregrounds the relationship of the film to 
its particular cultural and ideological circumstance, which, I argue, ensures its 
transparent readability. 33 In this sense I confirm that Eisenstein's montage theory, 
32 I understand the notion of an objective ideal to arrest the critical development of a more 
complex art practice, which could criticise its symbolic foundations and forge more complex 
material and conceptual expressions. In my project I aim to articulate this assessment 
further. In particular it is in the tacit juxtaposition of G.F.W. Hegel's 'ideality' and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty's 'doubt', that a clearer understanding of the relationship between ideality and 
subjectivity is being sought later on in this thesis. 
33 There seems to be a paradox in Eisenstein's ideality with regard to the national confines 
and the international aspirations of his montage theory. 
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although attacking a concurrent (American) hierarchy of material valuation and its 
absolutism, instantly proposes a new hierarchy and totality. 
Eisenstein's idea of 'conflict' constructs 'The Filmic Fourth Dimension', but crucially 
it is one distinct dimension, rather than open-ended n-dimensionalities. For 
Eisenstein the idea of open-ended, n-dimensional, and individual impressions are 
'that dreadful swamp of inexpressibles in which you sink when you have no clear 
aim or when your purpose is not cast in a firm compositional form, expressing one 
basic idea.' (Eisenstein, 1968, p162) In relation to my earlier debate, his notion of an 
undepictable, then, is affirmed not as an actual space of inexpressibles. It does not 
constitute such an 'inexpressible swamp'. Rather, it is assured in its expression 
within the symbolic framework of the film. 
The consequence of Barthes' identification of Eisenstein's montage as a symbolic 
semiotic is crucial to my project. I argue that the symbolic foregrounds the 
correspondence between the individual subject perceiving the work and his/her 
constitution as a social subject. It ties the work to a geographical, cultural and 
political context: to the ideological circumstance of the work. The undepictable 
identified as a symbolic undepictable orientates it within the drive of the total film 
and its symbolic circumstance. This is in stark contrast to Barthes' 'accent', which 
constructs a 'third meaning' that is not derived as a consensual meaning. It is 
neither semiotic nor symbolic. Rather, in the accent, Barthes proposes a perceptual 
autonomy. Similarly, I attempt to articulate the artwork as a material complex, which 
provokes the subject to realise it in his/her individual experience thereof, beyond 
conventional hierarchies of perception, and without being guided by the ideological 
The COUNTERPUNTAL METHOD of constructing the sound film will not only 
not weaken the INTERNATIONAL CINEMA but will bring its significance to 
unprecedented power and cultural height. 
Such a method for constructing film will not confine it to a national market, as 
must happen with the photographing of plays, [which is what they understand the 
'adhesive' sound films to become necessarily] but will give greater possibility than ever 
before for the circulation through the world of a filmically expressed idea. (Eisenstein, 
Pudovkin, Alexandrov, 1992, p319) 
I argue that this quote elucidates Eisenstein's beliefs that his method of audio-visual 
montage will open filmic meaning up infinitively, divorcing it from a local context, and make it 
accessible globally. However, my investigation of his montage practice via Barthes' notion of 
the symbolic reveals montage not as an absence of meaning enabling all meaning, but 
rather as a representation of absence imminently leading to an identification within its 
symbolic framework. In this regard, my investigation of Eisenstein's writings, I contest, make 
apparent a paradox between his desire for a global project of film-making, and the suture of 
his method of montage in the symbolic, which confines its reading to a local situation. 
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intentions of the artist. This presumes that the subject has the possibility to be 
autonomous, and that a material expression can escape recuperation into a shared 
context of meaning, semiotic or symbolic. Both these issues are central to my 
subsequent investigation into the artwork as a material complex. 
With my project, then, I want to promote an artistic strategy which is continually 
challenging hierarchies, ideological and aesthetic, and which refutes both vertical 
and horizontal recuperations. What I am seeking to explore is a (non-dialectical) 
nonsynchronisation of material in order to produce undepictables of n-dimensional 
kinds, and to involve the subject as a contingent and autonomous subject. I call this 
strategy 'disjointing' and stage this term in relation to Barthes' signifying.34 The verb 
to disjoin evokes the motion of atom ising [aesthetic] hierarchies, whilst the present 
participle implies the perpetuity of this action. From here I move on to enquire 
whether Barthes' notion of signifying at the accent presents a critical strategy in 
respect to my ambition. 
34 I am careful to differentiate my notion of disjointing from Giles Deleuze's notion of a 
'disjunctive synthesis'. Discussing the 'Sensible' Deleuze suggests that every sensation is 
synthetic. He understands the sensible (artistic) material as series, which are always relative 
to each other. In Logic of Sense Deleuze differentiates between three distinct types of 
synthesis involved in sensation: the 'Connective Synthesis', the 'Conjunctive Synthesis' and 
the 'Disjunctive Synthesis'. (Deleuze, 2001, pp175-77) Whilst the first two describe the 
sensation in the synthesis of one series or of converging series, the third considers the 
forced synthesis of a divergent series. I differentiate my 'disjointing' from his 'disjunctive 
synthesis' on the basis that his term implies a relative continuity as the principle 
characteristic of the sensible. Thereby all elements are always already in relation to each 
other and any synthesis, connective, conjunctive or disjunctive is, I argue, tautological. 
To bring this critique of relativism to bare on audio-visual production, I refer to Deleuze's 
book Cinema 1: the movement image. There he calls the individual shots (Eisenstein's cells), 
image-mouvement. He describes that all people, places and things, 'in' the image-
mouvement are in motion. However, this motion is not an autonomous fluidity. Rather, in this 
motion all people and things are relative to each other confirming the 'plan of the film'. In 
relation to this, the 'Sensible', for Deleuze, forms a series that are connecting, conjunctive or 
disjunctive. In either case they stage a 'unity in mobility'. In relation to 'the plan of the film' 
they are recognisable as a 'temporal-perspective', a relative fluidity. I argue that this notion of 
a 'temporal-perspective' renders all 'disjunctions' unified in their relative positions in time. (As 
such they are negative to a fixed cinematic interpretation.) (Deleuze, 1997, pp1-28) 
Eisenstein's montage-film understood as a Deleuze's 'Sensible' seems to correspond to 
'disjunctive synthesis'. In turn, 'disjunctive synthesis' reflects on Eisenstein's conflicting 
juxtapositions in montage, where a synthesis is reached by force, from diverging series. For 
Deleuze this unity of mobility is the great achievement of montage. By contrast, it is in 
critique of this unity that I position my idea of 'disjointing'. As a corollary, this differentiation 
allows me to make explicit my critique of relativism. My project does not work on the pre-
supposition of a relative continuity between the complex elements, as series, of an artwork. I 
suggest that this forecloses any complexity outside the series. This critique of relativity is 
more relevant to chapter two and three, where the idea of sense, nonsense or non-sense is 
being discussed in relation to the complexity of artistic production. 
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Barthes' Obtuse Signifying 
Barthes' notions of 'third meaning' and 'signifying' investigated in parallel to 
Eisenstein's idea of a 'montage of conflict' and his notion of the 'undepictable', 
clarifies the ideology and ideality of Eisenstein's montage project vis-a-vis 
symbolism. Barthes understands the symbolic to articulate an 'obvious' meaning, 
suturing the artwork. He promotes the idea of a 'third meaning', an 'obtuse' 
meaning, produced in the practice of 'signifying'. 
Barthes identifies this 'obtuse' meaning, which is continually signifying, at the 
location of the 'accent', the 'punctum', 'the something in Jerome's eyes'. It is in this 
accent that, according to Barthes, perception exceeds the referential motif and the 
artwork does not follow a 'compositionally controlled' expression. Instead it 
configures an experience which he says is too tenuous to be intentional on the part 
of the artist but rather encourages an 'emotive' participation on the part of the 
individual viewer. In this obtuse, the work does not pre-empt itself through the 
intention to (re-)organise its material articulations via a symbolic order. In the 
location of the something which escapes structural articulation, the artwork does not 
arrest its expression in representation, but continues to signify infinitely. Thus, I 
argue, structural hierarchies of signification, dependent on temporary closures in the 
signified, break down. 
The 'breakdown' of meaning in the 'obtuse' is not overcome and determined through 
a lexical (ideological) symbolism. At the accent, the sign, Eisenstein's 
cinematographic ideogram, remains incomplete, and does not perform a synthesis. 
Rather, according to Barthes, it compels the viewer to 'inhabit' the image (the 
artwork). He suggests that 'this longing to inhabit, if I observe it clearly in myself, is 
neither oneiric ( ... ) nor empirical ( ... ); it is fantasmatic.' (Barthes, 2000, p40) In 
relation to the image of Jerome, Barthes positions himself, in these eyes, in 
complicity with the work, engulfed by its materiality, rather than at a distance from it. 
Barthes argues that the lack of a structural reference compels his sensitive body into 
the work, rather than indexing him as a structural subject (an aesthetic subject), 
judging the structural whole of the work. 
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He acknowledges that he borrows his methodology from phenomenology.35 I 
understand him to suggest that at the accent the photograph is understood in terms 
of an intersubjective 'life-world'; where the subject is constituted in relation to the 
accent and the accent in relation to the subject, continually in the present.36 The 
term signifying implies a continuous engagement with the work. The subject extends 
the material expression through his/her imagination and both come to exist 
continually in this engagement. It is this individual sensitivity that, according to 
Barthes, at once reveals and critiques structural limitations. 
I understand that the phenomenological process of the artwork at this point of 
material configuration achieves 'simultaneity' of being: the emotive process of 
signifying produces a simultaneous production of the subject and the work. This 
phenomenological simultaneity is opposed to the differentiation defining the semiotic 
perspective, which makes visible the sign through processes of systemic 
equivalences and differences: codes, symbolic lexica. By contrast, in developing the 
idea of the accent, Barthes does not call on a symbolic context to find his way 
around this simultaneity but rather proposes an individual engagement. Thereby, he 
at once, reveals the unified reading of Eisenstein's simultaneity as a symbolic 
orientation, and proposes a level of criticism that works from a more singular 
position inside the work. Barthes' signifying does not produce a material 
simultaneity, using the material -sound and image- as 'elements of equal 
significance'. Rather, Barthes' signifying produces a conceptual simultaneity, which 
clarifies Eisenstein's simultaneity as an ideal, a representational simultaneity. 
Eisenstein's model for simultaneity is a combinatory organisation of material cells, 
351n Camera Lucida Barthes contextualises his discussion of the photograph at the punctum 
by stating that 'in this investigation of Photography, I borrowed something from 
phenomenology's project and something from its language.' He admits that 'it was a vague, 
casual, even cynical phenomenology' (Barthes,2000, p20). To me it presents nevertheless a 
~henomenological consideration, however vague and cynical. 
6 I am referring to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological project. In the Primacy of Perception 
he describes the world as a 'life-world', which I create through my being in it, and which in 
turn creates me as an intersubjective subject continually at the moment of this interaction. 
Merleau-Ponty talks about the concrete and abstract movements and gestures with which 
we approach the world and through which we construct and are constructed in that world. In 
this 'life-world' we grasp space through our bodily, intersubjective, situation. He writes that 'I 
grasp myself not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and which constitutes 
the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a particular thought, as 
a thought engaged with certain objects, as thought in act.' (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p22) In 
relation to Barthes, I understand it to be such a grasping, actively engaged intersubjectivity 
which constructs the photograph in the accent. I develop my use of phenomenology for a 
complex art practice in more detail in the subsequent chapters. 
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which produce the work through their superimposition.37 The subject is not involved 
in this superimposition, and merely watches it from his/her pre-determined 
ideological position outside the work. 
The loss of perspective in Eisenstein's nonsynchronisation is re-aligned for Barthes 
via invisible nominals of the symbolic (collective) register, never really abandoned as 
an organising principle in the first place. By contrast, Barthes loses his surveying 
perspective by placing himself within the work, by inhabiting it as a 
phenomenological life-world. In this way, his signifying processes propose personal 
and singular interpretations of the work from inside the accent. This seems to him 'to 
open the field of meaning totally, Le., infinitely.' (Barthes, 1991, p44). However, 
beside the celebration of this engagement, he also mentions the futility of its infinity: 
Analytically there is something ridiculous about it; because it opens onto the infinity of 
language, it can seem limited in the eyes of analytic reason. It belongs to the family of 
puns, jokes, useless exertions; indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories (the trivial, the 
futile the artificial, the parodic), it sides with the carnival aspect of things. (Ibid., p44) 
His assertion that on this level the work is 'indifferent to moral and aesthetic 
categories' I understand to suggest that the (obtuse) work exists outside consensual 
aesthetic qualifications and is therefore not, or at least not exclusively and 
singularly, ideologically invested. The artwork in the obtuse presents, then, I argue, 
not a specific 'four dimensionality', but opens itself to n-dimensionalities. These n-
dimensionalities offer me the possibility to articulate the artwork as material 
complex. Such complexity is produced in relation to multiple positions, accents, 
37 To dispel the idea that frames amicably 'blend' into each other, forming sequential 
organisations, which are differentiable, Eisenstein insists: 
For, in fact, each sequential element is perceived not next to the other, but on top of the 
other. For the idea (or sensation) of movement arises from the process of superimposing 
on the retained impression of the object's first position, a newly visible further position of 
the object. ( ... ) From the superimposition of two elements of the same dimension always 
arises a new, higher dimension. In the case of stereoscopy the superimposition of two 
nonidentical two dimensionalities results the stereoscopic three-dimensionality. 
(Eisenstein, 1992a, p141) 
Acknowledging the dynamic of conflict at the basis of his production and pursuing this to its 
logical extension, the superimposition of a two-dimensionality -vision- with a nonidentical 
three-dimensionality -sound- would result in the expression of a four dimensionality. Fourth 
Dimensionality, temporality, I understand to be questioning laws of spatial orientations -
perspective- and promote a kind of simultaneity in which all stimuli are present at once 
instead: a four dimensional space-time continuum. 
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which open the work towards contingent meanings, produced by the subject 
engaged as a sensitive body. This potentiality allows me to articulate individual 
sense not as nonsense, dialectically opposed to consensual sense. Rather, it 
acknowledges any sense as meaningful in its sensitive contingency. 
However, the remainder of the quote hints at the question of the tenability of such a 
disjuncture of the work, and its subject, from its (symbolic and semiotic) 
collective/analytical register: 'Analytically there is something ridiculous about it' 
(ibid., p44). The notion of the ridiculous and the futile implicit in the attempt of the 
singular and infinite, relates back to my earlier acknowledgement of the futility of a 
beyond, implied in the dialectic nature of things. With Barthes, I acknowledge that 
the idea of a 'totally open field of meaning', produced in the material assemblage 
that is the artwork, is futile in the face of the dialectic dynamic that organises analytic 
reason. It seems inevitable that any singular expression finds its way back into a 
shared 'language' and is thus defined in the negative to such an eventual (shared) 
expression. However, as I stated earlier, the futility of such an attempt at total 
openness, I understand, rather than frustrating the production of complex artworks, 
presents the motivation to produce such work exactly. In this sense my choice of 
terms: the 'complex artwork' and 'disjointing', come to be clarified in their distinction 
to a total artwork, produced intentionally through a synthetic material assemblage. 
Conclusion 
The question that remains central to my research into the sensitive contingency of 
sense, produced in the individual perception of the artwork as a material complex, 
then, is, how, a singular and private notion of experience is conditioned, given that 
there is no such thing as a private language, and given that we are all, at once, 
singular and relative to a collective? The articulation of a private experience brings 
to the fore the relationship between the singular subject and his/her collective 
affiliation in the moment of production and perception of the accent. I go along with 
Barthes' notion of the accent in signifying. However, can Barthes' experience the 
accent as the location of the something, which, apparently, has no semiotic or 
symbolic meaning, remain really a radically individual experience? 
This question highlights the issue of interdependence between the author and 
audience, as well as between materiality and its collective cultural framework of 
production and perception, at the core of my project. It probes the dialectic dynamiC 
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of structural, analytical, sense making processes; material and linguistic. Can there 
be a radical accent in the obtuse, in which I singularly and emotively experience, 
make sense of, the work? Conversely is the accent, my sense of it, always opposed 
to the obvious, and bound up in the dialectic with its semiotic and symbolic register, 
and hence consensually meaningful as the negative of that obvious? These 
questions formulate the central issues of my research. In this sense they articulate 
the problematic of the subsequent chapters. Thus to answer these questions, in the 
next chapters, I tacitly query the 'overflow' and 'excess' of meaning, which Barthes 
positions in the obtuse moment, in relation to the (obvious) structural system it 
apparently overflows. 
In conclusion to this first chapter, I acknowledge that the unexpected junctures of 
Eisenstein's montage, interpreted as continually produced undepictables, 
experienced at the junctions of the material assemblage, are useful to articulate my 
strategy of the artwork as a material complex. At least initially they are, if the 
junctures are understood not as ideal unexpected junctures, but as junctures that 
are unexpected in the sense that they produce temporary and singular 
undepictables, then, Eisenstein's montage theory is useful in developing my own 
ambition for an 'open-ended' art practice. However, the ideological investment of 
Eisenstein's project negates this possibility. Instead its ideological interest 
(propaganda) proposes only one reading, one undepictable per pre-determined 
unexpected junction. This undepictable is acknowledged as a fourth dimension, but 
crucially it is still one recognisable dimension, referencing a clear system of 
orientation in time and space. 
I have shown that the depictable created in this fourth dimensional perception is not 
a material but a conceptual depictable. However, decidedly, its conceptuality is 
determined via a symbolic order, assuming as a corollary a symbolically determined 
subject. Hence it produces, at least in theory, one total meaning, one objective 
ideality. (Whether his films really manage to guide the audience exclusively to the 
propaganda message that the author, Eisenstein, intends, or not, is another matter.) 
Barthes' accent seems to propose a more multiple and individual experience of the 
artwork. He does not purport an ideal conceptualisation, but understands the subject 
to be engaged, individually and emotively, in the production of the artwork. Barthes 
is not afraid of a 'swamp of inexpressibles'. Rather, he seems to celebrate the 
emotive experience in the obtuse. At the accent Barthes' subject extends the work 
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from his/her imaginative engagement with it. I am interested in this extension of the 
work by the subject. I am particularly interested to gauge the scope and 
consequence of this extension in the face of the apparent futility to overcome the 
dialectic recuperation of the material and the subject into the collective mould. With 
my suggestion for the artwork as a material complex, then, I want to provoke such 
an emotive and singular engagement. This engagement I understand to propose 
infinite, n-dimensional, extensions of the artwork, from the material junctions, in all 
directions, into the sensitive and contingent imagination of the subject. 
Thus I aim to develop a strategy for art practice that works with the material as a 
simultaneous, non-hierarchical complex, and engages the viewer without directing 
him/her within a pre-given system of referentiality or in negation thereof. In other 
words, I want to provoke undepictables that are like accents, extendable (signifying) 
infinitely and personally and which exist not simply in contradiction to a structural 
whole. Rather, they are produced continually in the imagination of the subject, who 
in turn is identified as a contingent rather than an aesthetically unified subject also. 
To do so I develop Eisenstein's nonsynchronisation into a non-ideologically driven 
continually disjointing effort of perception. A priori I propose the artwork as produced 
in centrifugal motions, from the material junctions, into the emotive and singular 
circumstance of the viewing and listening subject.3a This shifts the focus from 
production to perception and challenges thus the status of the author and the 
ideological intentions bound up in the artwork's production. 
Despite my earlier agreement with Eisenstein's nonsynchronisity, at the end of this 
chapter, my strategy finds no identification in the symbolic framework of Eisenstein's 
montage. Rather, at this stage, Barthes' signifying processes help me to mark out 
my ideas. I identify with the present participle of signifying and the promise of its 
38Eisenstein considers such a centrifugality decadent: 
It is only in periods of decadence in the arts that this centripetal movement changes to a 
centrifugal movement, hurling apart all unifying tendencies that are incompatible with an 
epoch that places an over-emphasis on individualism. (Eisenstein, 1977c, p84) 
By contrast I am excited by the notion of an 'incompatibility' of sensation, and an 'over-
emphasis' of the individual. I understand incompatibility, rather than to shut down 
communication, to propose an awareness to the fragility of its exchange. I believe the notion 
of incompatibility enables me to assert a critique of the total ising ideology which facilitates 
Eisenstein's assumed solidity and unity, and to instead stress the contingency, and 
individuality, the heterogeneity, of any exchange. This articulates my motivation for this 
project. I seek to investigate the ideal of totality and homogeneity for artistic production, and 
critique this ideal as orthodox, in order to challenge concurrent ideological determinations of 
sense and value. 
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continuality.39 However, rather than staying with signifying in the accent, which still 
suggests a reference to the systemic whole, I instead propose the term diSjointing 
as a non-ideal nonsynchronisity. Disjointing seeks to articulate a radical and non-
intentional nonsynchronous signifying that does not aim at an orchestral 
counterpoint, and remains speculative about Barthes' identification of the accent 
also. 
Thus I work on the articulation of an individual sense produced in a continual 
disjointing (an atomising) of consensual (narrative) meaning. The material elements 
as well as the subject are identified in their discrete particularity rather than in 
relation to a totality. In this way I am trying to produce a critique of the relationship 
between material elements -vision and sound- their hierarchical arrangement, its 
aesthetic judgement and the impact thereof on notions of materiality and 
subjectivity. 
It is, then, from an experimental and critical location of disjointing as a strategy of 
atomising nonsynchronisity, taken up through Barthes' notion of signifying at the 
accent, that I propose an opening of the artwork at the limits of structural 
determination, toward a more individual and contingent evaluation. The subsequent 
chapters develop this affiliation and test the scope of its realisation as well as its 
consequence for artistic production and perception. In particular, chapter 2 
concentrates on the material composition of Robert Smithson's film Spiral Jetty 
(USA, 1970). I develop the proposal of the artwork as a material complex, as 
articulated in this chapter, via the consideration of the perceptual complexity of 
Smithson's film. Observing my contingent and particular viewing of Spiral Jetty I 
problematise its form between the heterogeneous complexity of its scenes, and the 
homogenous totality of the film as a whole. 
39 This hybrid term highlights the actuality and the continuity of the present participle. My 
strategy of disjointing seeks to realise both these characteristics. 
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Chapter 2 
Spiral Jetty; Audio-Visual Collage as Artistic Strategy 
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In this chapter I stage and develop the designation of the artwork as material 
complex via an engagement with Robert Smithson's film Spiral Jetty (1970). I come 
to describe the film as a 'collage-montage'. First I contend the film presents a 
complex material expression on the level of the scene (this complex scene I identify 
within the term collage). Second I contend this complexity is resolved through the 
insistent ideological drive of the film, which organises collage's centrifugal 
production in an ideal combination (this motion I identify within the homogenising 
quality of montage). To stage this argument I employ Kristeva's ideas of the 
'signifying practice of the text' along with her ideas on the symbolic. I contest the 
term collage within her 'text', and, distinguishing her symbolic from Symbolism, I 
discuss Spiral Jetty's material complexity in relation to a 'tendential' symbolic rather 
than a symbolic 'order'. This highlights the centrality of the subject in its contingent 
circumstance of viewing, and leads me to critique the ideological specificity and 
dominance of montage within 'collage-montage', and to propose the idea of a 
'temporal-collage' instead. 
Note to the reader: 
This text has been written distinguishing between my contingent viewing of the film 
Spiral Jetty, and my theoretical analysis thereof. The viewing commentary is printed 
in standard font, whilst the theoretical investigation is typed in bold font. This serves 
to allow for two different readings: one concentrating solely on the observation of 
materiality, which is anecdotal and makes no claims to be justifiable beyond my 
individual and contingent viewing, and a theoretical analysis, which follows the 
strictures of an academic argument. 
55 
Introduction 
This chapter takes up and develops further my contestations on the complexity of 
audio-visual combinations as performed in the first chapter. The central question 
elaborated in chapter one, namely whether or not a Barthian 'accent' in the 'obtuse' 
enables a singular and emotive experience of spectatorship, is further evaluated 
here. The relationship of such a singularity to a consensual reading is queried 
through Robert Smithson's film Spiral Jetty, theorised via Julia Kristeva. In particular 
her 'signifying practices' and her ideas on the symbolic, are useful to stage this 
theorisation. What is queried is the status of signifying's individual production vis-a-
vis shared (symbolic) sense making processes. 
The framework of this enquiry is formed by a particular viewing of Robert Smithson's 
film Spiral Jetty (1970). This film was seen as part of the exhibition entitled 'En 
pleine terre' ('On Bare Earth') 'Eine Wanderung zwischen Landschaft und Kunst, 
Spiral Jetty und Potsdamer Schrebergarten' ('A Journey Between Landscape and 
Art, Spiral Jetty and Potsdamer Allotments'). This show featured a range of 'Land 
Art' projects from the late '60s to the present day. It was curated by the Museum fOr 
Gegenwarts Kunst, in Basel, Switzerland, and run there from the 16th August to 16th 
November 2001. I am interested in my individual and contingent perception of this 
film as material complex. Thus this chapter investigates the film not as a historically 
and culturally (semiotically and symbolically) verified artwork, and pays no attention 
to Smithson's, or his critics', statements on the work. Rather, I concentrate on my 
individual and temporary perception of the film at the moment of viewing. I 
understand that this focus on the particular, contingent, perception rather than on 
the artwork as it exists within art-historical discourse, allows me to re-consider its 
aesthetic complexity and hence its criticality now. The individuality and contingency 
of my perception, I argue, allows me a fresh look at the material interplay within the 
work, beyond an aesthetically validated and unified reading of the film. 
For this methodology I am taking my cue from Julia Kristeva's essay 'The Imaginary 
Sense of Forms'. In this essay, Kristeva describes and discusses a particular 
viewing of sculptures by Alain Kirili's which she views 'in the midst of the Gulf War' 
at Commandement XI, in Paris. I am inspired by her idea that sculpture, the artwork, 
'lends its geometry to our projections, body and soul.' Rather than insisting on 
making her perception coincide with an art-historically verified reading, she 
understands the material 'lends itself to the most unsayable aspects of our corporeal 
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experience.' (Kristeva, 1991, pp29-30). I take measure on her method of viewing an 
artwork, and aim to perform just such a contingent projection, 'body and soul', in 
relation to Spiral Jetty. 
I contest this method of viewing, and its issue of the singular and the collective, in 
relation to a Symbolist notion of a subjective perception. Edvard Munch's text 'on 
subjective vision' (1889) taken from his Notebook and Diary Entries 1889-92, allows 
me to draw such a connection. 
The thing is that at different times you see with different eyes, you see differently in the 
morning than in the evening. 
The way in which you see is also dependent on your state of mind. 
It is this which makes it possible for a motif to be seen in so many different ways, and it 
is this which lends interest to art. (Art in Theory, p1 041 )40 
In my viewing of Spiral Jetty I investigate Symbolism's subjectivity in relation to 
signifying's singularity. Thereby Kristeva's positioning of the symbolic vis-a-vis her 
signifying practices is investigated also. Subsequently the conflation of Kristeva's 
ideas on the symbolic with Symbolist philosophies and practices aids me to clarify 
the status of the symbolic in relation to a private experience and enables me to 
probe this private experience in regard to sense making processes. 
Barthes' critique of Eisenstein's montage principally centres around its symbolic 
investment and the consequent foreclosure of its material organisation according to 
a symbolic lexicon forging an intentional legibility. I develop this critique via Julia 
Kristeva's philosophies of the symbolic. Her notions of the symbolic are brought to 
bear on Smithson's film. Distinguishing her symbolic, from Symbolism, I identify the 
film's material complexity within the notion of a neo-symbolism: a symbolism after 
modernity, which finds no recourse to a symbolic lexicon but only shares in a 
'tendential' symbolic. 41 This conjunction is useful to clarify the status of the artwork 
as a material complex vis-a-vis montage's limitations identified by a Barthian 
symbolic semiotic. 
40 This text has not been published elsewhere. The excerpts printed in Art and Theory 1815-
1900 were selected from documents held at the Edvard Munch Museum in Oslo, Norway, 
translated by Ingeborg Owesen. 
41 I am employing the term 'tendential' consciously as an attribute. In the role of the adjective, 
tendency denotes a quality produced in perception rather than a quality intrinsic to the 
material perceived. It suggests the material as a perceptuality and thus, I contend, involves 
the subject perceiving it. 
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In the process of this investigation I am re-evaluating my strategy of disjointing in 
relation to Smithson's film, and in the terms of Kristeva's signifying. In this enquiry I 
bear in mind my critique staged regarding the totality and authorial intentionality in 
Eisenstein's montage theory. As a consequence of the ideological investment 
identified, in the last chapter, as preventing a truly complex practice of montage, I 
investigate the film Spiral Jetty with regard to (authorial) ideological intentions. 
Principally, I explore the sequencing of images, the framing, lighting, colour, pace, 
the sound-track and centrally the relationship between image and sound as the 
material elements of an aesthetic and ideological organisation. In this exploration 
the film's aesthetic valuation and ideological investment are tested by my particular 
viewing of its material complexity. Kristeva's ideas on the signifying practice of the 
text includes a consideration of the autonomy of the subject, working beyond the 
intention of the author and any stable registration of the artwork, producing the work 
continually in its perception. This idea becomes crucial to my encounter with 
Smithson's film. 
However, in this attempt at a perceptual individuality, I acknowledge the moderation 
of my experience as an always already ideological, and hence always already 
aesthetic subject, and thus accept the problem, and possible futility, inherent in my 
attempt at an originary reading.42 However as a principle rather than in the 
particular, the motivation to do so, I argue, performs a shift in artistic sensibility from 
judging the work as an authorial product, to considering it as a production in 
perception, which has the potential to challenge a concurrent ideology. 
I understand my desire to investigate the work in my contingent experience rather 
than in relation to its art-historical verification, in conjunction with Land Art's 
philosophy of the entropic and the temporal. My reason for choosing Smithson's 
work, and in particular to focus on his film Spiral Jetty, reflects his claims that his 
work is unconventional and challenges ideas of fixed monumentality that 
mainstream artwork acquires in the museum space.43 I understand his stance 
42 In the first chapter I clarify my position as a subject within Louis Althusser's notion of the 
subject as living 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology (Althusser, 1993, p4S). For 
Althusser this ideological position is tautological: the subject understands the world through 
his/her ideological position within it. Following him I argue that the aesthetic subject is 
tautological vis-a.-vis Art's ideology. To break such a tautological position and to investigate 
the potential for a subjectivity which is not ideological, or at least not tautologically so, in its 
perception and evaluation of an artwork, is an aim of this research project. 
43 In a sense I am counteracting Smithson's paradox which lies in making a filmic document 
of something he then states is an entropic monument. In his text 'Entropy and the New 
Monuments' printed in the The Writings of Robert Smithson, Smithson emphasises time and 
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against the monumental and the gallery, against 'The Establishment', as articulated 
in his 'Void Thoughts on Museums', comparable to Eisenstein's claims regarding the 
critical position of his montage theories.44 Where Eisenstein states that his montage 
stands in critical contrast to the 'satisfaction of simple curiosity' afforded by the 
establishment of American narrative film, Smithson identifies his work in opposition 
to an institutionalised Gallery practice (Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Alexandrov, 1992, 
p361). Both artists understand their work to critique a dominant (traditional) 
ideology. 
Planning the Spiral Jetty 
Spiral Jetty, 16mm film, colour, sound, Robert Smithson, 1970 
1 
The film starts with colourful textures and patterns which are moving rhythmically 
over the screen. The impression is one of having dived into a microscopic world. 
The textures have a cell like appearance. I am reminded of a biological programme 
on television, where single cell organisms, moving in a liquid substance, are 
observed under a microscope. The soundtrack, which runs parallel to this visual 
material, strengthens my impression of observing a fluidly moving micro-organism: a 
decay rather than space and longevity as the central characteristics of the 'new' artwork. He 
stages how the contemporary artist works in materials that 'are not built for the ages but 
rather against the ages. That are involved in a systematic reduction of time down to fractions 
of seconds, rather than in representing the long spaces of centuries.' (Smithson, 1979, p10) 
In relation to this embracing of decomposition, his move out of the Gallery, onto a salt lake in 
Utah, to build the Spiral Jetty, presents itself as a conscious effort against a monumental and 
lasting work. He knows, that within time, his sculpture will be submerged by the lake and 
rendered 'non-existent' again: it is entropic, following the reversibility of the second law of 
thermodynamics. By contrast, the film, I argue, proliferates rather than decomposes the 
work. To develop and practice this critique, in this chapter, I am foregrounding the 
temporality and contingency of my perception of the film Spiral Jetty. 
Smithson points out that film, since it can be played backwards as well as forwards, confirms 
this entropic reversibility. In his essay 'A Tour of the Monuments of the Passaic; New 
Jersey', from the same collection of his writings, he states that 'of course, if we filmed such 
an experiment we could prove the reversibility of eternity by showing the film backwards, but 
then sooner or later the film itself would crumble or get lost and enter the state of 
irreversibility.' (Ibid., p57) Despite this redemption of film into his general philosophy of 
entropy, I nevertheless understand Smithson's motivation to make the film, rather than leave 
the entropic monument decay, away from the Gallery, if not contradictory, then at least 
duplicitous. However, it is not his artistic integrity that I am interested in here. 
44 Smithson articulates a critique of the museum as a space for art in his essay 'Some Void 
Thoughts on Museums'. There he writes that 'visiting a museum is a matter of going from 
void to void.' (Ibid., p58) He discounts it as a space of experience and instead identifies it as 
a place of representation where art is not alive, a space of action, but dead and buried in its 
'tomb'. He illustrates this thought colourfully in his essay 'The Establishment' where he states 
'in the museum one can find deposits of rust labelled 'Philosophy', and in glass cases 
unknown lumps of something labelled 'Aesthetics'. One can walk down ruined hallways and 
see the remains of 'Glory'.' (Ibid., p79) 
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mixture of electronic sounds and the noise of wind compose this track. The stable 
rhythm and low pitched quality of the electronic sound supports the idea that 
something is moving inside a liquid. The slow and rhythmic repetitions of this track 
and the sound of howling wind enhance the movement of the imagery, and bring the 
micro-organ ism-like patterns to life in my imagination. Particularly, the wind adds to 
my sensation of life-ness. It brings a sense of energy and a notion of life-forces to 
my perception. In this way the sound-track creates the physical context of what I am 
seeing and extends it beyond the screen. I perceive the electronic composition as a 
rhythmic and low pitched synthetic thudding. The artificiality and compressed 
pushing quality of this sound-track supports my sense of looking at something very 
small blown-up under a microscope. In the same way that the visual focuses in on 
and enlarges a miniature world, the sounds too seem to amplify something very 
delicate and almost inaudible: the cell-like patterns appear to be near invisible to the 
naked eye; the low compressed thuds of the sound-track seem to refer to a source 
at the threshold of audibility. This gives me the impression of hearing the isolated 
and boosted sound of micro-organisms through a stethoscope. This sensation 
coincides with the visual observation through the binocular of a microscope. 
Everything seems to be happening at the same time. In this density of events a 
particular and separate world is being constructed here, both on the visual as well 
as on the sonic level. 
This observation of a separate and microcosmic world is interrupted, and 
paradoxically strengthened, through a male voice-over saying: 'Utah'. I am forced to 
leave my position as a 'scientific observer', in a quiet laboratory, peering through a 
microscope, and find myself looking out of the back window of a car instead. The 
sound of howling wind has taken on a more biting character. I am outdoors. The 
wind is now connected with the force of a car rather than with the energy of a 
microscopic world. The imagery presents me with a gravel road, the sand whirling 
up from the force of the car driving on it. I hear the engine noise and the road 
sounds from inside the car. I am in this car, I am part of the image I am observing. I 
am sitting here, right in the middle of the frame, moving somewhere without a clear 
direction. 
Torn-out pages are flying all over the road. A wooden, clock like ticking impresses 
its rhythm. The same male voice-over from earlier enters again. This time the voice 
narrates something about pages. It works around the rhythm of the tick-tock sound 
with its own particular, rather monotonous, rhythmicality. I am not really 
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concentrated on the content of the voice-over, and cannot focus on what the voice is 
telling me in particular about these pieces of paper. Something about the process of 
writing and reading is being said. What seems more important is the relationship 
between the sound of this voice and the imagery seen. The pages are outside, 
whirling about in the wind, whilst the voice is recorded in the studio. No wind is 
interfering with the quality of the recording, the voice talks in a steady and calm 
rhythm, away from the agitation of the visual scene, in an 'acoustic shelter'. I 
experience not a contradiction but a simultaneity of spaciality. My attention is 
focused on the visual pages spinning around in the wind, my imagination extends 
the relationship between these pages as paper material, and the materiality alluded 
to by the wooden tick-tock sounds, conjuring up a sensorial texture of sound and 
image. The image goes close-up onto these pages, flying about in wood-like 
surroundings. I cannot quite discern where I am. Somewhere between the voice in 
the studio and the pages outside in the woods. 
But I am soon back on the road. Again I am looking through the back window of the 
driving car. The tick-tock sound of the wooden rhythm stops here for a while, leaving 
me to find another rhythm in the visual and sonic elements of the scene. Then, from 
this position inside the car, I am presented with a map of Utah. The camera is slowly 
focusing in on it. The tick-tock sound is back accompanying the imagery. It is slower 
and lower now, as if the action on screen has lost some of its wild and random force, 
and become more focused and concentrated in its pursuit. The voice-over talks 
about the relationship between the Salt Lake shown on this map and the sea. It 
narrates the myth of this Salt Lake and places this myth in a historical origin. 
After this visually static and interlude-like image I am back in the car. This time I am 
facing the road ahead, the surface of which is always as yet undisturbed by the car 
driving through it. The next shot focuses in on a stack of books. The sound of wind 
is overlaid and then slowly replaced by the mechanic sounds of a Geiger-counter. 
The subtle sliding change of place between wind and counter presents me with the 
possibility of connecting the visual and sonic material in this scene differently. For a 
moment I am focusing on the books, the Geiger-counter soundtrack pulls on their 
stillness, and propels my imagination beyond sound and image. 
The noise of this radiation search-equipment continues. I am again inside the car, 
looking through the rear window. The Geiger-counter sounds and the imagery of the 
sand whirling up from the road behind the car find a rhythm together. I perceive a 
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moment of conjunction: the wind, the force of driving, the spinning micro-particles, 
notions of radiation, books, pages and detection technology all become connected. 
Coinciding with this connection the film seems to loose its speed, the image and 
sound seemingly halt. This is not a literal halt, the Geiger counter sounds go over 
into the next image, and the film keeps on running (I am watching a video projection, 
not the original 16mm projection), but the pace seems slowed down, and the 
footage arrested, at least conceptually. I experience a pause, as if the scene comes 
to an end here. 
For the purpose of the theoretical analysis I distinguish the above staged film 
sequence as a temporal scene. Admittedly this scene involves more than one 
mis-en-scene, more than one camera position. However, I justify my 
identification by stating that the images and sounds form part of one four 
dimensional moment, of one four dimensional mis-en-scene.45 Even though 
the elements evolve in the time rather than in the space of a mis-en-scene, I 
nevertheless argue that everything seen and heard belongs to this one set up. 
All the elements, sonic and visual, relate to each other in a temporal 
arrangement. However this arrangement is not necessarily linear. There is no 
dominant drive which orders my perception towards a consensual narrative. 
Rather all elements of this mis-en-scene produce a (non-linear) simultaneity.46 
This impression of simultaneity, I argue, foregrounds the film's sculptural 
quality. All the material is available to my imagination as happening at the 
same time, how I order it is up to me. I contest that it is only the slow-down, at 
the end of this scene that enforces a linear development. The conceptual 
stoppage point, I argue, marks a cut that signals the end of the scene. At this 
end point the complex sonic and visual elements gain a purposeful 
orientation. The delineation of the scene organises them in hindsight. Of 
45 Eisenstein's theories of montage celebrate audio-visual montage's four dimensionality as 
a critical development. In chapter one I contend that his four dimensionality lacks criticality 
since it still defines a certain spatio-temporal context. By contrast via Barthes I argue for n-
dimensionality produced in individual perceptions. I propose that in signifying the artwork is 
not a specific 'four dimensionality', but opens itself to n-dimensional imaginations. As a 
consequence of this argument my articulation of the four dimensional character of 
Smithson's mis-en-scene hint at a contradiction between Smithson's theoretical concepts 
and the actuality of his work. This contradiction is argued between the terms collage and 
montage throughout this chapter. 
46 The term simultaneity is imported from chapter one. As a consequence of my elaboration 
of Barthes' notion of a phenomenological 'simultaneity' of the subject with the material in the 
'accent', I can now articulate the Spiral Jetty scene as such a simultaneity. Following 
Barthes' phenomenological description I understand this scene to allow me to 'inhabit' its 
audio-visual material. I am complicit with the footage and peruse it in my contingent 
imagination. 
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course this insight only lasts a short moment, since soon my concentration is 
back on the screen, watching more of the audio-visual material unfold. 
However, I contest that this moment of closure organises the footage viewed. I 
take the sense enforced in this organisation with me into the next scene. In 
the next part of this chapter I debate how this end constructs a denouement 
that relativises the complex (non-linear) material elements in relation to a 
consensual (narrative) order. To stage this argument, in the first instance, I 
discuss the role of the symbolic lexicon in creating this denouement, and then 
consider the symbolic quality of the material elements in the scene. 
Starting from the point in the car, when 'the Geiger-counter sounds and the 
imagery of the sand whirling up from the road behind the car find a rhythm 
together' it appears that a specific relationship is being foregrounded. The 
slowed-down juxtaposition between the images of first books, then spinning 
micro-particles and the mechanical soundtrack of the search equipment 
references science, divergence/radiation and searching. This reference, I 
argue, closes the complex perception of the scene. The synthesis of image 
and sound at this point sublimates (aufheben) the specificity of each element, 
and instead presents one particular sense. I understand this consensual 
sense of science and searching is produced in relation to a notion of the film 
as a whole. I contest that the slow-down and eventual cut of the scene 
references the material elements to the context of the film. I argue that at this 
moment of closure the material becomes organised in the sense of a Barthian 
semiotic symbolic as argued vis-a.-vis Eisenstein's theories of montage in 
chapter one. 
I contest that this focus on (a symbolic) context drives and determines the 
relationship of the parts to the whole, supposedly the whole of the film. I come 
to perceive the images and sounds in their relation to (the) film as a higher 
order reference. The notion of this higher order framework, I argue, organises 
the material horizontally: each element is a context for each other, and also 
vertically: each element refers to the historical, aesthetic and ideological 
actuality of film. The filmic context becomes symbolic context. The footage, 
the material complex, and all the imaginary extensions performed by the 
viewer 'before' this 'symbolic instance', I argue, become organised in relation 
to its lexical register. The non-linear (phenomenological) simultaneity which 
allows me to play with the footage in my imagination, producing my own 
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conjunctions and establishing my own emphasis, is being forcefully (re-
)organised at this point. In this (re-)organisation a linear development is will-
fully imposed, and the footage attains a consensual (narrative) structure. 
I am being reminded of the 'grand narratives' which support such a 
consensual reading: the film Spiral Jetty, Film in general, Art, Nature, etc .. 
These symbolic narratives, I argue, come to influence and limit my perception. 
Thus the individual elements: the soundtrack of the Geiger-counter, the 
thudding electronic music, the images of books, the sand, the road, the car, 
etc., insist on a consensual sense produced by me as a collective (symbolic) 
subject, rather than allow for an imaginary production through each individual 
and contingent viewer and listener. Following Barthes, I read the end of the 
scene as a symbolic juncture which articulates an obvious meaning, suturing 
the artwork.47 I cannot stray anymore, or else ... and anyway, any imaginary 
fooling about would always be re-captured as a negative to this lexical 
orientation, simply confirming it in its negation. 48 
This sublimating re-organisation of simultaneous material complexities brings 
me back to Eisenstein's theory of montage. I contend Smithson's film to be 
following an Eisensteinian strategy of montage, where simultaneous, 
complex, material expressions, suggestive of Eisenstein's nonsynchronous 
cells, are organised and rendered legible according to the grand narrative 
identified as the cultural, geographical, political, i.e. the ideological 
circumstance of its viewing. Thus conflating Eisenstein and Barthes via 
Barthes' symbolic semiotic in an encounter with Spiral Jetty, I could pursue 
47 According to Barthes: 
The symbolic meaning ( ... ) compels my recognition by a double determination. It is 
intentional ( ... ) and it is selected from a kind of general, common lexicon of symbols; it is 
a meaning which seeks me out -me, the recipient of the message, the subject of reading-
a meaning which proceeds from Eisenstein [the author, i.e. Smithson] and moves ahead 
of me. It is evident, of course ( ... ), but evident in a closed sense, participating in a 
complete system of destination. I propose to call this complete sign the obvious 
meaning. (Barthes, 1986, p44) 
48 The negative is understood in terms of Hegel's 'negative'. For him the negative: death, 
destruction, decay, etc. is not an autonomous action which finishes the relationship of the 
subject with life, the nation-state, growing etc .. Rather, the negative is a necessary stage in 
the forever-being of the totality of life and the nation-state. This forever is expressed in the 
Idea. 'What is true is eternal in and for itself, neither yesterday nor tomorrow but now in the 
sense of absolute presence, in the Idea, what may seem lost is eternally preserved.' (Hegel, 
1953, p95). One of the questions of this project is to enquire whether or not it is possible to 
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the identification of Spiral Jetty as a montage film. However, before settling on 
this identification, and calling Spiral Jetty strictly within Eisenstein's theory of 
montage I consider the material complexity of the film 'prior' to the moment of 
denouement and its backward operating organisation. I argue that the 
complexity I encounter is not analogous to the intentional nonsynchronisity of 
Eisenstein's first step of montage. Rather I contest that on the level of the 
scene, Spiral Jetty works along a different complexity and according to a 
different symbolism. I develop the notion of such a different complexity in the 
term collage and contest the particularity of its symbolism in the next part of 
this chapter. 
The audio-visual material prior to its symbolic organisation offers itself to the 
viewer's imagination. I contest that the scene, without the closure, and hence 
its (narrative) organisation in reference to the whole of the film, invites 
imaginary play and centrifugal motions.49 On this level, the material is 
simultaneous. I am complicit with the film, in Barthes' terms, I inhabit the 
material. There is no ideal organisation that determines my reading position. I 
am producing the material as a phenomenological rather than a structurally 
indexed subject, from my position within it, and in my contingent 
circumstance. 
What I am initially suggesting here then, is that on the level of the scene the 
film appears to be working in relation to Barthes' 'third level of meaning', as 
discussed in chapter one. This third level, where the 'signifier possesses a 
theoretical individuality', Barthes calls the 'obtuse' (Barthes, 1991, p43). He 
explains it to be produced continually in the process of signifying. An obtuse 
sense is produced through a subjective and experiential practice of the 
material. This experience is, according to Barthes, crucially, not an 
'intellection' but a "poetic" apprehension' (ibid., p43). Further, although the 
closure, to borrow his terms, 'belabors' the material and 'imposes' a symbolic 
(consensual) meaningfulness, my experience of the material prior to this 
point, I argue, is similarly, sensorial rather than intellectual, individual rather 
produce an expression of material complexity, which is forever-being, without being tied up 
with the positive totality of the Idea. 
49 In chapter one I propose the artwork as produced centrifugal motions of perception. I 
suggest that the artwork is perceptual rather than a product, and that the audience works 
from the material presented centrifugaly into his/her contingent circumstance of perception. 
Here I develop this term and I contest it in relation to the perceptual complexity of the 
simultaneous material in Spiral Jetty. 
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than collective, and practical (ibid., p45). 
I argue thus that my perception of the scene, prior to its organisation in the 
symbolic, is too tenuous to be intentional on the part of the artist in the same 
sense that Barthes identifies the accent to be too tenuous for such 
intentionality. For Barthes the accent is the moment in the artwork which 
refuses a shared sense. It is the point in which he remains solitary and unable 
to articulate his sensation. Following his argument I am tempted to 
understand the scene as a 'tapestry of accents', which I inhabit as a 
phenomenological subject. I connect these accents and extend them 
imaginatively, unperturbed by (authorial) intentionality, and uninterested in a 
collective, symbolic and lexical reading thereof. However, I am aware of a 
problem of tenability here. In the conclusion to my first chapter I ask 'how a 
singular and private notion of experience is conditioned, given that there is no 
such thing as a private language, and given that we are all, at once, singular 
and relative to a collective?' The question of a private experience brings to the 
fore the relationship between the singular sensation and the collective sense, 
the symbolic, the aesthetic and its ideological investment. This points to the 
conflation of the subject as a singular and collective subject, and the difficulty 
of producing sense outside the collective without confirming its viability from 
that outside position. This (re-)issues the problem of the negative.50 The 
apparent futility to overcome this problem is my motivation to understand the 
relationship between the complexity of the scene and the sublimation of such 
complexity in relation to the whole film Spiral Jetty, in the denouement of the 
scene. 
I am aware that Barthes' third meaning stands in relation to a first and second 
meaning. His theory does not critique and remove the primary semiotic and 
the symbolic semiotic, but finds in the third meaning only an occasional 
position which escapes rather than refutes the first two. His accents are, in his 
terms, an overflowing of structural meaning, and are thus identified in relation 
50 The dynamic I am pointing to is the dialectic dynamic described earlier via Hegel's 
negativity. This dynamic predicts that any position taken up in denial of another necessarily 
implies not a total negation of that position but rather involves both, the negative and the 
positive position, in the formation of a new totality. If I say 'no' by implication I acknowledge 
the position of 'yes'. My no, according to Hegel, does not abolish the idea of yes. Rather, the 
two are carried together as potentialities within the Idea, their conflict forever pushing 
transformations towards a higher totality of Spirit, the essence of which is this action of 
conflict and transition. (Hegel, 1953) 
66 
to a flow of meaning. The scene understood as a tapestry of accents, I argue, 
would identify the scene within this negativity also. However, I understand my 
perception of the material complexity on the level of the scene not in excess 
of the (symbolic) sense produced at its closure, confirming its consensual 
meaning in the negative. Instead, I argue that the material elements possess a 
perceptual autonomy. Consequently, rather than calling the material 
simultaneity a tapestry of accents, I propose it as a 'temporal-collage': a four 
dimensional assemblage of complex simultaneous elements. I suggest that 
such assemblages are 'opened' in a disjointing-like effort by the complicit 
subject experiencing the work in a 'bricolaging' production of perception.51 My 
perception produces the sonic and visual elements of this scene: the sound of 
wind, the force of driving, the flying particles, notions of radiation,. books and 
detection technology. In this phenomenological engagement it is not the 
nominal objects (books, particles, technology, etc.,), that I connect to each 
other in my perception, rather, it is the perceptual objects (my contingent 
experience of the books, the particles, etc.,), that I bring together in my 
viewing. I contend that my viewing of these elements does not produce a 
horizontal or vertical organisation (semiotic or symbolic), rather, I 'build' 
(brico/er) them together as simultaneous sensorial elements and extend them 
51 I employ the term 'bricolaging' bearing in mind Claude Levi-Strauss' use of 'brico/eur' and 
'brico/age'. In his book The Savage Mind, Levi-Strauss employs brico/age in relation to 
mythical thought. In his terms 'the "bricoleur" is adept at performing a large number of 
diverse tasks; but unlike the engineer he does not subordinate each of them to the 
availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project.' 
Rather, for Levi-Strauss the process of brico/age is contingent, the brico/eur makes do with 
'whatever is at hand'. (Levi-Strauss, 1970, p17) In my use of the term I am employing this 
sense of a contingent and individual production of the artwork as purposeless 'raw material'. 
Adopting his ideas I seek to stress the process of production rather than the outcome, the 
brico/age. In the context of my research project, then, the verb brico/er (to bricolage) is 
employed to articulate the idea of perceptually building the artwork from its discreet sensorial 
elements. I use the verb in its present participle, bricolaging (brico/ant) , to denote the 
continuity of the activity of producing, through cutting and pasting different material elements, 
in this case sonic and visual footage, a temporal-collage work. I am arguing that the subject 
experiencing a collage, plastic or audio-visual, is complicit in its production via his/her 
bricolaging, cutting and pasting, effort of perception. 
Also, with this term I import Derrida's sense of it as criticality. In Writing and Difference, 
commenting on Levi-Strauss' notion of brico/age, Derrida articulates the idea 'that bricolage 
is critical language itself.' (Derrida, 1978, p285) Again however, I understand this critical 
activity of brico/age not in reference to the 'building' of a myth, the production of a poetic 
meaning, but in terms of its processes of critical engagement. Bricolaging in my terms 
denotes a critical practice in perception. In this sense, the conflation of brico/er with 
disjointing is neither an accident nor a contradiction. Rather, in order to signal that the 
interest is not in bringing brico/er to a conclusion, to a distinct brico/age, the continuous effort 
of disjointing, which takes apart and restages any connected material, is part of its practice. 
The interest is not to produce an object, but to continually produce, from parts but not in 
relation to a whole. 
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'outward' in my imagination. 
In this way I differentiate between a tapestry of non-dialectical accents on the 
level of the scene and the moment of closure, which organises this tapestry in 
relation to the whole film. Whilst the first presents a complex material 
expression, the second resolves this complexity through its ideal 
combination. This latter mode of production, I argue, confines the sensorial 
elements, as (semiotically) nominal objects, within the film as a symbolic 
whole. In this way it produces the material within the homogenising quality of 
montage. In distinction, I call the complex sensorial assemblage on the level 
of the scene a 'temporal-collage'. 
Fig. 1 
Temporal-Collage Key 
The outward pointing arrows illustrate the 
centrifugal motions in which the subject 
produces the artwork. The material is 
extended in his/her contingent and 
imaginative perception. This elucidates the 
term 'temporal' in relation to an individual 
process of perception (continually disjointing 
and bricolaging the material complexity). 
The assemblage of differently shaped and 
over- and under-laid elements illustrates the 
complex heterogeneity of the artwork. This 
elucidates the term 'collage'. The organisation 
of these heterogeneous elements is proposed 
as contingent and individual. 
The subject is complicit in this process. 
He/she is simultaneous with the material. In 
collage temporality refers to the non-linear 
time of individual perception. 
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Fig. 2 
Montage Key 
The downward pointing arrows illustrate 
viewing and listening as an 'inward' orientated 
perception where the focus is on the relation 
of the elements to each other (rather than in 
relation to an 'outside', an individual and 
O focus on the cut, between the material D elements, explains the term 'montage'. 
The tension is between the material and leaves 
the subject in a distanced (meta-) position. 
The horizontal arrow illustrates this position. 
From there the cuts between heterogeneous 
elements are organised according to the 
intentions of the author, realised in relation to 
a symbolic register, achieving a homogenised 
perception by the (symbolic) audience. In 
montage temporality refers to a linear time line 
produced collectively according to the 
'directions' of the author. 
This differentiation presents the main basis and methodology for the 
examination of Smithson's film in this chapter. I stage the film between this 
idea of a temporal-collage, the simultaneous and non-differentiated 
production of the material complex of the scene, and montage, the moment of 
closure which delineates and orders the scene in relation to the film as a 
whole. I engage and elaborate on this initial understanding in my analysis of 
the film's material expression to test the tenability and consequence of its 
proposition. To do so I investigate the individual scenes which compose the 
film Spiral Jetty. I consider the positioning of these scenes in relation to each 
other, and in relation to the film as a whole. 
In the next part, then, I re-articulate the film's collage and montage moments 
in regards to their aesthetic strategies of assemblage: I contest the 
relationship between their two modes of material practice, and come to a 
clearer understanding of their respective function within this film. To do so I 
further contemplate the film's material composition and investigate Spiral 
Jetty vis-a-vis Kristeva's four signifying practices: 'narrative', 'metalanguage', 
'contemplation' and 'text'. In particular, for the next part, I develop Barthes' 
signifying accent, and my initial identification of collage as a tapestry of such 
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accents, via Kristeva's notion of signifying as a textual practice. 
2 
The sound of the Geiger-counter which constructed the symbolic denouement of the 
last scene, gets taken up in an electronic composition in this next scene. I am in a 
museum-like space now. Presumably I am in the paleonthological department of a 
natural history museum. But this could also be the rooms of a collector's stately 
home. I am presented with skeletons of dinosaurs standing and hanging against a 
red background. The camera is slowly panning around the room. The low lighting 
and red tinge of the imagery gives the scene an intensity and discomfort. The 
electronic soundtrack is sombre and low, almost scary in its terse composition and 
dark timbre. The potential of this collection being private adds an overall sense of 
spookiness and tension. The obsessiveness, which a private display of dinosaur 
skeletons suggests, makes me uneasy. The voice-over, which breaks into the 
imagery at this moment is talking on a very personal level. The voice narrates in the 
first person singular. Rather than talking about the skeletons and referring to the 
dinosaurs in a scientific manner, as might be expected from the visual setting, it 
relates a more personal story about existence and change. In the meantime the 
camera singles out, and starts to circle around, one particular dinosaur skeleton in a 
glass-box. 
3 
A short while after that we are back on the road. The colours and the lighting seem 
very bright now. I am looking through the windscreen of the car. The driving ahead 
takes away some of the stuffiness and austerity experienced inside the 'museum'. I 
am being shown a map of the area. It seems to be an old map. The voice-over 
draws my attention to the fact that the salt lake is not marked on it. There is no lake 
visibly marked on the map despite the fact that I am looking at a plan of its very 
location. This presents me with the temporality of the lake's situation. It leads me to 
assume that the lake was not always here as a distinct lake, separate from the sea, 
suggesting also that it might vanish, and become part of the sea again. I am 
confronted visually with the idea of change and existence. An electronic soundtrack 
runs simultaneous to the image. This track is uncomfortable, composed of low 
frequency sounds with higher pitched tones interrupting its flow. I am presented with 
a newer map now, showing the Salt Lake in its present state. The voice-over talks 
about the Salt Lake seen on the map in a very scientific manner and starts to 
describe where the Spiral Jetty will be constructed. I am following the visual surface 
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of the map whilst listening to this voice-over talking about the origins of the Salt Lake 
and the planned design for the Jetty. The electronic sound-track, although fading 
down a little when the voice is talking, builds a stable background to this sequence, 
bestowing the two dimensional image a spatial extension. Now the film presents the 
image of pink water parallel to the undulating sound of water. A voice-over explains 
the scientific reasons and data of the pink colour of the lake. This explanation is 
mixed visually with the image of a man's shoes, walking. I am watching this man 
surveying the area, whilst the voice over informs us about the planning of the Spiral 
Jetty. 
I understand this part as two scenes, two 'temporal-collages' juxtaposed 
according to the principle of montage, performing a montage of collaged 
material: a 'collage-montage'. 
Fig. 3 
Collage-Montage 
1. 2. j 1. 
Key 
1. Illustrates the complex 
heterogeneity and 
centrifugal dynamic which 
produces the film as a 
temporal-collage on the 
level of the scene 
2. the downward arrow 
illustrates the 'inward' drive 
at the cut between the 
scenes, which establishes 
a montage collision and 
renders the scenes' cells in 
relation to the overall 
montage drive 
As a consequence of my critique of Eisenstein's montage theory with regard 
to the dialectic dynamic imposed at the cut, I am critical of the cut between the 
scenes in Spiral Jetty. I contest that the conflictual juxtaposition directs my 
understanding of the two scenes toward an ideal resolution. Such a 
resolution, I argue, limits my effort of disjointing and bricolaging to the 
purpose of an ideal (consensual) sense. This purposefulness hinders my 
imaginative proliferation of the material elements. The 'museum-scene' is 
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delineated and orchestrated by the 'outdoor-scene' (the images of the Salt 
Lake), and vice-versa. The centrifugal extensions, expressed as arrows, and 
the simultaneous materiality, presented by the assemblage of different 
shapes, are arrested and sublimated at the moment of montage. I contend that 
at the 'ideal juncture', where the scenes meet, a homogeneous (collective) 
sense is forged at the expense of more varied sense making processes.52 To 
develop my critique of this sublimation I recall my experience of the scenes in 
themselves and consider them in relation to collage as a strategy which 
challenges the total ising dynamic of the montage principle. 
I have previously argued that the complex and seemingly unintentional 
material assemblage of the scene provokes a simultaneous position. I 'inhabit' 
the museum; I 'inhabit' the car. I contest that the scene's visual and sonic 
material is understood from this inhabiting position. I extend the material from 
this complicity in a bricolaging and disjointing effort, imaginatively. I come to 
this assertion via Barthes' signifying in the accent. However, I realise that 
thinking via his accents, I still confirm a consensual thread (first and second 
order semiotic meaning) underpinning and delimiting my imaginings. At the 
accent my perception is not autonomous, but only in excess of this thread 
that holds me to the collective and threatens to imminently recuperate my 
individual and contingent sense making process within the grasp of 
consensual meaning. Thus although initially borrowing Barthes' idea of 
signifying, and siding with its active continuity, I acknowledge the need for a 
different theoretical position if I want to avoid such a dialectic recuperation. 
I contest that Julia Kristeva offers me a tool to re-think and develop Barthes' 
signifying and accent, via her own consideration of signifying practices. In her 
thesis on the Revolution of Poetic Language she formulates four different 
signifying practices: narrative, metalanguage, contemplation and textual. 
Whilst the first three work on the basis of a collectively redeemable 
expression, the fourth seems to propose a more complex, temporal and 
individual engagement. It is this fourth practice that I want to discuss in 
conjunction with the term temporal collage. But first I need to rule out the 
other three in relation to collage. 
52 In the previous chapter I argue that the unexpected junctures of the cells in Eisenstein's 
montage theory are ideal rather than unexpected, since they are determined in relation to the 
film as an objective totality. 
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According to Kristeva in the signifying practice of the 'narrative' 'material 
discontinuity is reduced to correlations between opposites (highflow, 
good/bad, inside/outside) which delineates narratives geography, temporality, 
plot, etc.' (Kristeva, 1984, p90). I dismiss her narrative in relation to collage, 
since, as she says, despite the fact that this signifying practice may include 
various materialities and sensations, these are ultimately 'poured into the 
rigid molds of a nondisjunctive structure.' (ibid., p90) I understand this 'rigid 
mold' of the narrative to corroborate my articulation of the grand narrative, 
produced in the symbolic moment at the cut between the scenes. I understand 
this to clarify the dynamic of montage as a nondisjunctive but homogenising 
practice.53 For Kristeva, the narrative is delineated as a weak signifying 
process as it centres on an axial position. I adopt this idea of weakness here 
also for montage, since the montage moment too organises the complex 
material axially, and weakens the potential to roam. The horizontal arrow in 
my figure 2 illustrates this axial, nondisjunctive structuring of various 
materialities in montage. 
The second practice, 'metalanguage', according to Kristeva, is the guarantor 
for the symbolic system. It places the subject as a fixed subject outside the 
text: 'he hovers above it' and is 'absent from it' (ibid., p95). For Kristeva the 
symbolic systematicity eliminates heterogeneity and forges omnivalence. 
Conversely the fixed position of the subject is the only guarantee for the 
symbolic to work. I read her to suggest that the symbolic demands as well as 
constructs the subject as a fixed subject. This subject is confined to the 
socio-historical context of his/her symbolic register and reads the text from 
this 'meta-'position. This fixed and detached position of the subject differs 
from my notion of a contingent and active subject inhabiting the text, the 
artwork, as collage. I understand Kristeva's metalanguage in relation to 
montage's ideological specificity. It clarifies the symbolic closure at the 
53 Thus following Kristeva's description of narrative practice, I clarify my conclusion on 
montage as possessing a homogenising quality which erodes the complexity of its parts into 
a dialectic synthesis, within her term nondisjunctive structure. Eisenstein's (unexpected) 
junctures are idealised ultimately in relation to the orchestrated homogeneity, the total film. 
This totality, I argue, secures the context or structure of these junctures and thus renders 
them nondisjunctive, in the sense of only relatively disjunctive within the framework of the 
total film. I have argued this relativity in relation to Deleuze's 'disjunctive synthesis' in chapter 
one. Here I can confirm, via Kristeva, that the cut never really produces unexpected 
junctures, but only ever 'correlations between opposites' within the 'plan of the film' 
(Deleuze, 1997, pp1-28). This, I argue, achieves montage's (consensual) narrative 
character, and forges the ideological homogeneity of its expression. 
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moment of the cut between scenes and confirms montage's symbolic lexicon 
as a systematicity which constructs and limits its material within a notion of 
omnivalence and consequently delineates its subject as a historically fixed 
and context bound subject at a distance.54 This clarifies my criticism against 
the contextual rigidity of montage as articulated in chapter one. Later in this 
chapter, I am re-considering this fixed symbolic order in relation to 
Symbolism as a 'tendential' quality, inviting a generative rather than a lexical 
reading. 
But to remain within Kristeva's signifying practices for now, the last to rule 
out as a model for collage is 'contemplation'. It is in relation to contemplation 
that Kristeva employs Aufhebung, sublimation. It is precisely this term which I 
introduce as the central problem of this thesis in my introduction. I place this 
term more particularly in relation to montage in chapter one. The problem of 
sublimation lies in the very conception of the symbolic. Kristeva writes 'this 
Aufhebung of the instinctual chora is always already inevitably and 
inseparably symbolic.55 The chora's closure within contemplation condemns 
contemplation to meaning, disarticulating it, only to return to it, 
disenchanted.' (Kristeva, 1984, p96) This sketches contemplation as a 
dialectic activity; negation continually arriving at a positive, thesis and 
antithesis. Any particularity of expression is 'swallowed' continually in this 
circular dynamic, which she calls a 'ring': 'eternally returning, perpetually 
trapped.' (Ibid., p95) The material is secondary to this dynamic, sublimated by 
54 The notion of historical and contextual specificity of montage is pointed out as a paradox in 
chapter one. There I state how Eisenstein's desire for an international practice of film-making 
seems to run counter his own theory. Montage, I argue, dependent as it is on a symbolic 
register for the communication of its ideological message, particularises the viewer in his/her 
social-historical context rather than allowing for it to be received by any viewer, anywhere. Its 
insistence on omnivalence via the symbolic determines the subject locally. In relation to this 
montage is identified as a metalanguage as articulated by Kristeva. The paradox of locality 
and globality, which such a metalinguistic understanding implies, is clarified and developed 
in relation to the context of the network age in chapter 5. 
55 The 'chora' is the key idea of Kristeva's semiotic. It is the basic principle that allows 
individual expression whilst securing it within (consensual) sense. Kristeva articulates this 
dual role of the semiotic chora when she describes it as 'a nonexpressive totality formed by 
the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated.' 
(Kristeva, 1984, p25) For Kristeva the chora is the pre-condition of language. It is a semiotic 
device which pre-cedes consensual expressions and permits them at the same time. 
Through the semiotic chora the subject is 'always already involved in a semiotic process' 
(ibid., p25). Thus it is in relation to this chora, closing it temporarily, that the subjective 
expression attains consensual meaning. According to Kristeva it is in relation to this idea of 
the chora that the subject works the signifying practice of contemplation; depending on it as 
well as refusing it. However, as negativity in a Hegelian sense, the refusal is not a denial, but 
part of the forever dynamic character of the chora. 
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its symbolic totality. Contemplation, according to Kristeva, is responsible for 
producing and keeping the ideological, hierarchical status quo of the state, or 
any other ideological apparatus. She concedes that the signifying play within 
contemplation shifts and changes, drifting (derive), without however, ever 
breaking the 'communicative function'. In this same sense I concede montage 
shifts meaning and re-articulates expressions. However, due to the fact that it 
remains tied down to the symbolic register, montage too is 'condemned' to 
(consensual, narrative) meaning; any disarticulation returning back into a 
collective articulation all the time, whilst the particular nonsynchronous 
material elements are sublimated to this dialectic dynamic. 
I contest that all three signifying practices articulate characteristics so far 
established and discussed in relation to montage: the narrative supports the 
axial nondisjunctive structuring of montage; metalanguage identifies its 
distantly fixed subject; and contemplation explains its sublimating quality and 
dialectical dynamic. I understand that all three signifying practices are tied up 
with each other through their interdependence with the symbolic register. This 
dependence also identifies them in relation to montage. I contend that 
although the first scene of Spiral Jetty mainly highlights the narrative and 
metalinguistic characteristics of montage, the juxtaposition of the last two 
scenes, elucidates contemplation's dialectic dynamic, and re-presents all 
three qualities. 
I thus reiterate my initial statement on the montaged relationship between 
these last two scenes and suggest that the symbolic directive and 
homogenising quality of montage renders them a signifying practice, 
corresponding to Kristeva's narrative, metalanguage and contemplation. The 
two scenes are brought into a moment of conflict that orchestrates and 
subordinates the complex material of either scene in favour of a homogenised 
reading. I am forced to view the 'museum-scene' (2) in a conflictual 
juxtaposition with the 'outdoor-scene' (3), 'the driving ahead takes away some 
of the stuffiness and austerity experienced inside the 'museum". What 
becomes emphasised is the indoor/outdoor relation: stuffiness/fresh air, 
culture/nature. This nondisjunctive structure produces homogeneity. The 
sensation of homogeneity is tied up with the symbolic systematicity of the 
film as a whole, which in turn determines the sublimation of incongruous 
elements within the scenes. I contest that this moment confirms the grand 
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(ideological) narrative, and places me, the subject, in a fixed spot at a 
distance. This allows for nothing but an ever returning and perpetually 
trapped contemplation of the material sublimated in a symbolic order. The 
downward-pointing arrow in my figure 3 illustrates the 'interiority' of this 
intentional symbolic systematicity of montage. Every point, all complex 
material elements, are turned inwards. The individual cells, shots or scenes, 
are experienced in relation to a symbolic system which renders their 
juxtaposition tautological. It enforces one reading, rather than enabling a 
proliferation of meanings in the individual imagination of the contingent 
subject 'outside' the film. By contrast, the arrows pointing outwards, in all 
directions, in figure 1 and 3, illustrate such an individual and imaginative 
centrifugal proliferation from within the scene. 
The scene itself I understand within her fourth signifying practice: the 'text'. 
Kristeva introduces the text as radically different from its contemplative 
simulation, as well as from metalanguage and narrative. I discuss and apply 
her contestation of this distinction and its consequence to materiality and the 
subject in relation to my articulation of temporal-collage. later on, I discuss 
her 'practice of the text' in association with writings on collage as a particular 
strategy of assemblage, to confirm this conflation. 
The text, is distinct from the other three signifying practices, according to 
Kristeva since the 'real object is never posited as lost' (ibid., p99). I 
understand this to suggest that the material complexity of the text is never 
sublimated and homogenised into a discontinuous structure. 'Although 
rejection posits them as elements, the reactivation of rejection traverses these 
elements and knots them in a dynamic interdependence.' (Ibid, p99) Hence the 
sublimation that does happen does not create a lack, does not reject in 
synthesis, but rather points to 'an endless mobility', positing elements and 
reactivating them in ever new 'knots of interdependence' (ibid., p99).56 I find 
56 According to Kristeva, this 'endless mobility' is not a deconstructive, post-structural, motion 
of endless deferral. Rather, in marked distinction to deconstruction, which always still 
produces consensual sense, objectivity, even if this sense is temporal and contingent, the 
text's endless mobility does not engage in consensual meaning but produces singular sense 
processes. In comparison, I understand Kristeva's contemplation as a signifying practice of 
deconstruction. Contemplation includes the derive; the drifting, shifting and changing of the 
material without ever breaking with the communicative function. Kristeva refers in her 
definition of contemplation to Hegel's notion of totality, which she understands 'probably 
gives the best account of this device: the entity and difference of opposites, implying the 
endless excavation of the Idea on the path of self-consciousness.' (Ibid., p98). Thus, in 
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her 'knots' offers a useful replacement of Barthes' accents. I want to stress 
their 'endless mobility' by proposing them as the 'knotting points' of a 
complex materiality.57 
The text 'involves combination: fitting together detaching, including, and 
building up "parts" into some kind of "totality".' (Ibid., p102) Crucially, 
however, this totality is not a communicative totality, not an objective 
totality.58 'This practice has no addressee; no subject ( ... ) can understand it.' 
(ibid., p1 01) The text is a solitary practice, which does not function 
communicatively. This secures the subject a relative autonomy in his/her 
knotting process. At the same time the knotting points come to be identified 
as non-objective, non-dialectical accents. The ideological and material 
hierarchies are not abandoned, but relaxed in this practice. According to 
Kristeva the hierarchies are fluctuating and 'its members are relatively 
independent of that code or authority.' 59 (Ibid., p99) The fluctuation marks this 
as a contingent and temporal process, dependent on updating the laws and 
boundaries which demarcate it all the time. 60 
The text is a process. this process breaks up the totality of the envisioned object 
and invests it with fragments (colors, lines, forms). Such fragments are 
themselves linked to sounds, words, and significations, which the process 
contemplation, self-consciousness, self (one's own) sense, is a path without an end. Its goal, 
the Idea, can never be attained, positioned as it is within the 'ring' of contemplation. In this 
way contemplation clarifies deconstruction as essentially Hegelian. Accordingly I understand 
deconstruction not to critique the dialectic dynamic of Hegel's 'objective ideality'. It only 
quarrels with its notion of ideality without however questioning the objectivity of its process. 
Hegel's dialectic, I argue, is always already deconstructive; the notion of ideality only 
suggesting a progressive motivation rather than a goal. The critique I aim to pursue however 
is not a critique of the term ideality, which I understand to be structural as well as post-
structural. Rather I aim to critique the notion of objectivity: consensual meaning. (This exploit 
clarifies how my notion of a complex material practice does not align itself but critiques post-
structuralist deconstruction rather). 
57 As with the terms 'disjointing' and 'bricolaging', the present participle of 'knotting' points to 
the continuality (continuous actuality) of such knots as process. 
580r as Kristeva clarifies: 'It (the text) does not instigate the "process-of-becoming-a-subject" 
of the masses.' (Ibid., p102) I understand this to propose that the text is a subjective/singular 
rather than an objective/collective process, producing a 'subjective ideality'. The status of 
this subjective ideality in relation to the text is contested in chapter 3 in an investigation of 
the details of its signifying process. 
59 'Metalanguage' and 'narrative' as well as 'contemplation' are the tools and the scaffolding 
of this system but crucially not its content. 
60 The notion of this signifying process as 'contingent and temporal' explains the 'temporal' in 
temporal-collage in relation to perception. The signifying practice foregrounds the temporality 
of the perceptual process rather than the time of the material unfolding on screen. This shift 
of focus allows me to extend my notion of temporal-collage beyond time-based work, and 
enables me to apply it to a wider realm of art practice. 
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rearranges in a new combination. The combinatory moment, which accompanies 
the destructive process and makes it a practice, is always produced with reference 
to a moment of stasis, a boundary, a symbolic barrier. Without this temporary 
resistance, which is viewed as if it were insurmountable, the process would never 
become a practice and would founder instead in an opaque and unconscious 
organicity. (Ibid., p102) 
The signifying of the text is explained as a process of combinations. Between 
'detaching, including, and building up "parts'" a rearrangement is being 
forged. The detaching and including allows me to situate temporal-collage'S 
tandem of bricolaging and disjointing within this practice of the text, one 
continually building up, the other incessantly ripping apart. What is clarified 
here, in distinction to montage, is that the 'fragments' that are being taken 
apart and rearranged, are invested in this process rather than sublimated for a 
higher order totality. No higher gestalt is being thought, no ideal synthesis. 
Rather, this heterogeneous formation is a continuous passing beyond 
systemic limits, assuming an infinity of process, which does not seek to 
overcome complexity in a higher order resolution: objective ideality. The 
concentration is on the practice of the fragment rather than on a sublimation 
of the fragments in a totality. 
I understand Kristeva's viewing of the sculptures by Alain Kirili to perform 
such a textual practice: 
The heterogeneous and clashing material resound with different timbres: I hear 
them more than I see them and the libido they provoke soon involves all my 
senses in a series of jouissances, of complex pleasures, now opaque, now soft, 
sharp, hot, porous, cold, condensed'. (Kristeva, 1991, p29) 
The context of her viewing, the (first) Gulf War in 1991, mentioned in the essay 
and which resonates in her experience of the work, illustrates the issue of 'the 
laws and boundaries', which provisionally frame her perception and which 
she has to break to practice her own experience of the work. The war provides 
the particular setting in which she practices her textual perception and which 
she breaks with in that practice by extending the material into her own 
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particular rhythm.61 Referring to a piece called Mediterranee she declares: 
As if Matisse's paper cutouts were infiltrating the realm of volume, setting it in 
motion, summoning the eye even more than the touch, and thereby inviting a 
body, excited from the retina to the flesh, to plunge into the blue matter of a 
northern sea. Air and water, left and right, high and low, the locus and reference-
point of an undulation restored to me by my revery, according to my own 
aggressive or peaceable rhythm. (Ibid., p29) 
Accordingly, I experience and produce the complexity of the 'museum-scene' 
(2): the red tinge, the odd camera angles, the weirdly personal voice over, the 
spooky soundtrack, the awkwardness of place, etc .. These are all fragments 
that I attach and detach in my viewing of this scene. All my senses are 
involved in this heterogeneous complexity. What Kristeva terms jouissance I 
could term unease, but what remains of the term are the senses of complexity 
and intensity that go beyond the material presented and connects with my 
particular circumstance of viewing. It is my 'aggressive and peaceable 
rhythm' , which constructs the material emphasis and which brings an 
'extended sensibility' to the work. 
Kristeva practices Kirili's work in a continuous process of "appending 
territories" (Kristeva, 1984, p102). She performs an extensional process 
according to her 'rhythm' into her field of experience. I argue that this 
'appending' process is being undercut at the moment of montage. At this 
moment textuality is reined-in by the other three signifying practices, which 
force a communicative function onto the material extensions and arrest its 
individual rhythm in objectivity. 
Kristeva's understanding of the textual practice as an appending, extensional 
process links up with my desire for the art work as a complex materiality to 
trigger a centrifugal production in perception. It also links to William C. Seitz' 
understanding of collage. In the next part of this chapter I bring together 
Kristeva's signifying practice of the text, my understanding of the scenes in 
Spiral Jetty as such signifying practices, with Seitz' ideas on 'The Realism and 
Poetry of Assemblage'. Thereby I develop a clearer argument for my use of 
collage in the term temporal-collage, and assess my requirements for a non-
61 Her text foregrounds the particularity of war. I contest that she consciously parallels the 
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dialectical, non-objective, practice in this term. 
Building the Jetty 
4 
From this planing and observing stage, which constitutes the first part of the film, we 
move on to the actual building of the Jetty. The next scene consists of images of 
building works, visuals of water and picture book representations of dinosaurs. All 
three elements force themselves upon me as distinct expressions. Only after a while 
do I start to connect them in time. I see huge building machinery digging out earth 
and constructing the jetty. A sound track of heavy machinery runs simultaneously, 
out of synch, and out of proportion in terms of volume, with the footage seen. I see 
the motionless, pink water of the Salt Lake. All I hear is a quiet gurgling and 
splashing of water. But this quiet lasts only a moment, as I am soon pushed back to 
the loud construction work undertaken at the water's edge. The water-takes seem to 
exist in relation to, but are somehow oddly removed also from the dynamic of the 
mechanical actions. These takes grant calming moments, apart from the culmination 
of strength and size, whilst at the same time they are very much part of the same 
building process. The images of calm water show an always as yet not built upon 
stretch of water.62 The particular visual pairing of calm water and heavy construction 
work is repeatedly brought together. The composition of this emphasis is 
complicated through the interlacing of still images of dinosaurs taken from picture 
books, and a voice-over talking about the geological consistency of the jetty 
material. The film here is composed as a conglomeration of sonic and visual 
material of 'dinosaurs', 'water', 'machinery' and 'geology', still and in motion, 
producing the sequence as a non-linear assemblage. This assemblage compels me 
into production. At one time I am loosely connecting the building machinery and the 
shapes of the dinosaurs from the picture books. In another moment I am 
concentrating on the link between the machinery and the geological data, or the 
water imagery in relation to the heavy machinery, etc.. I bring my perception 
lawlessness of the war with the 'lawless', unorthodox, practice of her own perception. 
62 This 'always as yet not built upon stretch of water' links up to the driving sequence in the 
first scene, filmed through the windscreen, onto the 'road ahead, the surface of which is 
always as yet undisturbed by the driving through it'. This juxtaposition across scenes, I 
argue, works as a repetition which strengthens the latent symbolic register of the film, and 
forges in-between the two scenes a montage action. This serialised montage juxtaposition, I 
contest, does not enable a collaging impulse, which invites varied connections and 
individually driven sense productions. Rather, it works toward the enforcement of an 
objective meaning. It wills an ideological totality, which enforces a clear symbolic and 
ideological meaning: the conquering of new territory. 
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together in temporal and individual associations. 
I am working these sonic and visual elements as fragments, detaching and 
attaching them in my concurrent circumstance of viewing and listening. 
Following Kristeva's suggestion of 'appending territories', my centrifugal 
practice produces 'outward connections' in my perception. Both the 
bricolaging and disjointing effort, as well as the centrifugal motion thereof, I 
contest, assert the scene as a textual practice. William C. Seitz' conception of 
assemblage enables me to contest the link between Kristeva's signifying 
practice of the text, and my practising of the scenes in Spiral Jetty, in the 
sense of temporal-collage. 
In his essay 'The Realism and Poetry of Assemblage', which was originally 
written for the catalogue of the Art of Assemblage show in the Museum of 
Modern Art, in 1961, Seitz discusses his view on assemblage as 'a method 
with disconcertingly centrifugal potentialities.' (Seitz, 1989, p82) I relate the 
'centrifugal' to perception, and understand his 'disconcertingly' in the sense 
of disturbing a material homogeneity, disabling a total comprehension.53 
Reading his essay, I identify my notion of temporal-collage within his 
definition that in assemblage 'physical materials and their auras are 
transmuted into a new amalgam that both transcends and includes its parts.' 
(Ibid., p81) Likewise, I argue that in temporal-collage the material elements are 
exceeded imaginatively in the contingent perception of the viewer, but their 
sensorial qualities nevertheless remain specific and simultaneous. No 
homogenous whole is being produced in a sublimating assemblage. Rather 
the 'new amalgam' does not resolve but practices their complexity. In this 
sense I understand, along with Seitz, that assemblage offers a potential for 
anarchism, and agree with his ideas that 'intrinsic to the medium of 
assemblage is an entirely new relationship between work and spectator' (ibid., 
p80).54 
53 Seitz does not elaborate on this exclamation. I feel therefor free to interpret 
'disconcertingly' as I understand it in relation to the signifying practice of the text. 
Meanwhile, Seitz' use of the term 'centrifugal' allows me to develop my use of it as staged 
vis-a.-vis Eisenstein's assertions on the decadence of centrifugality in chapter one, and to 
bring it in direct relation to temporal-collage. (Eisenstein, 1977c, p84) 
54 According to Seitz 'assemblage has become, temporarily at least, the language for 
impatient, hypercritical, and anarchistic young artists.' (Seitz, 1989, p8S) He does not 
elucidate his specific understanding of such an anarchy or its consequences. On my part, I 
understand this notion of anarchy to suggest a truly individual practice which critiques the 
idea of an objectivity totality. In this sense I stage it in relation to Hegel's idea that the refusal 
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However, it is where he makes the general case for assemblage as 'poetic 
rather than realistic' (ibid., p81) that I realise important discrepancies between 
our understandings of assemblage and start to dissociate my notion of 
collage from his description of assemblage. I argue that the differentiation 
between the 'poetic' and the 'realistic' hints at a negative relation where the 
loss of one thing is ultimately substituted by another. Referring to the 
complexity of material elements in the last scene as poetic, I argue, suggests 
not an open (individual and imaginative) perception, but a new and different, 
but always already consolidated (consensual) reading: the 'machines', the 
'water' and the 'dinosaurs' connected as poetic elements, loose their primary 
symbolism, but regain solidity of representation already in a new (symbolic) 
configuration. I argue that the issue lies in the term poetic. I come to my 
interpretation of the poetic via Barthes' use of the term. 
Barthes employs the term poetic in reference to his accents where he calls the 
understanding of the material 'an interrogation bearing precisely on the 
signifier, not on the signified, on the reading, not on the intellection: it is a 
"poetic" apprehension.' (Barthes, 1991, p43) Barthes' use of quotation marks, 
I argue, is crucial in relation to the status of the term poetic. Barthes presents 
his accent as beyond a collective semiotic understanding, in an emotive and 
singular experience, which he posits within the 'poetic'. However as a third 
meaning, his accents are invested in meaning (consensual sense), presenting 
as they do the overflow and excess of the semiotic. This negative relationship 
renders them ultimately representational, and thus his poetic comes to be 
clarified as a representation of overflow rather than a supposedly individual 
'poetic'. In this sense I argue that the poetic delineates the representation 
rather than the perception of material complexity. Consequently it produces 
meaning rather than triggers sense making. 
of the objective leads to 'the form of subjectivity-selfishness and corruption in the unbound 
passions and egotistic interests of men.' (Hegel, 1953, p93) I encourage the practice of 
temporal-collage as a production in perception, which does not consider socio-historical unity 
but rather opts for 'unbound (subjective) passion'. However, I am aware of a conflict between 
my consideration of temporal-collage as text and as anarchic here. Kristeva, considering 
Hegel, posits the text and its subject not as anarchic, but always still in relation to its socio-
historical context. The potential to be anarchic and the notion of anarchy is thus dependent 
on its dialectical identification in relation to this context as the Idea. To investigate the 
possibility of a non-dialectical 'passionate' subjectivity, I undertake a consideration of 
Kristeva's subject in process/on trial, as a radical subject practising the text in chapter 3. 
There I am investigating her textual practice and temporal-collage in relation to Lyotard's 
subject of enunciation and its 'coup-inattendu' (unexpected game move). This clarifies the 
status of anarchy in relation to temporal-collage and its subject. 
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Seitz makes a general case for assemblage as poetic, promoting various and 
multiplicitous material conjunctions. However, as a consequence of my 
interpretation of Barthes' 'poetic' as representational, I argue, Seitz' 
conjunctions continually re-attain consolidated (consensual) sense via their 
dialectic relation to a primary symbolic association. When he talks about the 
mutliplicitous conjunctions that can be established between elements in 
assemblage he refers the connections back to an assumed nominal relation 
between those same elements in their 'original' setting. This posits his poetic 
conjunctions in the negative, and clarifies his notion of assemblage as a 
poetic system, within which any new connections are consolidated vis-a-vis a 
primary symbolic identification, even in their multiplicity. To argue this 
critique I turn to Kristeva's poetic, I refer back to the knots in her text, 
elaborated by me as knotting points. This re-affirms my critique of Barthes' 
poetic and reasons my critique of Seitz' notion of a poetic assemblage. 
Further, these arguments allow me to specify the term collage for my project. 
The ensuing contestation of a mulitiplicity, which is not consolidated in the 
poetic, enables me to clarify and re-stage my critique of a dialectic aesthetics. 
The poetic, according to Kristeva, formulates the break with the symbolic 
order of things. In her terms the symbolic constitutes the basic condition of 
things: it positions the subject and constitutes the necessary basis of 
(consensual) meaning as it presents the order on which its processes depend. 
In relation to this, she positions the semiotic as breaking with the symbolic in 
a so-called poetic practice. The symbolic is breached by the semiotic. In this 
transgression the symbolic is activated, moved on, and ultimately a new 
symbolic is constituted.65 For Kristeva it is the primary status of 
symbolisation, which makes the heterogeneity of this process possible 
without it threatening (consensual) meaning. I understand her to propose that 
since at the basis of things there exists a symbolic order, the poetic break 
does not truly destroy meaning, but only moves it on in semiotic motility. 
Kristeva understands art as performing such a poetic break. In her terms art 
65 According to Kristeva the symbolic positions the subject, and depends, on a socio-
historically fixed subjectivity. By contrast, the semiotic is the pre-thetic. It precedes the 
positioning of the subject and breaks the symbolic order and thus moves it on to ultimately 
re-stage a new symbolic 'reality' to be breached imminently again. Kristeva explains this 
peculiar relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic in the terms of a poetic practice. 
She writes that 'the semiotic -the precondition of the symbolic- is revealed as that which also 
destroys the symbolic' (Kristeva, 1984, p50). 
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disrupts the thetic by introducing an asocial drive into the symbolic order. 66 
According to her, the gap that is opened by such a practice invites the fetish 
to replace the loss of the understanding of the object as real.67 The artist's 
break is thus identified as relative to the thetic, which continues to ensure the 
signification of this break. In this confinement, the artistic drive is positioned 
as a negative to a social system, and is thus re-assured in the poetic. The 
poetic remodels the symbolic rather than really breaking with it. Only 'the 
residues of first symbolizations' are removed, the symbolic order remains 
intact (Kristeva, 1984, p69). 
I interpret her notion of a fetish replacement in terms of an aesthetic 
consolidation, or what she terms an 'aesthetic fetishism'. Such an aesthetic 
judgement stops the asocial drive. It does so in Kristeva's terms, ' ... in order to 
keep the process signifying, to avoid foundering in an "unsayable" without 
limits, and thus posit the subject of a practice, the subject of poetic language 
[the aesthetic subject] clings to the help fetishism offers.'68 (Ibid., p65) 
Fetishism is a displacement, which assures collective signification and which 
presents the asocial drive that produced the gap as a negative to be 
immanently overcome in poetic meaning. Such a fetish replacement, I argue, 
performs an aesthetic stoppage, which arrests the generative process of 
perception and consolidates the artwork's complex elements in a poetic 
system rather than allowing for them to exist in true disarray. 
66 According to Kristeva all enunciation is thetic. The thetic phase 'contains the object as well 
as the proposition, and the complicity between them.' (Ibid., p44) In other words, the thetic 
enables communication by offering the basic ingredients for signification and by giving a 
'space' for its coming together. The thetic is the realm which sets up enunciation and thus it 
is the realm of signification. The thetic phase marks the threshold between the semiotic and 
the symbolic. In reference to the poetic practice articulated above, the artwork according to 
Kristeva, is not yet ordered as an enunciation, its object and proposition are not made 
compliant to each other; it is semiotic until the poetic bestows its lack a symbolic function. 
67 For Kristeva the fetish 'is a displacement of the thetic on the realm of drives' and 'fetishism 
is a telescoping of the symbolic's characteristic thetic moment and of one of those 
instinctually invested stases (bodies, parts of bodies, orifices, containing objects, and so 
forth). This stasis thus becomes the ersatz of the sign. Fetishism is a stasis that acts as a 
thesis.' (Ibid., p64) In relation to art practice the fetish is the replacement of that which is 
destroyed in poetic practice. 'Aesthetic fetishism' consolidates the by the artwork contested 
thetic. In the terms of my project, the fetish replaces the imaginative perception of the 
material element, and consolidates it within the artwork as a whole. I can refer this 
identification to Seitz's notion of the poetic understanding of the material element in 
assemblage, which according to him takes the place of the original understanding of it as 
real. (Seitz, 1991, p80) 
68 I read her avoidance of 'a foundering in an "unsayable" without limits' as an avoidance of 
the boundarilessness of a relative meaning and identity (Kristeva, 1984, p65). I articulate my 
own critique of such a relative position or non-position rather in chapter one via Deleuze, and 
continue to pursue this argument in chapter 3, via the proposition of a subjective ideality. 
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This brings me back to Barthes' criticism of the symbolic certainty in 
Eisenstein's montage theory. Barthes describes Eisenstein's montage as 'a 
system of displacements and substitutions' (Eisenstein, 1991, p43). His 
definition elucidates montage as working on the diegetic, historical and 
ideological symbolism of its cells (the symbolic origins of its visual and sonic 
cells), displacing them from their symbolic origin ('vertical uprooting'), but 
eventually, through substitution, leading them together in a counterpuntal 
arrangement (signifieds) for the expression of another total, symbolic sign: 
the film. In this sense my earlier suggestion of the dialectic dynamic of 
Eisenstein's montage, and its identification within the context of Barthes' 
symbolic semiotic is further clarified in relation to Kristeva's idea of a 
symbolic order. I can now articulate montage's material strategy as an, in 
Kristeva's terms, asocial practice, which breaks with the symbolic order, 
opens a gap between its cells, severing original conjunctions, in order to 
immanently suggest a fetish replacement to fill the gap and close the 
junctions. The prosaic meaning is destroyed, but a new, poetic meaning is 
assured. The semiotic motility is arrested in an aesthetic (fetishism) 
consolidation, and the asocial is redeemed within the social (objective sense) 
that it brings to the fore. 
I understand Seitz to perform such a stoppage of the poetic drive in his 
aesthetic consideration of assemblage. He reviews assemblage within a 
poetic aesthetic in that he understands it to replace one object with another: 
its original meaning as 'real' is replaced with a 'poetic' meaning. Thus he 
asserts himself as a poetic, aesthetic subject, rather than a subject of 
practice, who understands the material, real or poetic, always in reference to 
the symbolic order of the thetic. In his aesthetic judgement he acknowledges 
that assemblages change and transform their material elements, their objects. 
Crucially, however, they do not question (symbolic) meaning making 
processes. The object in assemblage remains undoubted in a systemic 
symbolic. For Seitz neither the artist nor the audience can 'sidestep the 
symbolic meaning of objects' (Seitz, 1989, p84). 
As a poetic aesthetic, I argue, assemblage becomes a style, a language, rather 
than an activity. Its subject is socio-historically fixed vis-it-vis the symbolic 
context, and its material conjunctions are moved in relation to a symbolic 
order only. To read the 'outdoor-scene' (scene 4), within a poetic aesthetic 
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means to understand its individual elements, in a negative relation to their 
nominal, symbolic conjunction. The subject can break with this symbolic 
meaning in semiotic motility performed by an asocial drive, but ultimately, 
since the symbolic order remains intact, he/she arrives at another symbolic 
meaning. Identified within the framework of a poetic aesthetic, I argue, 
assemblage cannot transcend this symbolic consensuality. 
This is why I can find only fleeting associations with other writings on collage. 
I can identify my term within Harold Rosenberg's idea that 'collage is a way of 
making art, but it is not a specific art form, nor is it a style.' (Rosenberg, 1989, 
pS9) I, however, disagree with his inevitable aesthetic survey. I find affiliations 
with parts of various other descriptions but unavoidably come back to the 
point where aesthetic judgement stops 'the making of art', of collage, in 
'poetic meaningfulness' (consensual sense). Thus, although I link my notion 
of collage with Katherine Hoffman's idea that 'the concepts of disintegration, 
fragmentation, and integration are perhaps particularly important for the 
medium of collage', her notion of historicity and the comparison of styles, 
rather than a consideration of a contingent perception, disables my 
identification with the argument she develops in her text (Hoffman, 1989, p3). 
The assemblage strategy which I seek to promote with the term temporal-
collage defines a different motivation, that of a practice wherein sense is 
made in a contingent perception which is not arrested in a poetic aesthetic. In 
other words, I seek to articulate a perceptual practice that is not fixed in 
relation to a (collective) symbolic register.69 
I understand the complex elements of temporal-collage to be produced in a 
practice of perception rather than being appreciated in a poetic experience. 
The subject of temporal-collage is not an asocial subject, dialectically 
opposed to a social subjectivity. He/She is not a subject of irrelevant 
69 Florian Rodari, in his book Col/age Pasted Cut and Torn Papers, discusses collage from 
the making point of view. He still ends up with a historical survey, considering the making 
processes in relation to their time and place of production rather than in relation to his (re-
)production in perception now and here. What I consider interesting in relation to my attempt 
at formulating collage as a practice of perception, however, is his acknowledgement that 
'stressing the breaks and discontinuities between its different components, the collage of cut-
out, torn, or simply, "found" fragments seems to split up the act of seeing itself.' (Rodari, 
1988, p8) I understand him to suggest that collage fragments not its object, material 
elements, but the viewing process. In this way it makes the viewing subject complicit in its 
production. According to Rodari it is his/her seeing process that is affected rather than a 
his/her vision effected. Following this suggestion, rather than presenting an artwork to the 
eyes, collage challenges the viewing and sense making processes. 
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nonsense, but one of individual sense, or, as earlier defined, 
phenomenological non-sense, which is continually produced in his/her 
particular experience. Here I am re-evaluating my use of the term experience 
so far and clarify the experience of temporal-collage, as a production in 
perception, a practice, rather than an experience of knowledge?O I relate 
collage back to Kristeva's fourth signifying practice, and critique the status of 
historicity, its aesthetic valuation and the meaning assured by the symbolic 
order in the poetic experience of assemblage via her practice of the text. 
The text is completely different from the fetish because it signifies; in other words, 
it is not a substitute but a sign (signifier/signified), and its semantics is unfurled in 
sentences. The text signifies the unsignifying: it assumes [re/eve] within a 
signifying practice this functioning (the semiotic), which ignores meaning and 
operates before meaning or despite it. (Kristeva, 1984, p65) 
According to Kristeva, in the text 'the real object is never posited as lost, 
lacking.' (Ibid., p99) It is never lacking and therefore is never 'replaced', but is 
always produced through the interdependent knotting of the individual 
elements. I contend that I practice the scenes of Spiral Jetty in the same 
sense. I am 'Building the Jetty': I am knotting together complex material 
elements, machines, noises, silences, dinosaurs, water, etc., and extend them 
centrifugaly in my imagination. In this practice I do not extend in experience; I 
do not posit a replacement object, but rather I continually practice the object. I 
do not assess an aesthetic whole, as in a poetic experience, but produce a 
complex artwork. On the level of the scene Spiral Jetty is a temporal-collage, a 
complex artwork, in the sense of a textual practice 'when it is being carried 
out (and not when it is reified according to the exchange structures of a 
70 In this I am following Kristeva where, via Hegel, she makes the distinction between an 
experience and a practice of experience. She writes that 
Hegel distinguishes the moment of the object's first and immediate appearance for 
consciousness -moment of pure apprehension- from the moment of true experience 
where a new object is constituted from that first object through the turning back of 
consciousness upon itself, through "our own intervention". (Kristeva, 1984, p196) 
I borrow her distinction between an apprehended experience and a practical experience and 
identify the second in relation to the experience of the artwork as a temporal-collage. 
However, I remain critical of the socio-historical entanglement of her subject determined by 
her practice's relationship to the symbolic. I query this relationship further later on in this text 
via symbolism as a tendential quality, and also, in the following chapters, via a comparison of 
her practice to the involvement of the intersubjective subject of Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology. 
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particular society), (ibid., p104).71 
So, even though I have refused to suggest a clear description of the term 
collage in relation to an art historical identification, I believe that defining it by 
comparison with poetic assemblage, in a textual practice, clarifies its 
complexity ideologically, and avoids a reproach for arbitrariness of 
terminology. Hoffman's idea of collage as 'disintegration, fragmentation, and 
integration', interpreted via Kristeva's practice, rather than in relation to her 
own art historical and aesthetic experience of collage as an end result, a 
poetic assemblage, seals this conflation. 
My identification, via Kristeva, of the poetic as an aesthetic stoppage, 
confirming the symbolic through a replacement of its object, and the 
subsequent affiliation of collage with her text, leaves me to consider the 
status of the symbolic vis-a-vis the signifying practice of the text. The initial 
distinctness of the visual and sonic elements of scene 4 foregrounds this 
issue. The images and sounds of dinosaurs, stones, water, of the machines, 
etc., carry with them a heavy symbolism. I suggest that they impose on me an 
idea beyond these elements as representational elements and forge an 
understanding prior to the knotting effort of my collage perception whilst 
carrying this effort exactly. In the next part of this chapter I want to consider 
more closely the notion of the symbolic in reference to this scene. Therefore I 
contest the individual bricolagingldisjointing effort on the level of the scene in 
relation to Symbolism and the Symbolist 'subjective vision'. This contestation 
is staged in relation to Kristeva's ideas of the symbolic and its status vis-a-vis 
the practice of the text. To do so, I contrast her symbolic order to Symbolism 
as a practice, forged by a tendential symbolic, rather than a symbolic register. 
5 
A voice over pronounces "ripping the Spiral Jetty". I watch a close up of a machine 
ripping open the earth. The sound is maddeningly loud and overpowering. Too loud 
71 If the text is a practice, and collage a text, then following Kristeva the subject has to give 
up its' "meta-"position'; it has to inhabit and practice the text, the collage, from the knotting 
points into centrifugal extensions. As a consequence of this identification of collage with 
Kristeva's text the subject in collage comes to be identified as her 'subject in process/on 
trial'. Thus I acknowledge that my emphasis on practice, collage as text, foregrounds the 
status of the subject: 'Caught up within this dynamic, the human body is also a process.' 
(Kristeva, 1984, p101) The status of this subject is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
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in relation to the machinery presented and, added to this, the visual ripping motions 
and the engine noise are clearly not in synch. This non-synch adds to the intensity 
and peculiarity of the scene. I perceive an indifference between sound and image 
which opens a different space. I feel propelled into a wider context of strength and 
machines than the specific action I am being presented with. Apart from this ripping 
action, there are still-images, undulating sounds of quieter water moments and 
pictures of dinosaurs. They present a simultaneity and offer different levels of 
interaction. The machines are dinosaurs, the dinosaurs machines. I experience a 
fluid co-existence between the machines, the dinosaurs, the loud machine noise, the 
calm water. These sounds and images are detached elements in themselves. Their 
independence, I feel, compels me to playfully connect them, building different 
conjunctions and opening different spaces imaginatively. 
There seems to be a symbolic quality in this scene, which compels my 
engagement. However, I contest that this quality does not limit my perception 
to a symbolic interpretation. Rather it seems to propel my imagination. The 
machine strength, perceived in this scene, I argue, is not simply posited as a 
symbolic strength. It is not forged from the conflict of its material elements, 
sound and image, in the sense of a montage of conflict. No orchestral 
counterpoint leads me to a consolidated understanding of the film as 
signifying, in an obvious symbolism, the undepictable in machine strength. 
There is no conflict in-between any of these sounds and images, which might 
urge a resolution. Rather, they are simultaneous and mobile. I am forming 
knotting points, and extend the material elements non-materially. In this 
process I do not feel 'directed' by the intention of the author. I do not feel 
'seduced' to connect particular materials in a particular way, according to a 
symbolic register, in order to attain one ideologically driven resolution. 
Rather, the material complexity of the scene: water, dinosaurs, sound and 
images of machines, enables no such shutting down as I continue to perceive 
them. My spectatorship 'performs' the film in a more solitary and amicable 
play moved by a particular 'quality' of its elements. In the next part of this 
chapter I argue this quality as a tendential symbolism in distinction to a 
symbolic order. 
I contest that the symbolic strength that I am producing in my perception of 
this scene, is not the symbolic of a horizontal orientation of Barthes' second 
order semiotic: the obvious. I am not following the intentional, ideological 
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directive of a semiotic symbolic. Rather, I am engaged in a relationship to a 
symbolic quality in a more general sense. I argue that the images and sounds 
-the industrial sounds, the water, the machines, the dinosaurs, the silence-
bear a symbolic property, which triggers my engagement, but does not 
foreclose my understanding. These elements, I argue, display a tendential 
symbolic quality which I exploit in my perception. To clarify the status of this 
tendential quality in my perception of this scene, I articulate this tendential in 
relation to Kristeva's notion of the symbolic as order. This comparison 
explores the relationship between her signifying practice of the text and the 
symbolic order, and contests my conflation of her text and my temporal-
collage in relation to the symbolic. To stage this argument, in the first 
instance, I consider the conventions and philosophical conception of 
Symbolism. This connects Symbolism's 'subjective vision' to Kristeva's 
subjective viewing of Alain Kirili's work and by implication, to the subjectivity 
of her practice of the text. Consequently I can relate them both to my 
subjective viewing of Spira/ Jetty. 
Following Albert-G. Aurier, Symbolism is a reaction to the objective ideality of 
realism. It aspires to bring out in the object not its real, scientific being, but 
rather treats it as a sign, a referent. In his essay 'Symbolisme en Peinture' 
(Symbolism in Painting) he expresses regret that the viewer, who is according 
to him not an artist, not a practitioner, 'se trouverait devant elle dans une 
situation analogue a celie de la foule devant les objets de nature. II n'en 
percevrait les objets representes qu'en tant qu'objets'. ('finds himself in front 
of it [the painting] in the same situation as the masses in front of 'real' 
objects. He perceives the represented objects as nothing but objects'.) 
(Aurier, 1893b, p214, my translation) He suggests that this must be avoided 
and that the object in painting must be a suggestion not a representation. He 
explains that: 
72 
Donc pour enfin se resumer et conclure I'muvre d'art, telle qu'il m'a plu la 
logiquement evoquer, sera: ( ... ); Symboliste, puisqu'elle exprimera cette 
idee par des formes; ( ... ) et Subjective, puisque I'objet n'y sera jamais 
considere en tant qu'objet mais en tant que signe d'idee perc;u par Ie sujet. 
(Ibid, p215-216f2 
Thus in order to summarise and conclude, the artwork, in as much as I have discussed 
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I find his definition of Symbolism useful in relation to my understanding of the 
symbolic 'suggestion' of the material elements of Spiral Jetty. It aids me to 
articulate the forms, the material elements of the scene, in relation to my 
subjectivity rather than to an essential being. The material elements are 
means that take form in my perception. However, I disagree with his 
understanding that it is only the artist who can appreciate the complexity of 
the object and who is able to perform a translation between a symbolic idea 
and the object on the canvas. This pre-supposes a hierarchy between the 
author and the spectator, and suggests a lexical understanding between the 
symbolic idea and the object. Translation elucidates Symbolism's practice as 
an intentional ordering of ideational complexity according to a lexical register. 
Thus viewing is not a practical experience but an apprehension of 
knowledge.73 
This vocabularic understanding is also expressed in Jean Morc~as' Le 
Symbolisme, a literary manifesto, where he writes that Symbolism ought to 
produce sensible appearances that bring forth the affinity between the object 
and its primordial ideas. For the successful translation of this synthesis, he 
goes on to say: 
iI faut au symbolisme un style archetype et complexe: d'impollues vocables, la 
peri ode qui s'arc-boute altern ant avec la periode au defaillance ondulees, les 
pleonasmes significatifs, les mysterieuses ellipses, I'anacoluthe en suspens, tout 
trope hardi et multiforme: enfin la bonne langage. 74 (Moreas, 1973a, p32) 
His notion of 'une bonne language'; a good language, clarifies Symbolism as 
style. The symbolic form is worked into the object from a register, from a 
socio-historical specificity of archetypes, terms, phrases, etc.. In turn, the 
it, would be: ( ... ); Symbolist, for it expresses the idea by means of forms; ( ... ) and 
Subjective, for the object will never be considered as an object but as the sign of an idea 
perceived by the subject. (Aurier, 1893b, p215-216, my translation) 
73 This re-asserts the distinction made earlier between experience as knowledge and 
experience as practice. Following Hegel, Kristeva distinguishes between the object's 
immediate appearance as knowledge 'moment of pure apprehension' and the 'moment of 
true experience', when the object is constituted in practice (Kristeva, 1984, p 196). 
74 
Symbolism requires a complex and archetypal style: unpolluted terms, phrases which 
rear up alternating phrases with undulating weaknesses, significant pleonasms, 
mysterious ellipse, suspended anacoluthons, all the bold and multiform tropes: in all a 
'good' language. (Moreas, 1973a, p32, my translation) 
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viewing subject can be brought to its idea due to his/her affiliation with this 
lexical specificity. 
By contrast, my perception of a symbolic quality in Spiral Jetty, refers to 
symbolism as a philosophy of production in perception. In this I embrace 
Aurier's 'subjectivity' and his notion of a 'means to form'. However, I do not 
distinguish between the artist and the viewer. Rather, I consider them both 
practitioners. Thus the hierarchy between author and spectator is 
problematised and the socio-historical fixity of either position challenged. 
Without this hierarchy and the socio-historical (symbolic) framework, I argue, 
the intention of the author becomes incapable of forging one particular 
understanding of the complex object in relation to one primordial register as 
style. 
As a consequence of my problematising of authority and style, I read Munch's 
notebook entry on 'subjective vision' not as an instruction for the artist to 
paint, but for the viewer to produce in a generative practice of perception: 
If you see double, then for example, you must paint two noses. 
And if you see a glass slanting, then you have to make the glass slant. 
Or, if you want to present something experienced in an erotic moment when you 
are flushed and amorous - Here you have found a motif which you cannot present 
exactly as you see it on another occasion when you are cold. (Art in Theory 1815-
1900,1998,p1042f5 
If I abandon the notion of style and the authority of the artist I can position the 
viewing subject as a subject of a perceptual rather than a poetic practice. 
Consequently, as such a practitioner, the socio-historical specificity of my 
viewing becomes contingent to my concurrent situation rather than to that of 
the work or the artist. In this sense the subjective characteristic of Symbolism, 
divorced from the socio-historical framework of production, lends itself to my 
notion of the material as displaying a tendential quality without referring it to a 
symbolic register. To develop this tendential symbolism in relation to 
temporal-collage as a practice of the text, I investigate Kristeva's text in 
relation to her understanding of the symbolic as order. 
75Experpts in Art in Theory 1815-1900 are taken from unpublished documents at the Edvard 
Munch Museum in Oslo, Norway, orig. 1889. 
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In her essay From Symbol to Sign, Kristeva articulates the symbol as referring 
'to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of 
general ideas.' (Kristeva, 1986, p64) The symbol is thus, in distinction to the 
signifier, not arbitrary, but definite and socio-historically precise, involving a 
socio-historically precise subject position. The representation of meaning in 
the symbol is a functional relation, which has a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension. In Kristeva's terms, the social and the symbolic are synonymous: 
culture is based on the symbolic. Such a reading understands the symbolic as 
ordering. Its order can be broken into, and moved on through the semiotic, 
but due to its place within the thetic, it can never be destroyed completely. 
The symbolic represents the cultural contract. As discussed earlier it allows 
(the artist) to stage a transgression in the poetic, without the social contract 
being destroyed. Rather, this poetic transgression arrests the threat to the 
social order in representation (aesthetic fetishism). 
By contrast, according to Kristeva the text never halts for representation. 
Rather, it is the practice of endless mobility 'positing elements (time of rest), 
reactivating the whirlwind (time of crossing).' (Kristeva, 1984, p99) This 
practice includes her other three signifying practices: metalanguage, narrative 
and contemplation?6 'It adopts them but then pushes them aside as the mere 
scaffolds of the process' (ibid., p1 01). I have shown how her first three 
signifying practices work within the symbolic order. Thus, by adopting them 
the text encounters the symbolic order, but as a practice it passes through it, 
pushing it away. The symbolic barrier is its motivation, but not its directing 
orientation. The materials of metalanguage, narrative and contemplation, only 
provoke its production, whilst the textual process designates an "elsewhere" 
beyond this trigger moment (ibid., p100). 
I focus on Kristeva's idea of a momentary 'passing-through' to investigate the 
relationship of the text to the symbolic. I contest that the transient and 
appending connection articulates this relationship as tendential rather than 
76 In relation to contemplation Kristeva describes the symbolic sublimation as 'the eternal 
loop of a knotted signifier within the transference relation, which in fact offers no way out.' 
(Kristeva, 1984, p98) Withdrawn from social imbrication, this is the view of a symbolic 
register. By contrast, I am identifying the practice of temporal-collage with Kristeva's practice 
of the text. What I am after is symbolism as tendential quality, provoking an activity rather 
than providing the knowledge experience of a register. The symbolic register might trigger 
the symbolic understanding of the artwork as collage. However, I argue the knotting process 
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fundamental. In the practice of the text the symbolic order of the 'scaffold' 
presents a means to form, but the form is practised in the endless mobility of 
the text: it never settles in style. I understand that the symbolic 'residue' of the 
first three signifying practices in Kristeva's theory triggers and remains in the 
dynamic of the text as a tendential quality, but is never embodied as a 
Symbolist trope. Rather, the text 'sweeps along everything that belongs to the 
same space of practice' (ibid., p1 01). Thus the symbolic is the trigger but not 
the essence of the signifying practice of the text.77 
As a consequence of my identification of temporal-collage within the 
signifying practice of the text, it follows that in temporal-collage too the 
symbolic functions as a tendential quality, triggering a symbolic means, but 
not ordering the outcome of its form. This allows me to confirm a tendential 
symbolic in the material of 'Building the Jetty'. The quality of strength and 
power which I perceive in the visual and sonic material of the last scene (5) 
provokes my imaginative practice of strength and power as a textual practice, 
not however in relation to a certain symbolism thereof. I am knotting in an 
endless mobility, detaching, fragmenting and attaching the complex material 
elements provoked into action by a tendential symbolic quality which is never 
realised as a style. The work is not limited to an outcome: the film as sign in 
relation to its symbolic order. 
This coincides with my a-historical, non stylistically ratified, view of 
Symbolism as staged above. Symbolism is thus not seen within its socio-
historical context of the 19th Century and without the hierarchy between the 
artist and the viewer. Rather, it is emancipated from an underlying order and 
the insistence on a socio-historically fixed subjectivity and becomes a 
contingent and individual practice instead.78 
not as a process of tying practice down in relation to such a register, but of connecting up to 
release: 'to reconstitute the space of its formation.' (Ibid., p100) 
77 In this space of practice Kristeva stages the subject in process/on trial. Hers is not Aurier's 
aesthetic subject of Symbolism but a subject that produces him/herself and his her 
circumstance in the trial of perception all the time. 'Though it is made by one who is all, this 
practice does not claim all who would be One. It does not instigate the "process-of-
becoming-a-subject" of the masses.' (Ibid., p102) I develop this subject becoming 
him/herself but not the subject of the masses in the next chapter. 
78 The notion of the tendential symbolic, provoking the practice of the text, and the temporal-
collage of the scene identified as such a practice, focuses this investigation on the subject. 
The subject of temporal-collage is thus identified not as a symbolic (aesthetic) subject but as 
a tendential subject of practice. This practical position of the subject is developed in chapter 
3. 
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Surveying the Work 
6 
The middle part of the film concludes with the building of the Jetty. Now in the third 
and final part, I am taking off in a helicopter to survey the work. The sound of the 
building equipment is now replaced by the sound of the helicopter setting off, and 
following the spiral shape of the Jetty. I am flying several times, from various 
directions, and at different heights, over the Salt Lake with its new feature, the Jetty. 
The visuals are shot from above and locate me inside the helicopter, in the air, at a 
distance, surveying the work. Unlike the earlier car scene however, the sound of the 
helicopter engine locates me outside of it, confusing my viewing position. I am at 
once inside and viewing from a distance, and outside and hearing this very viewing-
position to be at a distance from myself. The image of the helicopter's shadow 
thrown onto the earth underneath, makes me doubly aware of the distance I am at 
visually. I can't help but feel a certain romantic notion influencing my perception. The 
vantage point high up in the air, and the vastness of land and lake underneath me, 
invites idea of heroic loneliness and the sublime?9 Into this reverie breaks a voice-
over which informs me about the geographical co-ordinates and the geological 
consistency of the Spiral Jetty. The voice-over makes lengthy and monotonous 
descriptions on the location and materiality of the Jetty, whilst the helicopter and 
with it my viewing position, circles higher and higher in the air above it, swinging out 
to the north and south, until I can see the whole Jetty at one glance. Having 
presented me with the whole work, the chopper swings round and starts to circle 
down again. For a while the voice-over accompanies this descent. But soon it stops 
79 This elevated position makes me self-conscious about my viewing and listening. 
The distance and heroism of my position, high up in the air, and its deferential 
opposite, the man on the ground, trigger notions of the romantic sublime. The camera 
position opens a gap between the subject viewing the film and the subject 
represented on the Jetty, on screen. My distance to the figure on the Jetty, identifies 
me as a metasubject, the void between me and the figure on the Jetty at this point 
allows for metadiscourse, aesthetic theory, to fill this absence. This dynamic I argue 
produces my position as a romantic subjectivity. The romantic subject depends on 
absence, which is overcome, made present, through a replacement. I understand the 
process of this replacement in the sense of Kristeva's notion of a fetish replacement 
in poetic language (the first three signifying practices). I thus read the void as well as 
its replacement and the ensuing identity of the viewer within a romantic aesthetics. By 
contrast, I argue that the continuous and subjective mobility of the fourth signifying 
practice, which I have adopted for my strategy of temporal-collage, does not work 
along the lines of a romantic aesthetics. I have asserted temporal-collage within 
Kristeva's fourth signifying practice to allow neither for meta-positions nor to lead to 
fetish replacements. I thus argue that her textual practice and my temporal-collage, do 
not enable a romantic identity: one defined in relation to absence and its 
replenishment with a replacement fetish in an aesthetic theorisation. 
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and instead the sound of the helicopter grows louder and louder, signalling its 
coming closer and closer to the Spiral Jetty. The colours of the photography are 
changing, taking on a reddish tint, as the camera focuses in on close-ups of its spiral 
structure. At the same time we start hearing the sounds of bird-song and a rhythmic 
low pitched synthetic thudding. This electronic sound-track is not unlike the one 
accompanying the cell-like imagery in the very beginning of the film. The allusion to 
micro-levels is here made not only via the close focus onto the rocky material of the 
Jetty, but also via the voice-over. Its text brings sound and image together by talking 
about crystals at the microscopic level of the Jetty's materiality. 
The various sounds that furnish this filmic moment carry over onto the next 'image', 
which pulls my view back onto a wider stretch of the Jetty. I am observing a man, 
presumably Smithson, first walking than running along its shape. This male figure 
seems at first to be chased by the helicopter. His hair and clothes are blowing in the 
wind produced by the chopper right above him. He runs and stumbles as if on a 
hasty escape from the apparatus in the sky. At other times, however, it seems that it 
is he who is chasing the shadow of the helicopter, thrown in front of him, onto the 
Jetty. This struggle for assertion performed between helicopter and man ends when 
he arrives at the centre of the Spiral. Here he pauses and looks up at his adversary: 
the helicopter. Meanwhile, I, placed by the camera in the helicopter, am looking 
down at him, whilst listening with him to the engine noise. The man and the 
helicopter, give me two different pOSitions for the perception of this scene: I sense 
the sound of the helicopter with him, and adopt his position in this listening 
experience, the visual position above in the helicopter detaches me and makes me 
observe his running and struggling from a distance. This double pOSition creates a 
constant tension disabling an easy affiliative perception. When the male figure has 
arrived at the centre of the Jetty the two positions split. The helicopter pulls out, flies 
high up into the air and presents the whole jetty from far away. Up here the sound of 
the helicopter dominates and the dual position ceases. I am sonically as well as 
visually inside the helicopter now, enjoying temporarily a consolidated viewing and 
listening position. This position is however more and more at a distance from the 
man beneath, who has become part of the Jetty and invisible in its stony patterns. 
This scene, I argue, deviates from the character of the film by including a 
montage dynamic within the scene. The conflictual relationship between the 
man and the helicopter, the view from above, the sound from underneath, 
presents me with a antagonistic juxtaposition which forges a synthetic 
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solution. I am not given material to unpack and play with anymore. The 
sudden working with a directive montage strategy within one scene, I argue, 
produces an acceleration and intensification of the artist's intention. The artist 
puts pressure on me to reach a particular understanding. The tension between 
the man and the helicopter produces a dialectic conflict. In response, as a 
resolution of this particular dialectic tension, I am given the view of the Spiral 
Jetty from above. Up here the Jetty becomes an image, the earlier tension with 
the ground level is consolidated in this aesthetisation from far away. 
We are flying away from the Jetty now and are curving in-land and back, flying 
over it at peculiar angles. The Jetty becomes a total artwork, framed in the 
peculiar angles of the fly-overs. The diverse elements are held in a poetic 
frame. The fragmentary elements of collage are sublimated to this frame. My 
effort of practice is undermined in its ideological resolution. The closure of 
the footage in this one scene anticipates the reading of the whole film as an 
objective totality. The visual and sonic material: the stones, the water, the 
helicopter, space etc., come to be identified in relation to a lexical symbolism. 
The signifying practice triggered by a tendential quality is over-ridden. The 
individual elements are sublimated in favour of a consensual, symbolic 
reading. At the same time the viewer is re-positioned as a socio-historically 
fixed aesthetic viewer, and the film is identified in relation to a symbolic style. 
7 
When the helicopter flies closer in, I observe the male figure on his way back to the 
land, and hear the engine picking up again. The voice-over starts to narrate 
something poetic about appearances. Whilst the voice is talking the helicopter 
sounds dip. This makes me aware that these sounds are never 'real' and in synch 
with the imagery. Instead they form an artificial synthesis, a sonic composition, 
which evens-out certain visual stutters. The uninterrupted engine sound of the 
helicopter smoothes over the gaps and ensures a constant listening plane, which 
assures my viewing position inside the helicopter to be constant also. The voice-
over shifts slightly from the narrative on spiral appearances to analogues between 
spirals and headaches. Medical connections between the Spiral Jetty and the body 
are being drawn. An intensification of a physical experience by way of this analogy 
to pain is, if not experienced, at least signalled as an idea of the work. Finally the 
helicopter leaves the scene and flies away. 
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I am asking myself whether or not this voice-over challenges the apparent 
aesthetic closure that precedes it? In response I contend that this scene 
reasserts a collage strategy which allows me to work out of the context forged 
in the last scene. The foreclosure of the film achieved through the 
acceleration and intensification of montage in the previous scene (6) is 
arrested momentarily. This enables me to question its consolidated shape and 
to continue a contingent practice. However, the next shot relativises my 
autonomous practice yet again, and the film ends in a certain denouement, the 
ultimate folding back of its expression onto the mechanism and location of its 
production: the cutting table and a poster sized image of the Jetty above it. 
8 
The film cuts into the cutting-room. There is a cutting table and on the wall hangs an 
image of the Spiral Jetty. There is no sound in this scene apart from a rather 
oppressively silent atmos-track. It goes dark and the credits come up. 
Conclusion 
Formally this film works in four main parts: The planing phase, the building of 
the Jetty, the surveying stage and finally the revelation of the producing 
mechanism. These four parts formulate a complex presentation of sonic and 
visual material of water, rocks, machines, micro-particles, books,dinosaurs, 
etc.. Potentially these individual elements could be practised in varied 
connections, extending the work infinitely. However, I argue that in-between 
the scenes, montage moments produce conflicting juxtapositions, which 
forge a particular (synthetic) reading. The dialectic conflict imposes an 
ordering dynamic and stages a linear building process that constructs a 
consensual (narrative) plot. In relation to this narrative sense the material 
elements come to delineate particular themes and concerns such as energy, 
micro-levels, territory, myths, strength, geology, etc .. They are perceived in 
reference to a symbolic lexicon employed to substitute and replace the 'gap' 
produced at the junctures between scenes. 
Via my affiliation to the symbolic order I read the film in an aesthetic 
appreciation, understood as a poetic stoppage. Any lack of consensual sense, 
I argue, is made up for by a symbolic (fetish) replacement. This replacement 
repairs the break with the symbolic order provoked by the textual complexity 
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on the level of the scene, and thus re-establishes a consensual 
comprehension, a (synthetic) poetic reading. The poetic aesthetic is thus 
clarified as a reading of the material in relation to a symbolic order. Whilst this 
assures a total understanding of the work, this aesthetic 'knowledge', I argue, 
hinders my practising of its material in perception. The intricacies, the play, 
the freedom and complexity of the material on the level of the scene is 
arrested. The centrifugal knotting effort with complex elements is sublimated 
to this objective (narrative) totality. The connection between the elements as 
themes, I contest, is a willful imposition of the artist's intention. The totality 
which is worked out between his intention and the symbolic register ensures 
the communication of the whole film but delimits any individual imagination 
practised in a sensorial engagement. 
The framework of this chapter; the differentiation between my perception of 
the visual and sonic material presented, and the theoretical investigation of 
this perception, foregrounds this distinction between the material strategy 
experienced on the level of the scene, and at the point of connection between 
the scenes, where such scenes are juxtaposed in the production of the whole 
film. The scenes allow for an individuated generative sense. By contrast the 
montage moments undermine this individuation in the production of a 
consensual sense. 
I contend that the last part of the film accelerates this montage sequencing 
and contextualises the understanding of the film in a final denouement: its 
machine of production, the cutting table, and the summarising still-image of 
the Jetty. The autonomy of the individual scene is thereby conclusively 
sublimated for the purpose of the whole film. Its production in perception is 
paralysed for the realisation of this totality. In conclusion I thus re-assert my 
interpretation of Smithson's film Spiral Jetty as a collage-montage. 
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Fig. 4 
Collage-Montage 
Total Film 
1. 
Key 
_ 3. 
1. Temporal-collage scene with complex material elements. Their tendential 
symbolic triggers a centrifugal practice of perception. This is an individual 
and generative practice, which imaginatively extends the material outward 
in the contingent circumstance of the subject (individuated and generative 
sense). 
2. Montage moments in-between scenes. These moments organise the 
material 'internally' in relation to conflicting juxtapositions according to a 
symbolic register. Thereby the scenes' complex material elements are 
sublimated. 
3. Subject position. The (aesthetic) subject rests outside the films poetic 
structure. He/she surveys the dialectic conflict from that 'meta-position' 
and is directed to perform a synthetic reading of the elements in relation to 
the poetic structure according to the montage pressures. The ideological 
drive of the author as montageur achieves a sublimation of the complexity 
of the scenes in relation to the organisation of the film as an objective 
totality (consensual narrative sense). 
The basis of my critique of the moment of montage in-between scenes as 
constructing a denouement, is that it organises the complex material in 
hindsight. The montage moment in-between the scenes belabours the 
material, it locks it in relation to a symbolic order, and thus imposes a 
meaning upon the subject, who in turn is assumed as a collective symbolic 
subject also. The montage drive orders and sublimates any individual, 
imaginative ponderings as deviations from its grand narrative. By contrast, 
the scenes offer a material indulgence that I understand to undo the 
ideological certainty and drive of the total film and thus frees subjectivity to 
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pursue a centrifugal and generative practice. This I understand is the critical 
challenge of temporal-collage as I aim to pursue it. 
Centrifugality suggests a dematerialization, in the sense of a 
conceptualisation, and such a conceptual understanding stresses the 
individuation of the artwork in perception. I thus conclude that at the same 
time as the whole film is striving towards a consolidated expression, the 
(temporal-collage) scene allows for temporary connections of the material, not 
in itself and not in strict reference to an ideological or symbolic order either, 
but in an emotive participation. 
Thus, for the purpose of my strategy of a complex material practice, and 
instead of furthering an intentional production of the whole film as a total 
artwork, my interest remains with the level of the scene. I identify the scene as 
a 'temporal-collage'. The 'temporal' delineates collage as a perceptual process 
in time, and 'collage' establishes this process within Julia Kristeva's 
signifying practice of the text as a 'fitting together, detaching, including, and 
building' (Kristeva, 1984, p102). Her textual practice introduces a useful 
argument against the ideological dynamic of montage, and also establishes a 
critique of the signifying practice of Barthes' accent, ruled out early on, on the 
grounds of its inherent negativity. Kristeva's practice allows me to clarify the 
term 'disjointing', whilst collage enables me to partner it with 'bricolaging', 
and together they produce, in an endless knotting mobility, the artwork as a 
material complex. I understand the motivation for my own video work in 
relation to this quality of the scene. I engage the material, sonic and visual, in 
a complex assemblage, in order to enable the production of the work as a 
temporal-collage. 
The understanding of the symbolic as a tendential quality rather than an 
order, too, is crucial for this practice. It allows me to think the material beyond 
the collective in a contingent perception and not as an overflow of 
signification. Symbolism as a tendential quality is a radical re-interpretation of 
the relationship between symbolism and Kristeva's text. I interpret her ideas 
of 'text' in relation to her other three signifying practices, in order to consider 
its relationship with the symbolic order and to produce a break with this order 
whilst remaining unaffected by the negative of this action: endlessly mobile. 
This allows me to consider a symbolic practice that remains individual in its 
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particular execution whilst also sharing the collective symbolisation as a 
tendential trait. In the same sense I understand my audio-visual work to 
enable a general realm for a particular symbolisation without a clear reference 
to a symbolic order. 
Clarifying perception as practice, in distinction to the experience of 
knowledge, I have shifted the responsibility of complexity away from the artist 
onto the viewing and listening subject as a singular subject. What is thus 
elucidated as a central issue of my project is the status of the subject in 
relation to the artwork as a materially complex temporal-collage. This chapter 
focuses on materiality and neglects the subject, assuming its involvement at 
the periphery of the argument. This leaves me with the task of contesting the 
viability and nature of such subjectivity assumed here. The perceptual 
emphasis of temporal-collage foregrounds the spectator before the author or 
the text. In the next chapter I investigate this generative spectatorship after 
the death of the author, after modernism, in relation to Lyotard's 'Postmodern 
Condition' of perpetual practice. Chapter 3 investigates and clarifies such a 
subject in relation to the subject of Andrei Tarkovsky's film Stalker. 
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Stalker; The Subject in Temporal-Collage 
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In this chapter I clarify the subject of temporal-collage in relation to Andrei 
Tarkovsky's film Stalker. I parallel 'Stalker', the subject on screen, with the subject 
watching the film through Tarkovsky's mis-en-scene, 'the Zone'. Borrowing Barthes' 
notion of an 'ecrivant', I identify Stalker and the subject viewing the film as transitive 
subjects, 'spectatants', producing the Zone and the film continually in a signifying 
practice. To argue the particularity of this perceptual activity, I stage the Zone as 
postmodern condition of here and now. This idea is investigated via the theorisation 
of postmodernity as discussed by Jean-Fram;ois Lyotard. The playful enunciation of 
his subject is brought to bear on the filmic material, and also enters into 
correspondence with Kristeva's ideas on the 'subject in process/on trial'. The 
relationship between his rules of the postmodern game and her contract of the 'trial 
of sense and identity', renew a consideration of the symbolic. Thus, I argue for the 
Zone as a space of 'tendential' symbolism and stage the 'spectatant' as a symbolic 
subject after modernism. 
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Introduction 
This chapter investigates and clarifies the subject of temporal-collage introduced in 
Chapter 2. This clarification is developed through Barthes' idea of an 'ecrivant'.80 I 
investigate and borrow Barthes' notion of a transitive writer, and transpose its 
vernacular 'authority' onto the spectator. Thus I contest my understanding of the 
viewer-practitioner, as proposed via Kristeva in the last chapter, within the terms of a 
'spectatant'. I acknowledge the viewer as a transitive subjectivity, producing the film 
in perception. This argument problematises an interpretative discussion of the film 
Stalker and shifts the focus towards a consideration of interpretation as generative 
perception. Subsequently, this stresses the distinction between the conception of an 
authoritative, right, reading of a work of art, and its contingent production in 
perception, and problematises identity. Barthes' theory of writing allows me to re-
think the authority of the film and the position of its viewer, and aids me to develop 
my investigation. 
Having established the idea of the spectatant, I then bring its spectre into contact 
with the subject of Andrei Tarkovsky's film Stalker. I argue that on 'Entering the 
Zone', the central mis-en-scene of Tarkovsky's film, I become a subject spectatant. I 
contest this active and temporary subjectivity in relation to the activity of the 
'Stalker', who I suggest is an ecrivant. I then parallel Stalker as an active subject on 
screen, with the active subject watching the film. I argue that both have a transitive 
character and continually practise the Zone. In the Zone, 'apprehensional 
knowledge', in the sense of Hegel's 'moment of pure apprehension', is discounted. 
Only a temporary practice of perception, the 'moment of true experience', when the 
object is constituted in practice, produces the 'travellers' advancement through its 
terrain (Kristeva, 1984, p196). Following this distinction, I argue that the subject 
viewing the film, understood as a spectatant, produces the film through his/her 
practice of viewing. The notion of such a production in perception conflates the 
spectatant with my subject of temporal-collage and affirms its active identity within 
this terminology. 
80 In his text 'Ecrivains et ecrivant' (1960), Roland Barthes identifies the writer, the ecrivain, 
and the person who is writing, the ecrivant. Whilst the first is a recognised authority of 
writing, who uses as well as confirms the orthodoxies and conventions of literature, the 
second is a subject who is at this moment involved in the process of writing. The ecrivant 
writes as he speaks, continually in the present without being self-consciously limited by the 
authority of traditions and conventions. His language is a device rather than an assured and 
critically ratified material in and of itself. In this chapter I elaborate on this distinction in 
relation to the specatator. 
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From here I argue the Zone as text, in the sense of Kristeva's fourth signifying 
practice. The focus on the subject aids me to re-stage and confirm my argument for 
the correspondence between temporal-collage and her textual practice. This 
correspondence re-stated, I comprehend the artwork's material complexity as 
constituted in the sense-making process performed in the action of perception. Thus 
I can conceive of both, the material and the subject, not as objective entities, fixed 
and identified, but as transitive activities. This conception is facilitated and framed by 
Kristeva's theories of the 'subject in process/on trial': her notion of a generative 
subject whose sense and identity is produced in the continual trial of articulation that 
is the signifying practice. This allows me to argue for a subject that is not bound up 
with the dialectic of a social and an asocial identity, and is not identified within the 
conception of a subjective relativism either. I want to avoid slipping into the negative 
and into relativism here. I do so by focusing on the singularity of the subject in its 
place and time specific, generative relationship with the object. In this, I particularly 
argue against Donald Kuspit, who, in his essay 'Collage: the Organizing Principle of 
Art in the Age of the Relativity of Art', articulates collage as a relativist strategy. 
Problematising his ideas, I argue that the subject defines itself continually through its 
perceptual particularity. Thus, rather than formulating a generalisation about 
subjectivity, I highlight particularity, spatially and temporally. 
I investigate this particularity in relation to Fran<;ois Lyotard's 'Postmodern 
Condition'. I argue that Lyotard's positioning of the 'postmodern' as the here and 
now 'condition' of a game, offers a critical method to articulate a generative subject 
on trial that produces its 'reality' through doing, 'par Ie fait' (Lyotard, 1979). I agree 
with his critique of a modernist, romantic distantiation, and identify the signifying 
practice of the Zone (temporal-collage) in his continual here and now. I argue this 
contingent active production of reality in conjunction with the way in which 8arthes' 
ecrivant produces through writing, and my spectatant produces through spectating. 
However, I then go on to articulate a critique of Lyotard's condition in relation to his 
separation between the game and its rules. This separation, I argue, inadvertedly 
brings me (back), through synthesis, to a meta-position of discourse established in 
the dialectic recuperation. The separation between the moves of the game, and its 
rules, I argue, separates the subject's activity from its concurrent social contract, 
which is thus posited at its base. This realisation leads me to re-consider the issue 
of a symbolic order understood as a social contract underlying the semiotic motility 
of social expression in Kristeva's signifying practices. 
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The symbolic as discussed via Barthes assures a collective meaning. My 
consideration of Kristeva's textual practice has so far yielded a different 
understanding of the symbolic, not as an order but as a quality. However, the focus 
on the subject spectatant on trial producing the Zone re-evaluates this. I argue that 
her separation between the modalities of the semiotic 'drive' and the symbolic 
'matter' in the enunciation of the speaking subject forges a dialectic in-between. This 
in-between is overcome in the (synthetic) formation of an ever new symbolic. 
Although Kristeva proposes a dynamic understanding that is 'endlessly mobile', I 
critique the 'foundational' nature of her position via my notion of a tendential 
symbolism. This symbolism, I propose, works not from a symbolic order, but 
considers the symbolic quality of things in relation to a particular and temporal 
realisation thereof by the subject understood as a subject spectatant on trial. This, I 
argue, critiques the notion of a consensual 'order' assumed on the basis of things, 
and thus disables the idea of totality. 
To demonstrate this proposition, I argue the Zone as a space of tendential 
symbolism, and the travellers in the Zone are contested as symbolic subjects after 
modernism, a priori as neo-symbolic subjects. These travellers, I argue, produce the 
Zone in relation to the symbolic quality of their surroundings, but not in reference to 
a symbolic register. I further contest that the postmodern subject is not identified in 
relation to a collective symbolism. What is shared collectively is a tendential 
symbolic and social quality, and the desire to realise this quality rather than an 
actual order /register of symbolisation or socialisation. This assertion of a tendential 
quality marks the difference between my signifying practice of temporal-collage and 
Kristeva's signifying practice of the text, bound as it is to the notion of a symbolic 
order. 
Viewing Stalker: Issues of Interpretation and Experience 
In his book The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, Mark LeFanu points out that although 
it might be profitable to follow a strictly interpretative discussion of Stalker, such a 
discussion in his terms would produce distortions. LeFanu suggests that a 
hermeneutic criticism over-explains the work and betrays its experience. He 
understands formalism to be the only mechanism which can truly elucidate the value 
of a work of art. For him formalism is thus (alas paradoxically), central to his 
discussion of the film Stalker. Following LeFanu's inquiry I contest that Andrei 
Tarkovsky's films in general, and his work Stalker in particular, pose a problem to 
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the critic who tries to grasp and conclusively interpret the filmic material. It is as if 
the complexity of Tarkovsky's audio-visual expressions gets in the way of a 
communicable interpretation. So much gets lost and flattened-out in the quest for 
shared comprehension that no understanding is achieved beyond what concerns the 
mechanism of interpretation itself. All we seem to be able to talk about is the formal 
arrangement of his work. The 'what' of experience, I argue, is produced in a more 
sensible and individual discovery. 
In my own discussion of Stalker I am using a formal description. I do this not for the 
same reasons as Le Fanu however. My interest lies not in presenting the value of 
the film in the sense of its 'grandeur, importance and authority', nor am I interested 
in finding a conclusive and consensual interpretative understanding of the material 
presented (LeFanu, 1987, p92). Rather, the formal consideration allows me to 
reflect on interpretation as an individual pursuit. I argue that in the particularity of an 
individual and contingent viewing, interpretation is never a distortion but a 
production in perception. The form of the artwork, the film, is the platform of 
experience not however its limit. My use of formalism, then, is paradoxical too. 
However, the paradox lies not, as it does for LeFanu, between authority and form, 
but between form and individual experience. The individual interpretation of form, I 
argue, becomes its production in perception. The authority lies with the spectator, 
and the interpretation becomes the artwork as a generative action. Thus the value of 
the artwork lies in the conviction of its own interpretative production rather than in 
relation to presumed orthodoxies of valuation. 
This turning away from an evaluative criticism, toward a production of the film in 
terms of perceptual processes, I suggest, is in keeping with my ideas about 
production in perception as contested in relation to temporal-collage. I stage this 
argument vis-a-vis Roland Barthes' notion of an ecrivant (a person writing) as 
distinct from I'ecrivain (the writer), and employ his terminology in reference to his 
declaration of 'La mort de I'auteur' in 1968 (the Death of the Author). In his text 
'Ecrivain et ecrivant' (orig. 1960) Barthes debates two different forms of 'writing'. 
L' ecrivain is the person who writes, for the term ecrivain is a noun. According to 
Barthes, he is an author who uses and produces the institutional monopoly over 
language. He presents a literary tradition and institution, 'Ia grande langue frangaise' 
(Barthes, 1964, p148). By contrast, I'ecrivant is described as a different voice of 
action. The '-ant' denotes the present participle, thus the ecrivant is writing; he is 
produced continually in the process of his own production. At the time Barthes 
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coined the term ecrivant, authorship had not been taken apart entirely yet. In effect, I 
understand the shift from ecrvain to ecrivant as an important step towards its 
destruction. However, once the author has been declared dead, and the text, the 
artwork, has become foregrounded, the search for criticality has to take place in the 
realm of readership.81 I work with Barthes' terminology on the other side of the text: 
the author is dead and the text has attained an autonomous position, now I contest 
its reader: the spectator is opened to the problem of a transitive subjectivity. 
investigate Barthes' subject ecrivant in order to transpose it onto the spectator. 
'L'ecrivain accomplit une fonction, I'ecrivant une activite' (The writer performs a 
function, the person writing an activity), (ibid., p148, my translation). What they have 
in common is 'parole', spoken language. But the ecrivain is the professional, who 
works this language through technique and artisanship, and for whom, according to 
Barthes, the material of language is its own end. Barthes calls his process 
tautological, and his motivation narcissistic: The writer answers his questions about 
the world through language, and thus language always also defines the answers.82 
I'ecrivain congoit la litterature comme fin, Ie monde la lui renvoie comme moyen: et c'est 
dans cette deception infinie, que I' ecrivain retrouve Ie monde, un monde etrange 
d'ailleurs, puisque la litterature Ie represente comme une question jamais, en definitive, 
comme une reponse. 83 (Ibid., p149) 
81 This shift from the author to the text and subsequently from the text to the reader, the 
spectator, is central to my project. Barthes' 'Death of the Author', aids me to stage and 
situate this shift. In his terms, once the author is removed, the idea that one can truly 
decipher a text becomes utterly useless. He suggests that it is the Author who gives the text 
'un cran d'arret' (a cut off pOint, my translation), which assures the signification of this text. I 
understand this 'cran d'arret' in the sense of an 'aesthetic stoppage' as articulated in relation 
to the poetic in chapter 2. Barthes' suggestion that the critic needs this cut off point to 
estimate the value and meaning of the work, supports this connection. Without the author, 
without the institutional frame and value, to borrow further from Barthes, 'tout est a demeler, 
mais rien n'est a dechiffrer' ('Everything can be mixed, but nothing is there to decipher if). 
Instead 'Ia litterature, ( ... ), en refusant d'assigner au texte (et au monde comme text) un 
"secret", c'est-a-dire un sense ultime, libere une activite que I'on pourrait appeler contre-
theologique' (,Literature, ( ... ) by refusing to give the text (and the world understood as text) a 
"secret", in the sense of an ultimate meaning, ( ... ) liberates an activity, which one could call 
counter-theological') (Barthes, 1964, p66, my translation). I adopt the liberating characteristic 
of this activity in order to articulate the activity of the subject perceiving the work as temporal-
collage. Disregarding the sense that comes from authorship and its institutional and 
conventional readings, I argue, the subject produces contingent 'senses' instead. 
82 I contend that this tautological understanding of writing as produced by the eCrlvam, 
resonates the tautological character of Eisenstein's montage theory. Eisensteinian montage 
too produces an expression that works from the 'reality' of its own material expression 
toward its own 'reality' of the film, which is in turn legitimated within this totality. 
83 The writer seizes literature as an end, the world offers it to him as a means: and it is in 
this infinite deception, that the ecrivain finds the world, a world which is unknown, until 
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For this writer, Barthes suggests, the verb writing is intransitive; the real is only ever 
a pretext for language and is explained from a distance. The benefit of this writing 
he sees in its ability to produce a vertiginous spectacle, a fiction. What the writer 
produces is literature and values: the notion of a 'bien-ecrire' (well written); the 
system of its aesthetic judgement. 
By contrast, the ecrivant has a transitive character. For him language, which Barthes 
in this instance calls speech, is a means rather than an end. In this respect Barthes 
calls his project naive: 
iI n'admet pas que son message se retourne et se ferme sur lui-meme, et qu'on puisse y 
lire, d'une fagon diacritique, autre chose que ce qu'il veut dire ( ... ). II considere que sa 
parole met fin a une ambiguite du monde, institue une explication irreversible (meme s'il 
admet provisoire), ou une information incontestable (meme s'il veut modeste 
enseignant).84 (Ibid., p151) 
For the ecrivant his expression is an individual and subjective expression, 
provisional and inquisitive possibly, but not ambiguous. I argue that it is made 
unambiguous due to the particularity of the subject ecrivant. Ambiguity arises in the 
generality of language, not in the particularity of the action of writing. By contrast, for 
the writer his text is, in Barthes' terms, monumental, and thus open to interpretation. 
I understand this not as a paradox. Rather, I contend that if you are sure of your 
status as a writer you can accept subjective interpretations and ambiguous readings 
of your work without them destroying the underlying authority of its institutional 
language, and thus without interpretative ambiguity destroying the authority of your 
voice. 
The writing of the subject ecrivant, according to Barthes, due to its place at the 
margins of institutions and transactions, is much more individual. His writing is not 
justified through the notion of a bien-ecrire. It is the urgent individuality of his 
unambiguously subjective speech that justifies its expression, rather than language 
as a homogenised aesthetic system. Such an urgent and individual speech seems 
literature represents it in its questions, but definitively never as an answer. (8arthes, 1964, 
~149, my translation) 
4 He does not admit that his message returns and closes itself on himself, and that one can 
read in it, in a diacritical fashion, more than what he aims to say ( ... ). He believes that his 
speech ends the ambiguity of the world, and institutes an irreversible explanation (even if it is 
admittedly a provisional explanation), or an incontestable information (even if, when he his 
modest, an enquiring one). (Ibid., p151, my translation) 
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to be forever in conflict with conventions of writing and cultural inertia.85 The 
continuously present production of writing is what produces the subject ecrivant, not 
his language (the system). I appreciate his disregard for ontological, pre-existing, 
values, and understand his individual fervour and engagement to lead continuously 
to a particular subjectivity. 
I want to adopt these characteristics of the ecrivant and transpose them on to the 
subject perceiving the artwork: the spectator. I argue that in relation to art practice 
too I can differentiate between the person who understands and produces the work 
from his/her substantive and intransitive position, the critic, and the person who 
produces the work continually from the urgency of his/her transitive subjectivity. I 
thus consider the spectator from two different positions. One is the substantive 
spectator, the spectator who is an aesthetic subject, and follows the 'bien-faire' (well 
done) aesthetic and ontological conventions when appreciating a piece of art. The 
other is a transitive spectator, who produces the work in his subjective vision, 
disregarding conventions, and who is unambiguously individual. Following Barthes' 
terminology I call the first a subject 'spectateur', and name the latter a subject 
'spectatant'. 
In the next part of this chapter I discuss the aesthetic and ideological issues of such 
a subject spectatant in relation to the viewing of the film Stalker. The form of the film 
is understood as parole, the vernacular of film that both the spectateur and the 
spectatant share. The spectatant produces this form in an interpretative production 
of perception. I argue that the interpretation of Stalker by a subject spectatant avoids 
the distortions of a hermeneutic criticism through its unambiguous individuality; it 
ignores the 'grandeur' and 'authority' as searched for by LeFanu and establishes a 
temporary authority in the conviction of its own perception. Such an individual and 
generative interpretation produces the material as a means to an individual 
85 According to Barthes it is the task of the ecrivantto state without hesitation what he thinks; 
and in this urgency and subjectivity lies his criticality. At the same time, the function of the 
ecrivain and his literary language is to transform such critical production into a commodity, to 
make it writable in a conventional sense. I understand that my notion of critical futility, which I 
argued repeatedly in relation to the notion of a singular subject, lies exactly in such a re-
occurring transformation. Barthes concludes that today there exists the possibility to be an 
'ecrivain-ecrivant'. He suggest that one can become a 'bastard', and work on both sides of 
parole, as a writer and writing. In this sense he closes the cycle and accepts its dialectic as 
inevitable. However, he also acknowledges either use of language as worthy of critical 
consideration. Following his argument, even if I have to assume that any artistic articulation 
in a singular production, is always and inevitably brought back to a collective understanding, 
I argue that the action of the subject ecrivant nevertheless explains the criticality and the 
necessity of its writing. 
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expression, rather than thinking of the material as a means to a (collective, 
evaluatively interpretative) end. 
Entering the Zone: Becoming a Spectatant 
Following my proposed methodology I stage Tarkovsky's film Stalker in relation to a 
formal arrangement. Formally, the film can be divided into three parts. Quite 
conventionally I can understand them as beginning, middle and end. Although they 
do not exactly perform these functions, this separation aids me to investigate my 
perception of the work. In a generative interpretation of this separation I work out my 
(narrative) sense of this formal arrangement, according to the conviction of my 
urgent and individual perception. 
Fig. 1 (The Structure of Stalker) 
Sepia toned scenes which 
which 
The Zone Sepia toned scenes 
Introduce characters and 
characters into 
colour re-introduce the 
Location their original habitat 
1. 2. 3. 
1. The film starts with a sequence of scenes filmed in sepia tones. These are 
linear in organisation and introduce the viewer to the characters and locations. 
I view these first few scenes from a distance, following the film's unidirectional 
movement. The chronology of my reading and the distance of my position is 
particularly apparent in the domestic scenes. Stalker lies awake in his 
bedroom next to his sleeping child and wife, obviously uneasy and deep in 
thought. The ensuing domestic drama, the Stalker making himself ready to 
leave; his wife raging about her abandonment and in tears, I view from the 
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comfortable distance of a conventionally disaffected viewer. I have been led 
into this scene by a camera sneaking in through what must be a door or a 
window. I am invisible to the protagonists. I am a voyeur looking in, getting to 
know the characters, their emotional tensions and personal tragedies, without 
being exposed myself. The subsequent scenes, the meeting of, first the 
Writer, and then the Professor, the two characters Stalker is going to lead into 
the Zone, remain in the same 'tone'. I am at a distance getting to know the 
characters, their history and location. In the bar, where all three characters 
come together, I am literally outside the set even. Throughout the journey to 
the Zone, I remain in this distanced viewing position. I am engaged, gripped 
by the development of the narrative. I fear they will be captured, or shot, that 
they will not make it to the Zone after all. However, at this stage, I identify no 
more no less than in any narrative action film. 
2. Once the film cuts from the close up of the head of the Writer, filmed in 
sepia tinted film-stock, to the lush, green mis-en-scene of the Zone my 
position changes. The protagonists start looking back at me. Their gaze draws 
me into their midst. I am here with them, a fourth character. Their 
conversations all of a sudden include me, as if I am meant to hear what they 
are saying and am very much counted in as a fourth party. I am differently 
involved in the film from this point on. I am not a voyeuristic spectator following 
a teleological narrative anymore. Whilst the first scenes could have played out 
without my viewing them, here my presence becomes central to the 
production of the film. I exist in the gaze of the Stalker, the Writer and the 
Professor, and my gaze produces the tension of the film. I know the Zone as 
little as them and have to accept that it is different all the time, unpredictable 
and changing. Even after viewing the film several times I hesitate, I can't 
remember. No prior knowledge is going to help them through the Zone. There 
are too few reference points for me to re-position any sense produced in a 
prior viewing. I too become afraid, anxious and uncertain about the path to 
take to the 'Room', which is the aim of the journey. Very early on it is 
mentioned that there is a linear path to that destination. But the travellers are 
prevented by the Zone (or their own fear?) from taking that path. Instead the 
Zone coerces them and me through its ever changing terrain. 
The Zone transforms itself constantly. The Stalker needs to throw a metal nut 
in order to avoid the shifting pitfalls of the terrain. And although he is the 
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guide, he too is at the mercy of these changes. However, he seems to have a 
particular position in that he defends its processes in the face of the Writer's, 
the Professor's and my own frustrations about its apparent nonsense. 
The changes of the Zone are dependent on one's own conviction and 
character. It is the Writer's and the Professor's unconscious attitude towards 
life that build the Zone and which will kill them or let them pass in the process 
of its production. It seems like a double bind until you let go and accept that 
there is nothing to do but to walk the path that you create yourself. In this 
sense the content and the form of the Zone are enmeshed in each other. The 
content reflects on the production processes. The walking of the Zone is 
produced in the viewing of the film in the same way that the Zone is produced 
in the walking of its terrain. My unconscious attitude of viewing produces the 
Zone as seen. 
The Zone could just be a dream, it could exist solely in my imagination. My 
hold on a consensual (narrative) meaning is slipping: interpretation becomes 
imaginative production. Maybe I conjured up the characters myself. I am 
acutely aware of the detachment of these characters from nominal identities. 
Outside the characters' 'original' circumstance their titles -Stalker, Writer, 
Professor- lose their status. The protagonists are stripped bare and are left 
with nothing but their present being. Once I have abandoned their sure 
(analytically interpretative) identity, I cannot tell how much the characters are 
produced in my imagination and how much they are there, on screen. I too 
feel rather exposed and outside my habitual circumstance in this perception. 
This is not a viewing I can sit in as a Critic, I cannot produce a consensual 
interpretation to share with an audience. The value of my interpretative 
production lies in my contingent conviction. In the Zone I am a solitary viewer. 
The mis-en-scene is produced in my imagination: it is through my desires, my 
thoughts and my existential anxieties that I produce the characters' journeys 
and mine too. The film is a set up: you think you can view somebody else's 
existential struggle and are promptly confronted with your own. 
3. The formal characteristics of the last scenes refer back to the beginning. 
They share the sepia tint of the opening scenes, and also their pace and feel 
of domesticity. However, having journeyed through the Zone with the Stalker I 
am now in a different position than at the beginning of the film. I remain in a 
113 
close relation to the audio-visual material. I am acknowledged as a viewer in 
the gaze of the protagonists. I perceive my position as less generative and 
imaginative than it was inside the Zone. However, I am not back in the 
position of a distanced viewer. Instead, I understand myself to be represented 
by the Dog who followed the Stalker out of the Zone. The Dog is sitting there 
at the edge of the frame. In a docile manner he follows the Stalker back to his 
place. Just like him, I am somewhere at the periphery of the image, looking 
on, but sharing the 'knowledge' of a 'moment of true experience' in the Zone 
(Kristeva, 1984, p196). The acknowledgement of my presence is sealed when, 
having put the tired, angry and disillusioned Stalker to bed, the wife tells me 
her story. 
I argue that the sequence of scenes at the beginning produces the film in relation to 
conventions of film sense; a teleological and linear narrative progression leading to 
a denouement in consensual meaning, bound to a detached viewing position. The 
audio-visual material employed is worked through the orthodoxies of film-making; its 
systemic conventions. Consequently the film at this point exists in relation to a 
spectateur, an intransitive spectator, who queries the filmic material in relation to its 
institutional conventions and finds his/her reading within these conventions also. By 
contrast, once I am in the Zone, I cannot adopt such an intransitive meta-position. It 
is as if the Zone refuses the conventional methods of reading and provokes a 
continual writing by the spectator instead. I argue that the urgent and individual 
search for the fulfilment of one's 'innermost desire', which is after all the travellers' 
reason for entering the Zone and plodding a path to the Room, becomes the 
motivation that generates the journey as well its viewing. In the Zone it is my 
individual and generative interpretation of the material that produces my sense of 
the film. The 'value' of this sense, I contend, lies in my conviction rather than in an 
authoritative evaluation of the film in relation to a 'bien-filmer' (well-filmed). 
The understanding of this journey and its viewing formulates thus a very individual 
and in Barthes' terms a 'naive comprehension'; rejecting ambiguity whilst refusing to 
adopt consensual sense at the same time. My desire is not abatted at the end of the 
film. It could never be. Instead it evolves in the process of walking and viewing. I 
understand the fact that neither the Writer nor the Professor ultimately step into the 
room that they have journeyed through such adverse territory for is testimony to this. 
The rejection of this room, which was supposed to fulfil their innermost desire, I 
understand as the rejection of a denouement. Every time I watch the film I want 
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them to step into the room, in fact I want to enter the room myself. The frustration of 
this non-fulfilment presents me with the fulfilment that lies in the continual journeying 
itself. 
In the Zone I am a subject spectatant, producing the material through my own 
urgent and individual viewing. My sense of the journey is worked out through the 
practising of my own particular perception of the material in a generative 
interpretation. Whilst the Writer and the Professor are such spectatants also, I argue 
that the Stalker is an ecrivant. I understand him as the residue of the Zone's author, 
he guides you through, yet, it is not really his to guide you through. He too is subject 
to its changes. His defence of these changes however distinguishes him from the 
Writer, the Professor, and myself. 
The Stalker displays the naivety of the ecrivant who cannot understand or allow 
ambiguity in his writing. He gets quite tearful and irate at the suggestion that the 
Zone is worthless or should be destroyed. He seems unable to articulate his 
obviously very strongly felt and particular sense of the Zone, which in many 
instances, seems like utter nonsense to his 'three' companions. The principle, 
articulated by the Stalker, that the fulfilment of your innermost desire is only 
apparent once you have left the Zone, is pertinent in this regard. Whereas the 
Stalker, the subject ecrivant, understands the meaning of the Zone as he is writing 
it, what appears as nonsense to the spectateurs turns into individual sense, 
phenomenological non-sense, once we accept the transitivity of our sense and 
identity, when we become spectatants and stop seeking a denouement; a 
consensual resolve to the riddle of the Zone.86 
Once the Stalker gets home we are back in the sepia tinted and linear sequences. 
At home he begins to lament the lack of faith of the 'intelligentsia'. I understand the 
term intelligentsia to refer to the institutional, systemic subjects who produce and 
guard meaning as orthodoxies of science and language, i.e. the subjectivities of the 
Writer, the Professor and the Critic - the spectateurs. I relate to this rage from my 
own twofold viewing position: I am not anymore the distanced viewer of the 
beginning sequences. Having gone with the Stalker through the Zone I am at once 
86 In the introduction to this thesis, I refer such an individual sense, in distinction to 
consensual sense and nonsense, in relation to Merleau-Ponty's 'non-sense' understood as a 
sense established in intersubjective sensation rather than in a rational encounter. I persist 
with this differentiation between nonsense, sense and non-sense here, and elucidate it in 
more detail in chapter 4. 
115 
his confidant as well as a representative of the ideologies he is attacking in his 
disappointment at conventional meaning making processes and values. At this point 
in the film I am split between being a subject spectateur (a Critic) and a subject 
spectatant (viewing). I argue that my continual production of a particular sense of 
the Zone is now re-read through a general sense of aesthetic orthodoxies and 
systemic conventions. I have become a spectateur-spectatant. The viewing 
equivalent of the Barthian ecrivain-ecrivant the person writing brought back to the 
institutional text. 
As a subject spectatant my subjective experience is not equivalent to a 'nominal 
category' in the sense of 'Writer', 'Professor' or 'Critic'. Rather, following Barthes, I 
argue that the legitimisation of my transitive subjectivity lies in my own continual, 
individual and urgent production. To fend off the suggestion that such a transitive 
subjectivity is asocial, and to ensure the sociality of the ecrivant's expression and 
identity, Barthes relies on a foundation of parole and a dialectic dynamic between 
the ecrivain and the ecrivant, the ecrivain ultimately redeeming the subjective 
speech of the ecrivant by returning it to literary language, to make it writable in a 
conventional sense. I do not propose the generative sense and subjectivity of the 
spectatant as the negative to a consensual (narrative) sense or (categorical) 
identity. In this respect I distinguish my idea of the spectatantfrom Barthes' notion of 
a shared foundation of parole. However, neither do I promote the generative 
interpretation of the spectatant as producing a relative nonsense. Rather, I aim to 
avoid a relativist art practice, since, I understand that the relative ultimately leads to 
a negative relation between a systemic, foundational aesthetic interpretation of the 
film, and its urgent utterance (generative interpretation) in individuality. 
To develop this rejection of a relativistic conception of the spectatant, and to link this 
argument to my articulation of temporal-collage as staged in the last chapter, I 
discuss Donald B. Kuspit's notion of collage as a relativist strategy. This 
juxtaposition problematises the relative and tacitly introduces the identification of the 
Zone as temporal-collage. 
In his essay 'the Organizing Principle of Art in the Age of the Relativity of Art', Kuspit 
describes collage as 'relatively rather than absolutely art' (Kuspit, 1989, p40). For 
him, in collage, everything is related to each other and in a poetry of becoming. He 
equates this poetry of becoming with the poetry of relativity and stages it as the 
metaphor for universal becoming. In collage subjectivity and objectivity are lost 
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entirely, in his terms, and everything is relative to the point at 'which all choices of 
being are so relative as to be irrelevant' (ibid., p47). This relative understanding, 
posits collage in a negative relation to a 'positive' understanding of 'absolute art'. 
The dialectic relation reveals the relative to share in the same orthodoxies, 
conventions and ideologies as the absolute. At the same time, the notion of 
'irrelevance' posits collage on the margins of sense, not as phenomenological non-
sense, but as relative nonsense. 87 
To avoid such a negative or irrelevant relativity, I must assume a different link 
between the individual and temporary generation of sense by the spectatant and 
collective sense making processes. In this sense I have to believe in a shared 
connection characterising this activity. The connection I am proposing, however, is 
not a solid and re-presentable foundation as is 8arthes' parole. The sense produced 
in the activity of spectating, I argue, is assured through a tendential symbolic quality 
as introduced in chapter 2. I develop this tendential symbolism and match it to a 
tendential sociality later on. At this stage it is crucial to note that I am aware of the 
difficulty and seeming futility to propose a solitary subject generating sense outside 
the dialectic of communication, given that we are all always already ideological 
subjects, and given the dialectic dynamic of writing and viewing that I employ here. 
87 In Chapter one I differentiated my notion of 'disjointing' from Gilles Deleuze's 'disjunctive 
synthesis' on the basis that his term implies a relative continuity as the principle 
characteristic of sensation. In relation to film Deleuze suggests that all elements are in 
motion (the shot is an image-mouvemen~ relative to each other within 'the plan of the film' 
(Deleuze, 1997). I argued against such a 'relative unity' on the basis of its negative 
relationship with an 'absolute unity'. Here, I re-articulate this critique of relativism in relation 
to Donald B. Kuspit. Kuspit outlines his notion of collage as a relativist art practice, producing 
an 'incongruous synthesis'. He understands the idea of incongruity to keep 'in play (of) the 
possibility of the entry of the many into the one.' (Kuspit, 1989, p42) I understand Kuspit to 
attempt to promote a freeing of the material from categorical imperatives, and stereotypical 
subjectivities. I am inspired by his notion of a playful purposelessness. However, I argue, 
that to call this 'play' within the notion of relativity only ever achieves a fluidity of the material 
and the subject within nominal categories. Although he states that this becoming one is 
never achieved, there never is a completeness, I argue, that the drive of relating the 
individual parts to each other toward synthesis achieves an 'inwardness' in the sense of 
montage's internal relativity; where individual parts are perceived as series within 'the plan of 
the film'; the plan of the collage work. In this sense, his fluid purposelessness is immanently 
recuperated as the negative to a fixed, conventional, purpose. 
Kuspit's understanding of collage as a relativist art practice portrays collage art as a mockery 
of what he terms absolute art. I argue that temporal-collage is absolutely art but this absolute 
is an individual production rather than an institutional, aesthetic judgement. The complex 
elements of temporal-collage are not produced relative to each other. They are autonomous 
in time and space. The practice of these elements in knotting efforts is not confined to a 
closed off (negative) relativity as in montage, and does not promote a 'creative flux of cosmic 
becoming' towards irrelevance either (ibid., p40). Temporal-collage is not a 'mockery of art', 
and neither is it an irrelevant production. Instead, temporal-collage produces complexities 
which are certain and relevant in their particular circumstance of production. 
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The Spectatant as Subject in Process: Sense and Identity on Trial 
In order to develop such a subject spectatant in its sociality, I draw a parallel 
between the Zone and Kristeva's text, and later link this parallel to my notion of 
temporal-collage. I propose that if the Zone is understood as equivalent to her 'text', 
the spectatant becomes re-articulated via Kristeva's 'subject in process/ on trial'. 
Consequently her notion of subjectivity and identity 'on trial' aids me to clarify the 
notion of a generative sense and subjectivity in the Zone. This re-consideration 
confronts both, the Zone/text and the subject, with their ideological positioning. 
In chapter 2 I elaborated an understanding of Kristeva's text as a material 
complexity whose elements are never sublimated and homogenised from a static 
meta-position ('metalanguage'). I argued that the immersive practice of the text does 
not produce a nondisjunctive whole ('narrative'). I also contested, that the 
sublimation that does happen in the perception of this material complex does not 
create a lack, which is imminently filled and redeemed by a (fetish) replacement 
('contemplation'). Her text instead points to 'an endless mobility'; positing elements 
and reactivating them in ever new 'knots of interdependence,.88 As a consequence 
of this understanding I renamed Kristeva's 'knots' in reference to their endless 
mobility and staged them in the present participle as 'knotting points'. Further, via 
her notion of a poetic aesthetics, I argued that the text does not invite an 'aesthetic 
stoppage' but is continually produced through the knotting processes of complex 
elements in perception. The 'end' that is produced from the text is not a 
communicative totality, the text refutes address. Rather, it is a solitary practice. The 
text has no shared outcome, but remains forever a process. Kristeva suggests the 
textual practice as a contingent and temporal process, dependent on updating its 
laws and boundaries which demarcate it all the time. In her terms its heterogeneous 
formation is a continuous passing beyond limits without legitimating its sense 
systematically. 
88 The finity of this 'endless mobility' is re-assessed later on in this chapter when I consider 
Kristeva's signifying practice of the text from the point of view of her subject in process/ on 
trial. This focus shows her mobility not to be endless. It is not entirely without a break. I will 
show that there is a gap between the dynamic of the semiotic and the symbolic modalities of 
her 'endless mobility' which invites a (fetish) replacement, inserted in contemplation from a 
meta-position, and thus leads to a stoppage point in an aesthetic judgement. The 
acknowledgement of this break is the turning point in my use of Kristeva's textual practice. 
For now I remain in agreement with her text however. It offers me a model for the criticality of 
temporal-collage. 
118 
I argue that this understanding of the text corresponds with my understanding of the 
Zone as staged so far. I posit the Zone as a space of mobility, through which 
boundaries are updated all the time. I relate the inability to produce an aesthetic 
stoppage in the text to the impossibility to formulate a stoppage point in the Zone. 
The end that is eventually reached once I leave the Zone, or switch off the film, does 
not produce a communicative totality. It does not produce a consensual sense 
represented in the arrival at the Room: the denouement. I argue that a consensual 
sense of the film as a whole is produced in Kristeva's three signifying practices: 
narrative, metalanguage and contemplation, whilst the Zone is subject to the fourth 
signifying practice, the text. Its significance is produced continually in a particular 
perception.89 
To develop this correspondence and ultimately to bring it into contact with temporal-
collage, I articulate the subject of the Zone, the spectatant, in relation to Kristeva's 
subject in process/on trial producing her text. According to Kristeva, the subject and 
meaning are only phases of the fourth signifying practice. On passing through the 
symbolic in a semiotic motility this subject and meaning take on form. However, this 
form is not a fixed and consolidated identity, but only exists in the dynamic of its own 
motility. She posits this subject as a body in process: a body whose parts are 
'disarticulated' unless it is part of a signifying process. She suggests that 'outside 
the process, its only identity is inorganic, paralyzed, dead.' (Kristeva, 1984, p1 01) 
I contest this identity in process in relation to the subject producing the Zone: the 
spectatant. The 'outside' identity of the Writer and the Professor, men of wisdom, 
prestige and authority, is disabled in the Zone. The nominal unity and totality of 
character that is being promoted in their professional title is, to use Kristeva's term, 
paralysed, dead even, and a 'new' dynamic comprehension of identity takes its 
place. It is then not only the terrain of the Zone, but the bodies travelling through it 
that are 'fragmented, unpredictable and changing'. suggest that the 
correspondences between the text and the Zone rest on such a dynamic subject, 
whose knotting processes produce them both. 
Kristeva arrives at her notion of a subject in process/on trial via her criticism of the 
89 It might appear paradoxical that I do not narrate such an individual and generative 
interpretation. However, my point is not the narration of one particular generative 
interpretation, e.g. mine, rather this text aims to propose a model for a generative perception, 
to be practised by the individual reader. 
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assumed unity of the speaking subject, as articulated in concurrent French theories 
of discourse. In particular she speaks against Edmund Husserl's transcendental 
ego, ,which she understands as the basis of his theoretical discourse.9o She 
disagrees with Husserl's notion of a presupposed homogeneity for ego formation 
and positions her subject squarely in production. Referring to the motility of the 
signifying practice of the text she suggests that 'caught up within this dynamic, the 
human body is also a process.' (Ibid., p1 01) I read her focus on process, against 
transcendental values, in relation to Barthes' 'Death of the Author'; the author being 
identified as a trait of modernity, his death, called for by Barthes in 1968, I argue, 
challenges concurrent aesthetic valuations and necessitates a re-thinking of 
spectatorship.91 
Kristeva grants the theories that work from a transcendental ego a pertinence with 
regard to the first three of her signifying processes, not however in regard to the 
signifying practice of the text. In particular, she critiques such theories of discourse 
and their homogenised subjectivity for their failure to take into account ennuciations 
which expand the limits of what she calls the signifiable. She identifies poetry, music 
and the arts as such expanding enunciations. For her, in the signifying processes of 
the avant-garde, the text and the subject are on trial: neither of them is pre-given, or 
in a meta-position, and both are produced in a 'trial of meaning', a 'trial of sense'. In 
her terms, any metalanguage preserves the systemic understanding. By contrast 
neither the text nor the subject produces meaning within a pre-given system of 
sense production (transcendental aesthetic). 
I am borrowing her notion of a 'trial of sense' in order to articulate the trial of sense 
and identity in the Zone. I argue that the Writer, the Professor, myself as Critic, and, 
even the Stalker are on trial in the Zone. Any prior (apprehensional) knowledge, 
which might aid them through its terrain, is paralysed. At the same time any prior 
90 Kristeva critiques Husserl's transcendental ego since she understands it to imply the 
subject as a unified and knowing subject at a distance from its object. This, she argues, 
allows for a coherence of both the sign and syntax. Thus the Husserlian ego is not a subject 
on trial: It is not a dynamic subject produced in its signifying processes but precedes them. 
91 In this respect Kristeva's articulation of subjectivity as process is useful for my positing of 
the spectatant in relation to issues of postmodern spectatorship. I understand her focus on 
process to confirm the importance to both, free the text from the author, the authority of a 
systemic language, and to free the subject from the authority of a systemic reading. This line 
of thought brings her text in contact with the notion of its (historical and geographical) 
circumstance of viewing and listening; the particular circumstance of spectatorship. Later on 
in this chapter I clarify this circumstance in relation to Jean-Fran90is Lyotard's 'Postmodern 
Condition' . 
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(apprehensional) knowledge, which might help my understanding of the filmic 
material, is in doubt too. In the Zone our sense of self, our identities, and our sense 
of the real, are on trial. To follow Kristeva, the trial of meaning and identity 
formulates a heterogeneous dynamic, which challenges the notion of rationality. I 
understand this to render the Zone not a space of irrationality, negative to a rational 
space and identity. Rather, I argue, the notion of rationality itself is on trial. I contest 
that (rational) sense can only be established temporarily in a provisional and 
particular relation between the individual subject and the text. Thus there is no 
(irrelevant and negative) nonsense in the Zone, there is only 'sense on trial' 
(phenomenological non-sense). However, to live on trial, to live without the 
narrative, metalanguage or contemplation, takes conviction. This is, I argue, the true 
challenge of the Zone. 
Going through the experience of this crucible exposes the subject to impossible dangers: 
relinquishing his identity in rhythm, dissolving the buffer of reality in a mobile 
discontinuity, leaving the shelter of the family, the state, or religion, the commotion the 
practice creates spares nothing: it destroys all constancy to produce another and then 
destroys that one as well. (Ibid., p104) 
The connection between Kristeva's text and my notion of temporal-collage bring this 
challenge to rationality, identity and conviction to temporal-collage also. I contest 
that when I juxtapose this identification of the Zone as text with my articulation of 
temporal-collage within Kristeva's textual practice, then, accordingly, the Zone 
becomes identified as temporal-collage, and its spectatant on trial becomes the 
subject of temporal-collage. 
To demonstrate this articulation of temporal-collage within Kristeva's notion of trial I 
re-employ a graph used in chapter 2. The following illustration presents the quality of 
temporal-collage and stages it in relation to the formal construction of the film 
Stalker. This aids me to demonstrate again the heterogeneous and centrifugal 
qualities of temporal-collage and helps me to confirm these within the particularity of 
the Zone. I thus borrow fig. 1 of this chapter and illustrate the lush-green sequences 
of the Zone, with outward bound arrows and complex elements, to clarify the Zone 
as temporal-collage and to articulate the congruence between the subject of 
temporal-collage and the subject spectatant on trial in the Zone. 
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Fig. 2 
Sepia toned scenes which 
introduce characters and 
locations 
'----> 
1. 
Linear (montage) 
The Zone 
green 
colour 
Temporal-Collage 
Sepia toned scenes which re-
introduce characters into their 
orignial habitat 
3. 
Linear (montage) 
1. This part of the film is constructed according to a linear montage sequence, 
driving the narrative intention of the author. I am a subject spectateur who 
views the film from a meta-position. I relate to the images and sounds in 
relation to their ontological value and structure (tautological). I read the film in 
relation to shared narrative sense (teleologicaly). Thus I respect the authority 
of the author and of film in my construction of a theoretical interpretation. I 
contend that overflows of the consensual sense may occur in my personal 
imaginings, (place of Barthian signifying). However, I argue that these 
overflows are, due to their negative relation to the consensual narrative sense, 
ultimately recuperated within consensual meaning. 
2. These sequences present a non-linear but simultaneous assemblage of 
complex material elements. The Zone produces and is produced by me as a 
subject spectatant on trial. I generate the material seen and heard, as well as 
itself, continually in the trial of rationality, sense and identity that is spectating 
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without the system of a coded authority. Thus I produce the work in generative 
interpretations. The material is worked in centrifugal efforts of production, 
beyond the filmic authority, in the contingent circumstance of viewing. The 
sense produced thus is unambiguously true to its urgent particularity. The 
reference of any such urgent particularity of production to shared conventions 
does not hinder the generative quality of its centrifugal processes. 
3. These sequences are again organised according to a linear montage, driving 
the narrative intention of the author. I return to a meta-position. However, 
having been on trial, my relationship to a coded authority is not subservient 
anymore. The institutional rationality and sense have been put into doubt. And 
despite the continuing belief in narrative processes I know that any 
denouement in the generation of sense and identity, is produced in my 
contingent circumstance of perception only. In this instance I am a spectateur-
spectatant, the material is a poetic collage showing its transgressions of 
systemic objectivity, but already re-systematised within a new aesthetic 
framework. 
This illustration clarifies the subject in the Zone as a 'subject spectatant on trial'. The 
transitivity and particularity of this subject re-articulates the process of production of 
temporal-collage. I argue that the centrifugal motions, the disjointing and bricolaging 
efforts, the continual knotting of complex material elements, all these individual 
processes that produce temporal-collage in an imaginative perception, are now 
clarified within trial of materiality and sense in the Zone. This allows me to propose 
temporal-collage and its subject as 'sense and identity on trial': the artwork is on 
trial; its materiality confirmed as a complexity; its sense continually in production. 
The Zone as Postmodern Condition: The Condition of the Subject Spectatant 
on Trial 
To further contend the subject spectatant on trial in relation to temporal-collage I 
focus on the circumstance of temporal-collage's signifying processes. I thus turn to 
investigate the condition which frames the production of the Zone within the 
signifying practice of temporal-collage. To do so I go back to my identification of the 
spectatant as the spectator after the 'Death of the Author', after modernism. To 
stage this conjunction I discuss the Zone in relation to the 'Postmodern Condition' as 
articulated by Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, and query its subject spectatant on trial vi-a-
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vis his postmodern subject. 
In his essay 'the Sublime and the Avant-Garde' Lyotard offers a clear explanation of 
how he understands the relationship between the author, the work, and the 
spectator after modernism. Discussing the sublime, which he understands as 
'perhaps the only mode of artistic sensibility to characterize the modern' he states 
that 
Henceforth is seems right to analyse the ways in which the subject is affected, its ways 
of receiving and experiencing feelings, its ways of judging works. This is how aesthetic, 
the analysis of the addressee's feelings, comes to supplant poetics and rhetoric, which 
are didactic forms, of and by the understanding, intended for the artist as sender. 
(Lyotard, 1998b, p203) 92 
According to Lyotard, the sublime and thus modernity, includes an over there and 
another time of being. It allows for a meta-position in time and in space.93 By 
contrast the postmodern is only ever now, at this moment and in this place, and thus 
foregrounds the addressee. Barthes took the first step toward the postmodern by 
killing the author and in extension by getting rid of the notion of one authority, history 
and idea of (apprehensional) knowledge for the production of significance. Lyotard 
develops this, I argue, by negating the idea of one spatial and temporal location of 
authority, history and idea of (apprehensional) knowledge for the perception of 
significance. He shifts the focus from production to the moment of perception, and 
disallows any condition that is other than here and now to have any authority over 
the here and now.94 I adopt his postmodern condition, which designates (aesthetic) 
92 According to Lyotard, the sublime alludes to something that is not there to be shown but 
that is conspicuous in its absence. For him, this absence forces a theoretical presence, a 
presence of theory and judgement. The possibility of an absence, of nothing happening, 
induces too much anxiety and fear to just remain undiscussed. The theoretical discussion, 
however, renders it at once happening but also delimits the scope of nothingness in 
representation. Lyotard understands that it is from this apparent absence and nothingness 
that aesthetics asserted its critical right over art, and it is in that aesthetic of absence that 
romanticism and thus modernity is characterised. In other words, the modern is 
characterised by absence, made present in aesthetic criticism from a distance. 
93 I argue that the poetic didacticism, which Lyotard locates at this meta-position, describes a 
'poetic stoppage' as I articulate it in chapter 2. There I suggest that assemblage understood 
via Seitz, as a strategy of replacing the object-reality with an object-poetics, performs a 
stoppage of (art) practice in an aesthetic consolidation of the (art-)work as a whole; a poetic 
totality. Therefore, now, I can clarify the 'poetic stoppage' as a modernist didactic aesthetic 
of intent. 
94 Later on in the text I scrutinise this condition of here and now and its relationship to 
authority via a consideration of Lyotard's 'game plan' and 'rules'. 
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value and authority to the here and now of perception, for a discussion on the 
continually present 'condition' of the Zone. 
In an attempt to answer the question of the nature of the postmodern, Lyotard 
replies that 'postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the 
nascent state, and this state is constant.' (Lyotard, 1994, p79) His postmodernism is 
thus not something in itself, but is simply the condition of presentness, continually 
transitive, and potentially anything as long as it is here and now. This condition of 
presentness problematises, in his terms, any attempt to legitimise and validate the 
now through a meta-discourse established in the 'grand narratives' of the 
enlightenment. According to Lyotard the idea of knowledge legitimisation in grand 
narratives leads to a unification of knowledge in the 'Idea' (the emancipation of 
humanity). In the Idea, knowledge is posited as an ideal and objective totality. 
Totality, however, is a notion which Lyotard considers as 'violence to the 
heterogeneity of language games' (ibid., pxxv). In response to this, he defines the 
'postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives' producing an objective totality, 
and goes on to say that 'our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect 
salvation to rise from these inconsistencies' (ibid., pxxiv). In other words this is not a 
dialectical incredulity rendered immanently credible again in relation to the 
conventions and orthodoxies of the same grand narratives: the same institutions of 
knowledge. Instead, Lyotard suggests that postmodernity's principle is the 
'inventor's paralogy' (ibid., pxxv). Thus in the place of the 'grand narrative' comes a 
local and 'petit recif.95 This 'little narration' is not produced nor legitimated by a 
(enlightenment) metadiscourse, but is discourse. In his terms, it is not without rules, 
but is always locally determined.96 
95 This 'petit recit is translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, as 'little narrative'. 
However, to emphasis the practical aspect of this little narrative I refrain from using this 
translation: A recit is quite particularly an oral account, a one off live event. It is a narration 
rather than a narrative. To call it a little narrative, I argue, takes away the clarity of this 
expression. So I propose to use the term narration since I would like to keep in mind recit's 
live character of narrating rather than the idea of a narrative 
96 The 'grand narrative' validates and legitimises knowledge in accordance with historical, 
scientific, political, etc., discourses. In other words, it judges and validates knowledge 
according to dominant ideologies. Its narrator is a metasubject, its narrative affirms, through 
metadiscourse, the power base of empirical science and institutional knowledge. (Lyotard's 
use of the term grand narrative re-stages and clarifies my use of the term grand narrative in 
chapter 2. There the notion of a grand narrative is used in relation to the symbolic base that 
underpins and enables the production of a consensual (narrative) sense of Robert 
Smithson's film Spiral Jetty.) 
By contrast the 'little narration' it is an act of narrating that produces and legitimises 
knowledge through its practical performance, or what Lyotard terms a paralogical invention. 
This narrating does not produce a metadiscourse but is the practice of discourse. The 
narrator is not a metasubject but a subject of practice. I understand this transitive sense 
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I contest this critique of legitimisation through the grand narratives of emancipation, 
in favour of a local and 'little narration', in relation to my notion of individual and 
contingent particularity in the Zone. In the Zone I loose the ability to establish my 
position from a metadiscoursive perspective. Here the scientific grand narrative of 
the Professor, the literary Grand Narrative of the Writer and the aesthetic grand 
narrative of the Critic, do not manage to provide an objective totality. The grand 
narratives are in crises, now a local determination constructs the Zone continually in 
the present. The Room, which the travellers aim to reach, since it supposedly fulfils 
one's innermost desire, is never entered. The objective denouement is abandoned. 
Instead the journey, its continuously present act of walking is its object. The focus 
on walking, I argue, keeps sense within a local and concurrent determination. What I 
have still to ponder is the relationship of this walking-sense to the 'rules' of Lyotard's 
little narration. 
Lyotard equates the 'death' of the grand narratives with the abandonment of the 
ideology of systems. He argues that the apparent loss of consensual meaning in 
postmodernity is an acknowledgement that knowledge is not ontological and 
systemic anymore. It does not have the legitimisation of the grand (narrative) 
institutions. In terms of the Zone and its travellers, the grand institutions of history 
and identity do not get them to the Room, to a universally applicable denouement.97 
Thus the Room ceases to be a distinct goal, its authority is discredited. Instead it is 
the 'knowledge' produced in the act of walking that determines the purpose and 
sense of each individual traveller's journey. The fulfilment (provisionally) 'reached' is 
thus a subjective ideality, which lies in being rather than in relation to a having been 
or a going to be (in the Room). 
Having abandoned the possibility of a legitimisation through systems and 
metadiscourse, Lyotard justifies the postmodern condition as game. He presents the 
little narration as the quintessential form of imaginative invention; and stages 
production in relation to the urgent and particular writing of Barthes' ecrivant, articulated on 
the other side of the text. 
This distinction aids me to clarify the four different usages of the term 'narrative' as employed 
in my project: the grand narratives (symbolic, scientific, historical, ideological, etc .. ) enable a 
consensual 'narrative sense', whilst the little narration (the local and contingent paralogy) 
produces individual and temporal 'narrative sense making processes'. The different senses 
thus produced, however, are not entirely divorced from each other but interact in the 
contingent production of meaning. 
97 The sense produced in the Zone is a narrative sense but its narrative is produced in the 
transitive modality of narrating rather than as a consensual narrative sense produced in 
relation to the narrative of the grand institutions. 
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imagination as the force, which allows one to make 'coups inattendus': unexpected 
moves in this game. He suggests that the emphasis on being now and here 
increases the joy of inventing new rules. Every "coup", every utterance, changes the 
rules of the game. Every meaning produced is thus accordingly an innovative game-
sense rather than a systemic sense legitimised by a grand narrative. And every new 
coup changes this sense. 
Lyotard's emphasis on an individual imagination producing such an innovative 
'game-sense' allows me to try my understanding of 'sense on trial' in the Zone within 
his postmodern condition. Earlier I propose that it is each traveller's individual act of 
walking that produces the sense of the Zone. In other words I propose that the act of 
walking performs a 'narrating'. If I posit these walking acts as coup inattendus, and if 
I further position the Zone as the continually present condition of Lyotard's game, as 
the live event of the little narration, then I can clarify the sense produced on trial in 
the Zone within Lyotard's notion of a sense produced in (paralogically) innovative 
imaginations. The Zone is thus articulated as a changing-game in the postmodern 
now, and its trial of sense and identity is acknowledged as the playful production of 
its condition in innovative processes. 
Lyotard talks about the playfulness of this changing game, and describes agonism, 
rather than antagonism, as the characteristic of the relationship between its different 
players and material elements.98 I find Lyotard's notion of agonistic playfulness 
useful in order to re-affirm the amicable adversariness through which the subject 
spectatant on trial is producing him/herself and his/her environment. I contest that 
the knotting of temporal-collage's complex material elements are produced in such 
playful competition. The emphasis is on playing rather than on outcome. No result is 
forged which supersedes the difference between the material elements in an effort 
to achieve their sublimation in an objective totality. Instead, the particularity of the 
98 Although agonism describes a certain sense of adversariness, a certain tension, I 
understand Lyotard's use of the term not to set up an explicit conflict, which needs to be 
overcome in a higher ideality. Rather, I understand his agonism, in distinction to the dialectic 
conflict of montage to suggest a playful position within discourse. The tension of agonism, 
identified with the tension between the subject and the object of collage, is a particular and 
direct tension. I argue that in collage the subject and the object are constituted temporarily in 
this tension. In this sense the object as well as the subject are immersed and characterised 
by this tension, which does not however forge a resolution outside of itself. By contrast, I 
contest, that in montage the tension arises in an antagonistic way between two 'cells', two 
objects. The subject is placed outside of this tension, observing it, but not immersed in its 
production. Accordingly this tension forges a solution outside of itself, a third position which 
again the subject observes without his/her position being affected by it. (See appendix 1 for 
an illustration of this distinction). 
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individual perception, here and now, determines any (provisional) 'outcome' within 
the experience of playing. 
This conjunction allows me to articulate the Zone as a postmodern narration: as 
something that is nothing in itself but is everything it is in the here and now of its 
perception. In other words the Zone is nothing in itself but is its signifying practice. I 
can articulate this signifying practice in relation to the imaginative movements of the 
postmodern play. In this way bricolaging and disjointing become identified as coups 
inattendus. At the same time I can re-stage the sense on trial produced in this 
signifying practice, within the notion of a sense produced in play. The subject 
spectatant on trial is the player who invents the moves in his imagination, and his 
moves in turn continually produce new sense. Accordingly I can understand his/her 
identity as a playful identity also. 
However, whilst I find these ideas useful and adopt the verb play for the articulation 
of my signifying practice of temporal-collage, I avoid the noun game, which Lyotard 
uses to summarise and qualify the postmodern condition. According to Lyotard, 
there are rules, there is a game plan, a (social) contract, to which this game of 
postmodernism is complying, and thus, which determines the scope of its signifying 
practice. It is the notion of such a game plan, I argue, which distinguishes his playful 
condition of a here and now from the condition of the Zone as I am contesting it. 
I contend that, similar to Deleuze's articulation of the relativity of all movement to the 
plan of the (montage) film, the game plan renders the moves relative to each other 
and in this relative unity they are negative to an 'outside', another realm where the 
grand narratives validate the work. Thus, aesthetic judgement and systemic 
knowledge position the game as plan, even if after the event. The term 'game', I 
argue, allows the critic to marginalize the playfulness as perverted or decadent, 
asocial or simply silly.99 However useful I find his notion of playfulness, then, the 
99 Here I pick up on Lyotard's argument that the postmodern has 'no taste', 'no good forms' 
(Lyotard, 1994, p81). For him taste and good form imply a collective judgement, which is 
suspended in the game of postmodernism. The implication is that we will get it back when 
we stop playing. So there is always already the notion of an after the event, when taste can 
choose good form out of the mass of tasteless, decadent, silly, perverted, expressions 
produced during its run. For me this alludes to the idea that the postmodern is a phase, 
much like an adolescent abandonment of parental guidance, useful only in developing a new 
set of rules to be passed on to one's own children. This brings me again to the futility implicit 
in trying to avoid the dialectic inevitability of the social, the aesthetic. In relation to the film 
Stalker, I argue, this notion of a re-turn to taste and form is achieved in the third part, when 
we have left the Zone, but have kept some of its message and are now spectateur-
spectatant. In the next part of this chapter I want to try and argue for a position that is not 
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idea of a game and its rules, I argue, is too determined. 
In an attempt to clarify the relationship between the little narration of the artwork and 
the rules of the game, Lyotard explains the work of the postmodern artist by writing 
that: 
the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by pre-established 
rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining jUdgement, by applying 
familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the 
work of art itself is looking for. (Ibid., p81) 
Following this statement the rules are not pre-determined and provide no system 
according to which the artwork is constructed. However, and here lies my critique of 
Lyotard: he states that the work of art is 'looking for' rules. According to Lyotard, the 
artist, the person performing a little narration, does not work from rules, but works 
out the rules in a searching performative production. The artwork seeks rules that 
exist prior to its production not visibly or knowingly, but they are still there in an over-
there to be discovered and applied imminently in the over-here. His rules are not 
from within the game, but designate an outside which determines a before and thus 
achieves a thereafter. 
To perform a piece of work according to Lyotard, I argue, means to look for rules 
and ultimately to look for an understanding of the material complexity in relation to 
these rules. If I view the Zone by searching for rules, I seek to equate, to find 
patterns, repetitions, series, any directive that gives me a sense of order and 
determination. Instead of producing the Zone as complexity in perception, I find the 
complexity in perception. This complexity is a relative complexity however, its 
elements are a complex unity relative to the game plan, the plan of the film. Within 
this game plan I find the rules which construct the Zone in my (searching) reading of 
it. This, I argue, renders my experience tautological rather than individually 
performative and inventive. Thus, although I find his notion of the continually present 
and local productions in innovative play useful to develop my articulation of the Zone 
as the playful and present condition of the signifying practice of temporal-collage, it 
is the seeking of rules in Lyotard's notion of contemporary art practice that 
negative, that does not admit play and trial only as an 'adolescent' phase, but that truly 
remains playful and 'trying'. 
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distinguishes my understanding of this present condition from his. 
Lyotard goes on to say that 'the artist and the writer, then, are working without rules 
in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done.' (Ibid., p81) The rules 
and the game are posited separate from each other. And it is, I argue, this 
separation, which allows him to come to a 'been done'. This been done I 
understand, is the reading of the Zone from the position of the spectateur-spectatant 
of the last sequences (fig. 2, position 3). In this position I review the Zone in 
hindsight, when the game is played out and the cards are back on the table. And 
although Lyotard suggests that 'consensus is a horizon that is never reached' (ibid., 
p61), it is clear that in thinking of rules, he thinks of a consensus at the start of the 
game (even if this consensus only agrees on rules in a general sense). According to 
this, the consensus to seek rules in the Zone understood as game plan/film plan, is 
established in the first sequences of the film (fig. 2, position 1). Within this 
agreement the narration of the Zone is assured as a consensual (narrative) sense 
process. According to Lyotard the postmodern narration challenges the credibility of 
the grand narratives. However, it does not disable ideal objectivity. The separation 
of the rules from the game in his notion of a little narration allows Lyotard to critique 
the authoritative knowledge of the grand narratives, without loosing the social 
contract which grants the artwork legitimacy via a consensual (narrative) shape. 
I understand the need for rules separate from the game to be based in the desire for 
the sociality of the subject. The separation, I argue, allows for a return of the coup 
inattendu, the unexpected utterance, back into the game. At this stage it is clear that 
the coup inattendu, in its seeking nature, never left the game plan in the first place. 
The 'will have been done' clarifies in hindsight the individual and unexpected 
process of production to the collective, and thus assures the social as possible. I too 
am interested in the sociality of the signifying practice of temporal-collage. However 
I remain critical of a contractual sociality. 
Thus I critique the separation that Lyotard sets up in his game plan. I argue that his 
theory depends on a negative relation between the individual performance and its 
consensual interpretation. Lyotard positions the subject of narration between the 
game moves and the rules, the contract of play. His play however, I contend, is 
ultimately recuperated within a solid (contractual or foundational) consensus. I aim 
to critique the ideal objectivity which results from such a negative relationship 
between utterance and order. I stage this critique in relation to Kristeva's dynamic of 
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the semiotic and the symbolic in her fourth signifying practice and propose a 
different sociality for the subject spectatant on trial in temporal-collage, in critique of 
this negativity. Saying so I do not give up on the sociality of the subject spectatant I 
don't aim for a subject of irrelevant nonsense. Neither do I propose a relative 
subjectivity ultimately negative to a fixed positive position. However, instead of 
contract and order to assure the sociality and identity of this subject, I contest that 
the social and the symbolic are tendential, and argue this tendential quality to 
assure sociality in the 'particular', rather than in relation to a socio-historical 
specificity and its grand narratives. 
In the next part of this chapter, then, I re-stage and develop my proposal for a 
tendential symbolism in relation to a symbolic order understood as the rules of the 
social contract. This allows me to reflect on issues of consensus; the notion of stable 
systems; and the social determined by the notion of such systems. The pursuit of 
this argument borrows from the terms produced in the last chapter and develops 
their criticality through an emphasis on the subject. This focus on the subject re-
assesses the signifying practice of temporal-collage in relation to Kristeva's 
signifying practice of the text with regards to the status of the symbolic. 
Stalker as Neo-Symbolic Subject Postmodern, Working the Zone's Tendential 
Symbolism 
Peter Green in his book Andrei Tarkovsky The Winding Quest, seems almost angry 
at Tarkovsky's refusal to accept his work as symbolic. He points to what he 
considers as an inconsistency between his theory and his practice when it comes to 
the matter of symbolisation. He tries to present in examples how there is a 
contradiction inherent in Tarkovsky's claim that in none of his films anything is 
symbolised. What Green points to as a contradiction I understand as a struggle to 
define the symbolic per se. I do not want to take up Tarkovsky's argument or try to 
understand his relationship with the symbolic, however. I believe this would counter 
any suggestion that 'the author is dead'. Rather, what I want to suggest is that the 
inconsistency perceived by Green points to the impossibility of agreeing on the 
symbolic if you do not accept it as a lexical register but work its quality in a particular 
production. To argue this generative particularity, instead of seeking a consistency 
of symbolisation in relation to a symbolic register, I propose a re-thinking of the 
symbolic as a quality. 
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I understand there to be a symbolic quality, or maybe a symbolic tension, apparent 
in the film Stalker. Rather than assuming an analytical position and attempt to argue 
details of such symbolisations, however, I am interested in the characteristic of this 
symbolisation. My interest in the symbolic quality, then, lies not in establishing an 
understanding of the film Stalker via a collective symbolic referentiality. In fact I 
expressly argue against the possibility to claim such a referentiality in the 
postmodern condition: when the author is dead, and when the authority of the grand 
narratives has lost its credibility, then, in the here and now of postmodernity, sense 
and identity cannot arise from a collective symbolic referentiality but must come from 
a symbolic practice instead. In this I confirm my argument against Barthes' 'sciences 
of the symbol'. Barthes considers the symbolic in relation to its material 
configuration and placing as a whole. According to him it participates 'in a complete 
system of destination' (in relation to a horizontal and a vertical orientation, context 
and order) and comes to signification through this totality (Barthes, 1991, p44). 
Barthes posits this symbolic level as a double determination: at once expressing an 
artistic intention as well as a translation of a common lexicon of symbols into 
material configurations. Both, the authority of intention as well as a collective 
register are disabled in the postmodern. Thus I argue his symbolism cannot aid the 
subject spectatant on trial to understand the film Stalker, or Tarkovsky's work in 
general. 
I problematise this process of understanding the film Stalker via Kristeva's subject in 
process practising the film as 'text' in the 'endless mobility' of its trial: the semiotic 
motility of its expression continually breaks with the symbolic order, not however to 
instate a new symbolism, but to continually put it on trial. I adopted Kristeva's notion 
of trial for my characterisation of my viewing of the Zone as well as for the 
characterisation of the acts of the travellers walking through its terrain. In the 
condition of the Zone myself and the travellers are articulated as subject spectatants 
on trial. However, in the same sense as I agreed with Lyotard's playfulness but 
could not agree with his game plan, I now have to acknowledge that although I 
agree with her practice of trial, I disagree with the details of this practice. I argue that 
the focus on the subject clarifies the passing through the symbolic of the fourth 
signifying practice as a dialectical movement. What appears as one motion in 
reference to the material of the text, comes to be understood as a split action when 
focusing on the activity of the subject. 
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The issue again is one of separation. Although Kristeva speaks of an 'infinite-
indefinite sense' that is produced in this 'trial of sense', and although she talks about 
the 'endless mobility' of this trial, she still separates the semiotic and the symbolic 
and thus immediately encounters a dialectical opposition (Kristeva, 1984, p99 ff). 
She articulates the symbolic as 'matter', as a system of meaning, whilst the semiotic 
is the 'drive', which in the impetus of 'speaking' breaks down the matter of the 
symbolic. The trial, she argues, happens exactly at the interaction of these two 
modalities. At this point the subject and the symbolic break down, according to 
Kristeva, and need to re-articulate themselves. For Kristeva, this moment of break 
down, of transgression, is the key moment in practice. It is her point zero from where 
a new (symbolic) sense and identity is produced continually. I argue that this point 
marks a break in mobility, which elucidates the dynamic of the semiotic and the 
symbolic modality as dialectical; forging progressively one totality of sense and 
identity. The process of her trial is idealised in this totality. It is a subjective and 
heterogeneous totality of practice, but nevertheless a totality. This, I argue, limits the 
scope of its infinity and mobility in relation to the 'matter' of the symbolic order.10o 
Again, the notion of a symbolic order, like the notion of game rules, hints at an 
outside: a before or after the event, which ties the individual and temporary 
production of the semiotic drive, the moves of the players, to a 'plan'. Within this 
plan individual and temporary sense and identity is mobile but relative to a 
consensual sense and nonsense. The semiotic motility seeks and finds a totality of 
expression in the practice of this plan. The subject in process/on trial is a relative 
subjectivity, either mocked and marginalized in its irrelevance, or recuperated into 
collectivity via the negativity of its position. The practice of the text is a game for 
amusement, which is halted for a more pragmatic production. The need for 
conviction, and the danger of disarticulation, disorientation are thus minimal.101 
100 Kristeva acknowledges the negative of her conception but insists on its criticality in 
relation to the homogeneous direction of Hegel's 'Absolute Idea'. She states that unlike his 
ideality, her conception of praxis never negates itself in and of itself. Thus, whilst 
acknowledging the totality of her trial, she defines the criticality of its heterogeneity and 
practice vis-a.-vis an absolute aesthetic. I find her practice on trial useful to articulate my 
critique of objectivity, but propose to develop her critique in respect to the idea of totality. The 
progressive nature of her dialectical trial, I argue, leads to an ideal totality, however 
temporal, heterogeneous and subjective. I understand the difference between her totality in 
practice and Hegel's totality in ideality, and draw from her project. However, I aim to critique 
this practice even further and undo its dialectic relativity through the proposal of a self-
conscious transitivity: I propose the subject spectatant of temporal-collage to be in the 
process of a trial that is not progressive and dialectical and hence is never totalised 
objectively. 
101 Of course these dangers are marginal in art: I can quite happily admit madness when 
entering a gallery. It is a very safe space to lose my rational sense of place and identity in. 
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I contest that the break between the symbolic and the semiotic defines Kristeva's 
fourth signifying practice as a modernist practice.102 Her trial depends on the 
symbolic order as a foundation. Although this foundation is continually broken and 
re-negotiated through the motility of the semiotic, it remains foundational in 
And although, in my critique of the game rules and the symbolic order, I might seem to argue 
for an abandonment of rationality and stable sense per se, I am not. Rather, I acknowledge 
that such a promotion for irrationality would only outline a relative position of fluidity and 
insanity, imminently clarified in the negative. By contrast, I want to consider the foundation, 
the symbolic order and the game rules per se and investigate how they can be argued so as 
not to set up a dialectic position. A re-articulation of the symbolic and the social not as rules, 
nor as order, but as quality, I argue, allows for a criticality that is neither marginal nor futile in 
its relative negativity to a normative reading. 
102 Earlier in this chapter I articulated via Lyotard the distinction of modernism from 
postmodernism via the notion of the sublime as absence. Lyotard points out that it is at the 
point of absence, that aesthetics asserts its critical right over art and suggests that 
modernism (romanticism) is characterised by such absence filled by theory. By contrast, the 
postmodern according to Lyotard, is perpetually in the 'aegis of now' (Lyotard, 1998, p199). 
Following this argument I now contest that Kristeva's practice of two modalities, and 
Lyotard's game play, includes a 'sublime moment' in the dynamic of her semiotic and 
symbolic and at the intersection of his game and its rules respectively. Thus both allow for a 
romantic aesthetic (a modernist aesthetic) and define the subject within a romantic 
subjectivity. This romantic subject is in process, but its process is relative to the 'plan of the 
artwork' (a transcendental order). The void is not the Idea but the collective practice of a 
void, however, it is nevertheless a symbolic void. This point is pivotal to my project since it 
re-assesses Lyotard's postmodern condition and my suggestions made in chapter 2 about 
Kristeva's fourth signifying practice in respect to a romantic, modernist, aesthetic. The 
'absence' of the signifying dynamic is not represented in the material of the text. However, 
the transgressive break in the dynamic of the trial, in-between the rules and the game, I 
argue, invites a theoretical position, a meta-subject and a meta-discourse, which grounds the 
motility vis-a-vis the foundation of the symbolic modality, the game plan. This problematises 
my suggestion developed in chapter 2 that Kristeva's subject on trial is not a romantic 
subject. Now I argue that the subject on trial in a dialectic postmodern condition remains an 
aesthetic romantic subject. Its dialectic practice enables metadiscourse. The theorisation of 
this subject on trial in the (dialectic) postmodern condition, I argue, articulates the notion of 
'theory as practice'. However the dialectical dynamic of this theory as practice stages the 
meta-practice of the spectateur-spectatant as opposed to the immersive and perpetual 
practice of the spectatant. 
What is central to this in reference to the film Stalker is that the subject of the Zone can 
never be a romantic subject. I contest that the Zone has no 'game plan' in this sense it can 
never open a symbolic void relative to such a plan. Consequently it never allows the viewer 
to take a distanced position from which he/she could replenish an experiential void from a 
symbolic register in aesthetic theory. I argue that due to the practice and individuality of the 
non-dialectically postmodern subject on trial in the Zone, the romantic, aesthetic theory is 
rejected as a possibility. Rather the subject on trial in the condition of the Zone is argued as 
a practical and contingent romantic identity; a priori as a neo-romantic subjectivity. This neo-
romantic subject is not theorisable from a meta-position, since its processes are not 
discursive outside him/herself. 
This articulation of a neo-romantic subjectivity is crucial in regards to my own video work. I 
contest that the impression of a void in my work is not collective, romantic void, a sublime, 
experienced from a meta-position. Rather, I argue that any void felt is an individual and 
sensorial rather than an aesthetic void, and can thus not be filled through a representational 
replacement. It does not call for a replacement object, found in a collective symbolic register, 
articulated in aesthetic theory. Instead it invites a subjective and mobile production of the 
material. In this sense, my work does not produce a romantic but a neo-romantic aesthetic 
and subjectivity. The prove of this identity can never lie outside its practice however. 
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character. In response, I understand, the semiotic motility defines the concurrent 
social expression of this symbolic foundation. Although this semiotic sociality too is 
in process, it is not fixed but is continually re-articulated, its relation to a symbolic 
foundation gives it gravitas as representation. I propose to critique the dialectic 
inevitability set up in such a split mobility by re-considering not its representation, 
but its foundational characteristic. I contest that my notion of a tendential symbolism 
develops the conceptual shift from a symbolic characterised as an order to a 
symbolic understood as a quality. I argue subsequently that this allows the semiotic 
expression, understood as the social to be tendential rather than contractual also 
and thus the separation between the two modalities can be abandoned. 
I understand the semiotic and the symbolic not as two separate modalities. Rather I 
conflate them as qualities within practice. As a consequence of this articulation the 
semiotic does not break with the symbolic to move it on, rather, the semiotic quality 
is the temporary realisation of this tendential symbolic. I suggest that there always is 
a tendential symbolic, but there never is symbolism outside of its realisation. The 
symbolic is produced rather than passed through in practice. There is no tautological 
sense played out within the plan of the artwork, the sense produced lies beyond the 
work in its perpetual playful extension. Thus there is no sublime. The here and now 
is absolutely rather than relatively here and now. In relation to my articulation of the 
semiotic as the social moves of the game and the symbolic as its contract, I can now 
articulate the moves and its contract as one. I contest that when matter and drive 
are one, when the game's rules and the player's moves are one, then there is no 
break from where I can theorise the practice within an aesthetic register. 
I contest that the Zone provokes such a non-dialectically mobile practice. The Zone 
never breaks its practice. It never allows the viewer to take a distanced position from 
which he/she could fill such a break through (aesthetic) theory. The subject 
spectatant on trial in the Zone can thus never be an aesthetic (modernist, romantic) 
subject. In the non-dialectical here and now of my postmodern condition the mobility 
of perception is particular to my subjectivity and any stoppage, any pause of 
perception, is not re-presentable (theorisable) outside myself. This perception is not 
nostalgic, it does not refer to a transcendental/ foundational order. This does not 
mean, however, that it does no employ conventions. It simply implies that the 
conventions are not used in relation to their transcendental authority, but rather are 
practised by a subject on trial here and now. Such a contingent perceptual practice 
needs conviction since its does not stand relative to a foundational practice but its 
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'contract' is only ever and particularly now. 
I understand that without the particularity of the subject, such an abandonment of 
foundation in the conflation of the social expression and its symbolic contract, could 
lead to meaningless nonsense and asociality. However, I contest that the 
particularity of the subject spectatant on trial avoids this and determines the 
semiotic-symbolic signifying practice in its own particular motion here and now. 
Sense and identity on trial in the signifying practice of temporal-collage are assured 
not through a symbolic order but through the particularity of the subject continually 
realising a symbolic quality. 
To apply this argument, and to debate it in more detail, I turn to my understanding of 
symbolism in the film Stalker. I consider Stalker's symbolism not through a 
theoretical (aesthetic) analysis, but through a mode of production in perception. I 
contest my understanding of Tarkovsky's work through my realisation of the 
tendential symbolic quality of its material, visual and sonic. The symbolism is 
produced by me in my particular realisation of its tendential quality in the signifying 
practice of temporal-collage.103 In the last chapter I discussed this tendential 
symbolic as a 'trigger' that forged my engagement in the material but did not 
foreclose my understanding. Now, as a consequence of my critique of the break in 
the dynamic of the semiotic and the symbolic I re-assess this. The tendential 
symbolic is not a trigger separate from my experience of the work. The trigger is the 
experience and the experience the trigger all at the same time. The travellers 
walking through the Zone produce the symbolism of the Zone from a tendential 
quality of its material to symbolise, which they realise in their transitive spectating of 
the Zone, individually and contingently. In turn, I the viewer, am invited to produce 
103At this point I would like to clarify the notion of tendential in distinction to immanence. The 
term tendential is not a noun, it is an adjective. It is not something that is immanently 
available, rather it is the description of the action of production. It is thus not a spirit inherent 
in the subject nor in the object just waiting to be realised. Rather, it is its realisation now. It is 
the adjective and adverb that describes symbolism and sociality in its actuality. Tendential 
symbolism or sociality is produced in production. It is its own realisation continually in the 
present. I insist on this distinction in order to separate it from an understanding within 
Hegel's objective ideality, which is achieved through an activity, which immanently realises 
the thing towards its ideal outcome. I avoid such a progressive description of symbolisation 
and socialisation as an ideal activity (Tatigkei~, by focusing on its processes rather than an 
end outside of its actuality. Hegel's immanence includes the drive to overcome the 
incongruity between inner-necessity and outer appearance (Hegel, 1953). I acknowledge this 
incongruity as conflict, and immanence as an action born out of conflict toward its ideal 
resolution. By contrast, tendential is not an antagonistic quality. It points instead to a playful 
adversariness, agonism, which does not need to be overcome. Its play is infinite. 
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the filmic material from a tendential quality in the material to symbolise, via my own 
particular and individual practice of such symbolisations. There are always an 
infinite number of symbolisations possible. However, my particularity avoids the 
swamp of 'everything goes' and works out one particular symbolic from its tendential 
quality. 
Fig. 3 
Tendential Sense and Identity produced through the practice of Tendential Symbolic 
and Social Qualities; in the particularity of this practice without foundation they 
become one motion. 
Individual subject 'trying' the tendential semiotic-symbolic 
artwork in his/her practice of spectating. At the same time 
he/she 'tries' his/her own subjectivity. This signifying practice 
grounds the work in a particular here and now. 
-----
------------------ --------------------
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Tendential semiotic-symbolic object/event, 'tried' by the subject spectatant in a 
semiotic-symbolic signifying practice. 
[There is no recognisable outside of this signifying practice. The dotted line simply 
assumes the temporal border of perception for illustration purposes.] 
This produces an inclusive and continual practice of sense and identity. There is nothing that 
is not included, no outside, no before or thereafter. What assures the relevance and sanity of 
this practice is the particularity of the subject. What assures the sociality of this practice 
and subjectivity is the desire to share rather than a shared contract! order. 
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I argue that what I share with the Stalker, the Writer, the Professor and my fellow 
viewers, is the desire to use symbolisation and the desire to be social, not however 
a symbolic register or a social code outside of any practice of socialisation or 
symbolisation. If the postmodern condition is the condition of the here and now, 
there is no outside, no beyond. Everything is produced from within, immersive, and 
everything is generative, transitive. Meta-positions and stoppage points are an 
iliusion.104 The danger of relativity is avoided by focusing on the subject in 
perception. 
The travellers in the Zone are 'playing', jouant, rather than players, joueur. The 
Stalker, the Professor, the Writer and me, the Critic, 'play' the Zone. We share the 
desire to be social and the desire of symbolisation, not however an outcome or any 
rules and contracts of sociality or symbolisation. The rule is the game and the game 
are its rules in action. I propose the subjectivity in the condition of the Zone as a 
neo-symbolic subjectivity. This subjectivity is connected to a symbolism but not via 
the transcendental emotivity of the unified subject of Symbolism, nor in relation to a 
symbolic lexicon. In the Zone we are continually in the here and now and cannot 
nostalgically feed off a symbolic order outside of this position. 
Sense and identity based on tendential qualities rather than contracts and rules, 
assumes the desire to share these qualities. Thus, when Green laments Tarkovsky's 
unwillingness to explain his symbolic, I understand him to be complaining about the 
responsibility to produce meaning himself. I contest that when we talk about non-
understanding it is more interesting to consider the non-desire, the unwillingness, to 
understand rather than the faults of a contract or its transmission. Understanding, 
and contracts of knowledge are misleading as they suggest that if only the contract 
were right we would all understand each other. This patronises and sublimates the 
individual and robs him/her of his/her generative autonomy. By contrast, if we 
abandon the register of sociality and symbolisation it is only through ourselves that 
anything can make sense, and this sense, and our self, is perpetually on trial. In this 
sense, my notions of tendential symbolic and social start from the point of non-
contractual desire for communication and perform sense making processes in the 
104 For Lyotard totality is always an illusion upheld as real through terror. By terror he means 
the ability to exclude a coup inattendu or a player from the game in order not to disturb its 
totalitarian play. A renunciation of this terror is accordingly a renunciation of the possibility of 
totality and vice versa (Lyotard, 1994, p46). As a consequence of his insights my project 
takes up the implication of terror and attempts to escape totality via a signifying practice of 
temporal-collage. 
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contingency here and now perpetually. 
Conclusion 
Temporal-collage is thus confirmed not as an outcome, it is not a material quality but 
a 'fifth' signifying practice. I argue that it resembles in many ways Kristeva's 'fourth' 
signifying practice of the text, but contest that it is crucially different in respect to its 
understanding of the relationship between the symbolic and the semiotic, e.g. in 
relation to the social. In conclusion, I posit the subject of temporal-collage as subject 
spectatant on trial; I summarise the condition of this transitive subject as the here 
and now of (non-dialectical) postmodernism and re-assert temporal-collage as a fifth 
signifying practice. 
The fact that I do not posit the symbolic as an order, separate from the semiotic 
motility, but conflate them in the practice of the tendential, clarifies my distinction of 
temporal-collage and Kristeva's fourth signifying practice of the text. The separation 
of the semiotic and the symbolic, however mobile, renders her signifying practice of 
the text dialectical in reference to the underlying register. By contrast, I argue, my 
fifth signifying practice is not dialectical. Its perpetual practice of tendential qualities 
does not perform a break and hence does not enable a meta-position, which 
recuperates its individual and particular perception into a collective meaning, 
aesthetic theory. I still hold on to the notion of Kristeva's 'trial of sense and identity', 
and reaffirm the concept and ideological investment in her signifying practice of the 
text articulated in the idea of a Revolution in Poetic Language. What I re-evaluate in 
my signifying practice of temporal-collage, however, are the details of its practice. 
By conflating the symbolic and the semiotic in a semiotic-symbolic practice of 
tendential qualities, temporal-collage avoids the break. And, by focusing on the 
contingent particularity of this practice I also avoid the boundarilessness of relativity 
and the insanity of asociality. I contest that my re-thinking of the symbolic, not as a 
register but as a tendential quality allows me to grant the subject perceptual 
autonomy without having to accept nonsense as its necessary outcome. I conclude 
that the spectatant on trial in temporal-collage makes individual sense (non-sense) 
via the performance of a tendential symbolic. The sociality of this performance is 
dependent on the desire to share sense, not on a social contract. This notion of 
desire renders the collective a dynamic concept and allows the individual to be 
social without however limiting his/her sense and identity to a collective register. The 
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traveller is producing the Zone, his/her reality of it, as the condition of his/her 
generative experience, from a tendential semiotic-symbolic. In the Zone the Stalker, 
the Writer, the Professor and myself only share our desire to be there, to generate 
this condition. Any actuality of this condition however remains individual and 
contingent. 
The Zone (the condition of temporal-collage) is maybe naively but certainly 
unambiguously 'true' in this individuality. The social is the desire for sociality. Its 
perpetual production lies in the act of sharing, which is temporal and particular, and 
thus again unambiguous in relation to its contingency. Sharing involves the 
conviction demanded of the body in process/on trial by Kristeva. In the Zone this 
conviction is not nostalgic but continually presently produced. Ultimately no 
discussion of past achievements or failings aids the travellers through the terrain to 
the Room. In the Zone what is otherwise understood as common sense and 
pragmatic realism becomes a matter of belief. Thus understanding is a non-
measurable desire for communication rather than a pragmatic rendition of 
contracted rules. I argue the (social) subject of temporal-collage is a neo-symbolic 
subject. He/she enjoys his/her autonomous perception now, without falling out of 
communication and sociality. In neo-symbolism the social is produced in the desire 
for communication and sociality not in relation to a register. 
The notion of a subject spectatant on trial re-evaluates the sense of futility that I 
have articulated in relation to an individual non-systemic production of sense in 
perception. In the last chapter I argued that it is impossible to contend a radical 
individuality seeing that we are always already ideological. I contested that such an 
ideological subject is always recuperable into a collective identity. Although I still 
pronounced that trying to escape the dialectic is critical, I declared it futile at the 
same time. Now, however, I argue that the notion of a tendential symbolic and 
social, practised by the neo-symbolic subject, frees me from the constraints of a 
dialectic inevitability, without refuting the idea of ideology. The fifth signifying 
practice does not deny the ideological character of the individual. Rather, in 
temporal-collage ideology is the individual practice of desire rather than a symbolic 
power-pool from where, and in opposition to which, practice arises. This, I contest, 
allows me to produce an immersive and transitive sense and identity without an 
outside, metasubject/ metadiscourse, and thus without a (aesthetic) stoppage: there 
is no (aesthetic) theory as practice, but only practice. 
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I confirm that crucial to the non-dialectical understanding of this practice is an 
understanding of the postmodern condition as always here and now. No over there 
or another time can have an impact on its practice. The Zone, the condition of 
temporal-collage, is nothing in itself but is only the perpetual present signifying of a 
here and now. As a signifying practice temporal-collage is not restricted to film or 
video, the material complexity of audio-visuality.105 Its perceptual and individuated 
characteristic implies that any artwork can be produced within the signifying practice 
of temporal-collage. What is confirmed to be central is not the work but its 
perception. The focus is on the individual interpretation as a generative narration. 
The criticality lies with the anecdotal, the validity in the conviction of the subject. The 
status of temporality is thus re-evaluated by thinking it as a perceptual attitude with 
its basis in desire, rather than a quality based on a symbolic register. The 
understanding of temporal-collage as a perpetually present perceptual generative 
narration rather than a (material) aesthetic theorisation, allows me to apply its 
understanding beyond audio-visual work. This shift enables me to expand the 
specific realm of audio-visuality into a broader arena of art practice and to engage in 
a discussion around any artwork as a material complex. I pursue this expansion in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
In chapter 4 I test the viability of the signifying practice of temporal-collage beyond 
audio-visuality. This chapter elaborates the concerns developed vis-a-vis film work 
into a more general field of art practice. The ideas of sense and identity discussed 
so far are re-introduced and developed via the theories and practices of the digital. 
The next chapter thus 'tries' the subject spectatant, introduced and observed in this 
chapter, in process. I am inquiring whether or not my suggestions regarding the 
immersive and active subjectivity of the spectatant on trial is realisable beyond 
audio-visuality and in fact whether or not such an active position is actualised in the 
digital. 
105 Nevertheless, implicit in the argument of this chapter, is a critique of writing which 
theorises film and video work according to conventions of authorship, intentionality, visual 
and sonic codes, historical data, etc .. As an additional conclusion, I propose that in the 
postmodern here and now of the subject spectatant on trial, film theory has to abandon the 
notion of (semiotic) 'reading', and become a 'practice' in the sense of producing anecdotal 
narrations (generative interpretations) whose validity lie in the conviction of narrating rather 
than in a code of reading. In other words I encourage a film theory which abandons a 
systemic analysis in favour of an experiential production. Consequently the central issue 
would be audienceship: the relationship between the film and its individual and contingent 
viewing. And its central problematic would be the desire, or not, to share experience. 
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Chapter 4 
Euphoria of Immaterial Immersivity and Interactive Subjectivity: 
Temporal-Collage Tested as Digital Concept 
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This chapter elaborates the notion of the artwork as material complex developed vis-
a-vis audio-visuality into a more general realm of art practice. Current contestations 
of the network age, critically the ideas of Margaret Morse are reviewed in respect of 
the promise of radical temporality she claims to be produced in digital immateriality, 
and to result in an autonomous interactive subjectivity. Notably, her ideas about 
digital dematerialization are brought parallel to ideas of dematerialization in 
Conceptual Art exemplified in particular by Mel Bochner. At the same time, her ideas 
around the interactive autonomy of the digital subject are contested vis-a-vis 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological and intersubjective (analogue) subject. 
In the course of this review, the idea of temporal-collage is juxtaposed with the 
digital as concept. Through this juxtaposition, I propose a critical realisation of the 
signifying practice of temporal-collage and digital practice respectively. 
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Introduction 
In the last two chapters I articulated the artwork as a material complex, continually 
produced in a singular and generative perception. I staged this generative 
perception vis-a-vis Kristeva's practice of the text as the (fifth) signifying practice of 
temporal-collage; I identified the subject of this practice as a subject spectatant on 
trial; and summarised the condition of this transitive subjectivity as the here and now 
of (non-dialectical) postmodernism. In order to now re-assert and develop this 
proposal and test the scope of its criticality, in this chapter, I bring the signifying 
practice of temporal-collage in contact with digital practice. Thus I try my hypothesis 
of a transitive and generative materiality and subjectivity through a consideration of 
digital art practice, its conceptual promise and experiential actuality. I discuss the 
digital in relation to the contestations about materiality, virtuality and subjectivity as 
they are currently made apparent in digital artworks, and the theories ensuing from 
and describing such art practices. Accordingly, the ideas developed in the last two 
chapters: temporal-collage's centrifugal effort of production in perception (disjointing 
and bricolaging); the tendential quality of material and subject; and the notion of 
desire rather than contractual agreement at the centre of sociality, are re-assessed 
in relation to such theories and practices. 
I have argued that temporal-collage practices form as process. Material as ultimately 
non-physical in its centrifugal extension through a bricolaging and disjointing action 
of perception is generated by a transitive subject 'on trial'. The notion of a non-
physical artwork, and the idea of an 'active' subjectivity, I understand to resonate 
with claims made in digital contestations and brings me to this critical comparison. 
The focus on perception as a generative interpretation (narration) as argued via the 
language theories of Julia Kristeva and Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, affords me the 
methodological framework in which to articulate such a juxtaposition. Concurrent 
digital theories stage and discuss the digital object as a command enounced by the 
computer programme. The digital is thus identified as an object of 'quasi 
enunciation'. The notion of such a 'digital discursivity' evokes ideas of language as 
action rather than description: generative rather than analytical. In this chapter I 
investigate this identification of the digital as generative, with the generative 
interpretations practised in temporal-collage. 
My argument for the discursive/generative status of the digital object is staged 
initially via Manuel Castells' notion of the alphabet as a technology which enables 
143 
conceptuality, and through Timothy Druckery's ideas on the digital as iteration. I 
contend that the basis of both these ideas is an oppositional understanding of verbal 
and written language. Their ideas around the digital as temporal enunciation position 
the digital object in clear opposition to a spatially fixed, written analogue object. By 
focusing on their dichotomous identification, in the beginning of this chapter, I 
demonstrate how both manage to argue such an oppositionality through their 
equation of the technological novelty of the digital with a philosophical and 
experiential novelty. In order to examine the tenability of these oppositional 
evaluations of objecthood in the digital, and to critique their 'techno-philosophy', I 
discuss their ideas via the notion of the digital as abstract information, as staged by 
Margaret Morse. 
In her book Virtualities: television, media art, and cyberculture (1998) Morse 
articulates her ideas of the digital object as an abstract informational, data object 
disengaged from the actual material: a dematerialised object. The apperception of 
this data object, she suggests, forges a motion of 'reengagement' as a re-
materialisation of the object by the subject in perception. Her focus on this motion of 
reengagment introduces a perceptual consideration to production-based theories, 
and foregrounds the subject above technology. I discuss her ideas in order to query 
the usefulness of a perceptual object in the re-evaluation of 'techno-philosophies' 
and their ideological background. Her position allows me to re-consider the digital in 
terms of its experiential rather than its technological quality, and to re-think the 
subject in relation to this experientiality. This investigation initiates the critique of an 
easy dichotomy between the digital and the analogue. 
To develop this critique, I juxtapose Morse's ideas on the 'informationalisation' of the 
object, and its Ore-engagement' by the subject, with notions of 'dematerialization' and 
experience as proposed by a conceptual art practice of the 1970s. Conceptual Art 
and its theories are employed in order to argue notions of materiality and strategies 
of dematerialization as an artistic motivation against established forms of 
objecthood. In particular the work and writing of conceptual artist Mel Bochner 
affords me a critical insight into notions of materiality and non-materiality beyond an 
oppositional identification. Bochner questions the notion of dematerialization and the 
idea of conceptuality on the bases of their dialectical position vis-a-vis 
materialisation and actuality, or what he calls 'empiricism'. His argument offers me a 
starting point for the articulation of a 'nonmaterial' criticality to be applied to the 
digital as well as the analogue artwork. The question asked in order to stage this 
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argument is: does the digital object present an actual realisation of the desire for a 
conceptual immateriality as proposed by some works made in the name of '70s 
Conceptual Art and Bochner's practice in particular?106 
The argument triggered by this question works through the relationship between the 
analogue desire of the conceptual artist to challenge material/modernist models of 
aesthetic evaluation (focusing on the intentionality and authorial ideality of material 
production), and the digital claim for an immaterial immersivity and an extensional 
interactivity, which allegedly challenges such an aesthetic ideality. The claims made 
about the existence of the digital as fluid data, as an informational, enunciating 
object, are brought to bear on the conceptual artwork's emphasis on outline and 
measurement. I am considering the motivation and perception of the informational 
object in the digital in relation to the appearance of outline and measurement in the 
conceptual art-object in the analogue. In this way I examine their respective notions 
of 'participation'. This shifts the emphasis from the actual material of either practice 
to its production in perception. 
Central to this discussion is the relationship between what Bochner pushes as a 
critical practice of Conceptual Art -the measurement object- and its actual realisation 
as a 'measurement object' in the digital realm. This comparison leads me to 
speculate on discursivity and informationality in the digital and the analogue. What is 
highlighted and compared, then, are not their materialities as actualities, but their 
concepts of actuality; the ideologies behind the analogue and the digital aesthetics. 
The notion of the analogue or digital artwork as ideological enunciation rather than 
106 Timothy Druckery anticipates the affirmative with which for him such a question needs to 
be answered, when, in his essay 'Welcome to Netopolis', in the January-April 1998 issue of 
Exposed, he writes: 
How, then, can the development of electronic imaging be contextualised in terms of its 
relationship with the history of art and as a realisation of the transformed potential of 
imaging made possible with the use of digital technology? (Druckery, 1998, p10) 
For him it is seemingly not a question of if, but a question of how. I later argue that, in order 
to assume such a confident notion of the digital as a paradigmatic break, which realises 'the 
transformed [analogue] potential', his discussion of the digital is based on an oppositional 
stance between the analogue and the digital. I present how for Druckery the digital is a 
liberating tool that frees us from the constraints of an analogue notion of reality. The 
analogue, in turn, is positioned in direct opposition to such a liberated image world, 
presenting as it does a materially encumbered reality. For Druckery, in the digital, 'the 
shifting boundary of the image extends away from the static photographic mode into that of 
the "dematerialised" space of video, installation, information and electronics' (ibid., p10). I 
remain critical of such an easy oppositionality and aim to query the relationship between 
digital and analogue beyond a dialectical understanding. 
145 
actual materiality, is at this stage argued within the term 'conceptual actuality'. In 
relation to this term, I argue that either practice, digital and analogue, can be 
considered in reference to its conceptuality or its actuality. Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological philosophy in general, and his notion of doubt forging a continual 
production of the object in intersubjective uncertainty, in particular, is central to this 
articulation. 
From here I go on to develop this idea of the artwork as 'conceptual actuality' rather 
than as 'substantial materiality' by contrasting works by Californian-based digital 
artist! designer John Maeda and also Californian-based artist Ed Ruscha. I am in the 
first instance concentrating on those works for which both artists engage themselves 
with the appearance and interaction of written language. The doubling of language 
as language of production and as pictorial appearance renders these works 
particularly interesting for a discussion around the artwork as informational 
enunciation. A comparative study of Ruscha's word paintings and Maeda's 
computed text animations aids me to continue the discussion around language as 
description or informational production. It also allows a consideration of the 
motivational remit and perceptual consequences thereof. This further tests the 
tenability of an easy dichotomy between a quasi oral computer language and a 
graphic written language as it is set up in concurrent theories of the digital. The 
dialectic dynamic of any such argumentation is re-evaluated in a more sophisticated 
understanding of digital and analogue artworks as conceptualities. 
Conceptuality stresses the position of the subject. Both Maeda's and Ruscha's 
works involve the subject in the production of a contingent actuality I contend. 
Through a discussion of their works I am comparing the notion of the mouse-click, 
the actual digital interaction, with the conceptual interaction at the knotting-points in 
temporal-collage. 107 I argue that the actual interaction via mouse-click on screen, in 
Maeda's work answers a more conceptual interaction in Ruscha's paintings. I 
present how the first allows the user to make things move on screen, to open new 
107 I am using the term 'mouse-click' to include interfaces and feedback mechanisms such as 
mouse-over, plasma screen tactility, motion detectors and any other soft and hard-ware 
operational interactive devices which support the actual extension of the digital object. Thus 
the conceptual bricolaging and disjointing effort of perception in the signifying practice of 
temporal-collage is juxtaposed to an actual extensionality. Later on in this chapter, the 
comparison between actual, operational, interaction, and perceptual interaction is evaluated 
and clarified via Mel Bochner's notion of exteriorisation through imagination. And further, the 
issue is developed and rethought in relation to Bernd Wingert's notion of (mouse-) click in 
the digital as a 'centrifugal force', extending the work by opening links to other possible 
appearances or sites. 
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windows, extending thus the material actually. By contrast, the latter offers the work 
for a conceptual extension by the subject. This comparison highlights the core issue 
of this chapter: the differentiation between actuality and conceptuality; their 
correlation within art practice (analogue or digital); and the way in which they 
constitute notions of substantiality and subjectivity. 
The Digital Condition 
In the catalogue of a show of digital photography entitled 'Iterations: the New Image' 
Timothy Druckery writes: 'Any reading of the hype surrounding digital culture and art 
shows that the responses range from dizzying exaggeration to ethical SOlipsism, 
from paranoia to euphoria' (Druckery, 1993, p29). I agree with his assessment. And 
although this remark is ten years old, much writing about digital art seems not to 
have developed less anxious or excited understandings. 
Despite his awareness however, Druckery himself does not refrain from promoting 
the digital as a radically new and positively liberating expression in his own writing. 
Thus he introduces his essay 'Welcome to Netopolis', in the January-April 1998 
issue of Exposed, by stating: 
Haunting the transformation of photography in the past decade is a series of shocks 
broadly extended by digital media. This extension, made viable by computer technology 
demands a reassessment of the crucial role of technology and photography in the 
representation of information, particularly as the link between an event and its availability 
as "mediated" collapses. (Druckery, 1998, p8) 
He suggests the digital as a 'shock', and proposes the idea that it provokes a 
reassessment of information understood as information of a 'real' event vis-a.-vis its 
modes of representation. The notion of 'representation' hints at the idea that there is 
a real event that can be represented in mediation from a meta-position (analogue). 
By contrast the digital is suggested to collapse this position. Thus the digital 
information does not represent a 'real' event but produces the event as real. The 
'shock' of this proposes the digital in opposition to an analogue referentiality. In turn, 
I contend that this dialectical relation confirms the analogue as a conventional 
(nominal) system of reality. Similarly, the statements which introduce other critical 
texts on digital art portray the digital as the 'new' and present it as engendering a 
break in our sense of reality, its production and mediation, and thus also in our 
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sense of self. Digital theory in this sense propose that (digital) reality and subjectivity 
are posited in direct opposition to what in turn is conceived of as a nominal 
identification in the analogue world. The consequence of such an oppositional 
evaluation is a central concern of this chapter. 
I am following these texts to test the tenability of such an oppositional 
argumentation. Their critical trajectories offer me a basis to rethink the digital as well 
as the analogue sense of reality and subjectivity. However, I am not consulting 
these texts to reach an abstract understanding about a general notion of reality and 
its subject, or how these are understood to be reconfigured in the digital. Rather, in 
a more particular and concrete sense, I am positioning the theories on the digital 
object as something against which I test the object and subject of temporal-collage 
as argued in the previous chapters. The dialectical theories of reconfiguration and 
novelty are argued in relation to temporal-collage's insistence on a perpetual 
signifying practice in a (non-dialectical) condition of here and now. This investigation 
re-assess the digital in relation to the claims of its radicality. The notion of radicality, 
however, is important to me in regards to developing my idea of the signifying 
practice of temporal-collage, not in reference to a more general sense of success or 
failure of criticality in the digital. In this sense the notion of the (digital) 'new' is used 
to elaborate the investigation of the perceptual and continual 'newness' produced in 
the signifying practice of temporal-collage, and to verify its criticality. 108 
Vocabularies of Presentness and Fabrications of Language: Digital Techno-
Philosophy 
In The Rise of the Network Society, under the chapter heading 'The Culture of Real 
Virtuality', Manuel Castells, writes about the Greek invention of the alphabet as a 
conceptual technology. Via Havelock, he discusses how this technology enables a 
separation of the speaker from what is being said; between the subject and the 
object of discourse.109 He states that this 'new' distance, introduced via the alphabet 
enables conceptual discourse. The alphabet gives the thing articulated a security in 
108 The sense of material complexities practised in radical extensionality (generative 
interpretation), which I developed in relation to temporal-collage in chapters 2 and 3, is 
brought into contact with the idea of the digital object as a chain of complex commands in 
time and the notion of its operational extensionality through input device interaction, where 
the subject extends the apparent material on screen by opening new windows, triggering an 
animation, changing colours, etc .. 
109 Havelock, Eric A., The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences, 
Princeton University Press, US, 1982, (orig. Preface to Plato, 1963) 
148 
that it fixes and positions it in letters and words. The object in writing is spatialised 
as a material thing. In this state it becomes thinkable, conceptualisable. According to 
Castells 'it was the alphabet that, in the West, provided the mental infrastructure for 
cumulative, knowledge based communication.' (Castells, 1997, p356). This implies 
that conceptualisation does not come out of what Caste lis understands as the 
insecurity and temporality of spaceless orality. Rather, it is a framework of 
(alphabetical) representation that grounds the object, which can then be moved and 
extended immaterialy in conceptual discourse. 
Castells talks about the development of the digital in relation to the conceptual ising 
technology of the alphabet. He understands that: 
The new alphabetic order, while allowing rational discourse, separated written 
communication from the audiovisual system of symbols and perceptions, so critical for 
the fully fledged expression of the human mind. By impliCitly and explicitly establishing a 
social hierarchy between literate culture and audiovisual expression, the price paid for 
the foundation of human practice in the written discourse was to relegate the world of 
sounds and images to the backstage of the arts, dealing with the private domain of 
emotions and with the public world of liturgy. (Ibid., p356) 
From here he asserts that the 20th Century developments of radio, television and the 
digital computer represent revenge against the rational alphabetic order through a 
sensorial and quasi oral preference and audio-visuality. He parallels the relationship 
between orality and literality with the correlation between the digital and the 
analogue. The analogue is presented in relation to a systemic understanding of 
language, where the word refers directly to and nominates the 'thing'. By contrast, 
the digital is understood to communicate through the free combination of discrete 
pixels, offering complex conceptualisations. In his terms, the analogue is identified 
as the alphabetic system, which, whilst 'allowing rational discourse', prevents the 
fluid discursivity and complexity of orality. This fluidity he understands to be revived 
in the digital. Thus he identifies writing with the analogue, and asserts both, writing 
and the analogue, as material stabilities in opposition to the temporal character of 
digital 'orality', which, he argues, destabilises writing's analogue communication in 
immaterial thought. I contest that this designates conceptuality in a dialectic dynamic 
with actuality. In this dynamic the material encompasses the immaterial, and 
likewise, the immaterial the material, as immanently present within its identification. 
This inevitably ties conceptualisation to a dialectic return: every extension of the 
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object away from the alphabet, the analogue, in an immaterial, digital, 
conceptualisation thereof, presents itself immanently for nomination in an actual 
rendition .11 0 
I aim to question the tenability and usefulness of such a dialectic understanding. I 
contend that Caste lis' simple dichotomy between orality and literality, between the 
thing in space and its enunciation in time is not tenable when argued vis-a-vis the 
more sophisticated language theories of Julia Kristeva and Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard, 
as pursued in the previous chapters. Caste lis' theory presupposes a simple 
relationship between the object and its description. He does not acknowledge the 
more complex relationship, which constitutes the object between signifier and 
signified.111 
What Castells discusses in relation to the spatialisation of the alphabet and the 
temporal orality of the digital, Timothy Druckery discusses in relation to the 
authenticity of photographic representation. In his essay 'Welcome to Netopolis' 
Druckery writes that in the digital, 'the shifting boundary of the image extends away 
from the static photographic mode into that of the "dematerialised" space of video, 
installation, information and electronics.' (Druckery, 1998, p10) His essay suggests 
that the digital breaks with a 'static mode' of materiality, represented by analogue 
photography, and instead supports the notion of an informational and fluid 
immateriality. According to him, 'linked with the critical thinking of the past decade, 
the confrontation with the status of the photographic image has been subjugated 
and re-functioned, de-authenticated and repositioned.' (Ibid., p10) Druckery stages 
the digital in opposition to the analogue: the dematerialised (non-authentic) space of 
110 I understand the dynamic of Castells' writing to stage a Hegelian dialectic. One 
description, the analogue thesis, is imminently re-described through the overcoming of its 
discord with the digital thesis as antithesis, in a synthesis. This synthesis is a new thesis at a 
more advanced level, a higher order thesis. However, both the thesis and antithesis confirm 
each other in the synthesis which combines the methods of them both. The new thesis which 
imminently comes out of the conflict between thesis and antithesis, then, does not truly 
challenge their ideologies but reconfigures and hence confirms them as a negative to the 
current thesis staged as a positive. 
111 Castells seems to precede from a pre-Enlightenment understanding of language, where 
the object and its term work according to an analogical representation, in which their 
correlation is not considered arbitrary but referential. However, more sophisticated language 
theory considers the arbitrariness of the sign in the relation between signifier and signified. 
In-between those terms, a 'third meaning, in the form of a psychic image' can be inserted, 
which complexifies a simple analogical relationality, and forges a more complex production 
of the sign not as referential but arbitrary (Barthes, 1986, p2S). As I have already critiqued 
the 'more sophisticated' synthesis bound to Barthes' semiotics after deSaussure however, 
nominalism like semiosis, is understood here as limited to material referentiality. 
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video versus the static (material and authentic) space of the photograph. Although 
he acknowledges a pre-technological digitality explored in the 'critical thinking of the 
past decade', for him the technological realisation nevertheless breaks with an 
analogue sense of image making and its implied sense of a referential 'reality'. 
Both, Druckery and Caste lis sketch out a dialectic oppositionality between digital 
and analogue technologies of production and perception. Castells does so via the 
pronunciation of the alphabet as an analogue technology in opposition to the digital 
technology which renders the object discursive, and hence brings it 'back' to an oral 
sense of temporality and instability. Similarly, Druckery understands the 
technological digital as a dematerialization of the 'real' material, world. By contrast, I 
argue that the correlation between the digital and the analogue does not necessarily 
lead to such a dialectic oppositionality and its imminent reversal. I aim to goad the 
digital out of its negative relationship to the analogue, and to articulate an alternative 
understanding of either mechanism of production. I stage this critique via a 
consideration of the critical focus of digital theorisation. Margaret Morse's writing on 
digital practice offers me a starting point for this re-evaluation. 
In the first chapter of her book Virtualities: television, media art, and cyberculture, 
Morse initiates her ideas on the 'discursivity' of the digital via Julian Dibell's idea that 
the digital is not distinguishable from the pre-Enlightenment principle of the magic 
word: 'the commands you type into computer are a kind of speech that doesn't so 
much communicate as make things happen, ( ... ) the same way pulling a trigger 
does.' (Dibell quoted in Morse, 1998, p8)112 
In technological terms, the digital 'image' is a temporal organisation of discrete 
pixels. The icon I see on my desktop is created by the software command which 
produces and organises those pixels. According to Morse, the digital object is 
discursive, even if computerised discursivity is not necessarily wholly reciprocal. 113 
The on-screen object is the instant result of a chain of commands in time. Its 
objectivity is text-based. It is a continually present text which 'makes things happen'. 
112 Dibell, Julian, 'A Rape in Cyberspace' in the Vii/age Voice 21, December 1993, pp36-42. 
113 The issue of reciprocity between hearer and speaker, as a requirement for discourse, is 
discussed later via Margaret Morse's comparison between digital, instrumental interactivity, 
and notions of phenomenological (analogue) intersubjectivity. In her discussion of 'Machine 
Subjects' and 'Subject Machines', the notion of non-reciprocity in the digital is argued 
through the distinction between notions of analogue and digital discoursivity. This 
differentiation forms a central part of my critique of the digital techno-philosophy later on in 
this chapter. 
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Digital artist and graphic designer John Maeda's Script visualises one such 
temporal chain of commands. 
Image 1, John Maeda, a computer programme is a utilitarian typographers dream -
functioning machine composed completely of type, 2000, computer script on paper 
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Technically, the digital phenomenon is a complex event of terms organised in time. 
It is iterative, forever moving away from a closed form and definition, needing 
repetition to sustain a stable object. As soon as the computer software stops 
repeating its command, the image, the digital object and all its potential links, 
disappear. The digital phenomenon then, is abstract duration, is time. Repeating its 
command stabilises it, but only as long as the repetition goes on.114 The resulting 
object does not present a fixed configuration. Rather, it is an object in motion, 
composed by continuously changing affiliations, the docking of autonomous pixels in 
time.115 Its material stability is perpetually temporal rather than physical and spatial. 
The technical description seemingly affirms Castells' notions of the digital as oral, in 
direct opposition to an analogue object identified as literal. It apparently verifies his 
supposition that the digital, as orality, produces complex combinations in time, in 
opposition to the analogue as alphabet, which names and thereby spatialises a pre-
existent thing. I understand this to presuppose that the technical particularities 
delineate the digital beyond its soft and hard ware parameters. This gives the digital 
technology the status of philosophy. Such an understanding, I argue, ignores any 
consideration of content or aesthetics, relevant for the study of the digital beyond a 
simple techno-theory. Rather, it considers language within 'the pre-Enlightenment 
114 Repetition is a central device for the intensification of the ideological message in 
Eisenstein's montage theories as argued in chapter one. My critique of this ideological 
intensification articulated in chapters 2 and 3, via the development of a fifth signifying 
practice (temporal-collage), finds a crucial point of re-assessment here. Does the continuous 
repetition of the digital command support an ideological intensification in the sense that 
Eisenstein's repetition of conflict, as articulated in his montage theory, work towards an 
intensification of the propaganda message? In other words, does the repeating mechanism 
of the digital, as a mechanism of intensification, reveal the computer as a propaganda-
machine, working towards an ideologically total ideality? These questions allow me to 
consider the digital as technology in relation to the ideological dynamic of montage and 
temporal-collage respectively, and thereby to evaluate them both. 
115 Druckery, by identifying the still image of the photograph within the digital, highlights the 
digital not in regard to its technological temporality, but rather in its relation to an ideological 
sense of temporality. For him the digital photograph is not a static image. His notion of digital 
fluidity comes out of the sense that the digital image does not represent but creates its 
object. In this respect it stands in no relation to a real object or event: no sense of a 'having 
been there' is evoked (Barthes, 1986, p33). For Druckery the digital image continually 
pursues its own present production in opposition to an analogue photograph which is static 
in its historical referentiality and causality. This interpretation of the digital still-image as 
temporal, via its a-historicity, is interesting in regard to ideas of time and space, materiality 
and immateriality as ideological rather than rational and scientific. Later in this chapter I 
pursue this comparison via Margaret Morse. Morse articulates the digital as a separate 
'fiction of presence' to be differentiated from the 'fictions of past' of the 'real' reality. Her 
argument which is based on the differentiation between analogue 'reality' and digital 
'unreality', presents a starting point for my critique of such oppositional dynamics. 
This argument is also further pursued in the concluding chapter 5, when the dialectic 
dynamic between time and space, is scrutinised via the consideration of a net-work 
sensibility. 
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principle of the magic word' (Dibell in Morse, 1998, p8), and omits more complex 
linguistic theories which challenge such an easy relation between name and thing. 
I contend that the simple dichotomous interpretation of the digital via its 
technological workings, allows for a whole array of assertions regarding materiality 
and subjectivity to be argued convincingly: euphoric notions of real interactivity in 
the digital, as opposed to passive spectatorship in the analogue; the notion of virtual 
fluidity in opposition to material stability, two ideas suggested by Druckery, find 
confirmation in such technological argumentation. From the focus on technology, the 
digital can be claimed to break with analogue notions of materiality and its aesthetic 
valuation. However, I contest that the technological dogmatism prevents a 
discussion of the aesthetic and ideological issues which might link either expression 
and hence could problematise the notion of such a break. Thus I understand that the 
tenability of such a technology-based argumentation is questionable, especially 
when, instead of discussing the production of the digital from a technological point, 
we consider its production from the point of perception. This shift in focus, from 
production to perception, foregrounds the ideological interest behind the digital and 
problematises its relation to an analogue aesthetic. I aim to undertake such a re-
evaluation of digital theory via a practical (transitive and generative) perception. This 
critique is staged via Morse's articulation of the digital as abstract information and 
the reengagement of that informational object through its re-materialisation by the 
subject. I contend that her notion of reengagement challenges the technological 
orthodoxies as pronounced by Caste lis and Druckery. In this respect I understand 
her focus on perception to resonate with the challenge to aesthetic orthodoxies as 
articulated in the signifying practice of temporal-collage. 
The Reengagement of the Informational Object in Contingent Perception 
When to type a computer command brings a graphic world to virtual life as an immersive 
environment and when human qualities of subjectivity and agency can be granted to 
objects or even distributed over space itself, we have entered a realm for which we have 
little vocabulary and few reference points except the language of magic tricks or the 
linguistic of speech-acts or performatives, a category of words that bring the very 
situation they describe into being. (Morse, 1998, p8) 
This statement positions Morse seemingly in agreement with a dichotomous theory 
of the digital as orality. The notion of the digital command as 'speech-acts ( ... ) that 
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bring the very situation they describe into being' hint at an understanding of the 
digital as immaterial and discursive/ interactive orality. The idea that these 'speech-
acts' formulate a 'language of magic tricks' suggests the 'unreality' of the situation 
produced in such digital (generative) descriptions, directly opposed to the nominal 
'reality' of an analogue referentiality (analytical). She appears to identify the digital 
through its technological mechanism and thus to verify the simple dichotomy 
between the digital conceptuality and an analogue actuality. However, I argue that 
her position is more complex and takes into account the tautology of its own critique. 
Morse problematises the digital as an abstract information-object, produced 
continually in the command of its computation. The digital object is its data in time. 
In this respect she follows the technological argument. However, her consideration 
of the perception of this data object, develops this interpretation, and presents a 
useful argumentation against its dichotomy. 
Morse argues that it is exactly the disengaged ness of the digital object from its real 
context through informationalisation that demands of the subject to engage 
him/herself in its production. She acknowledges this motion of personalisation in the 
paradox between ever more impersonal machines and the increasing need to 
interact: 
The paradox of the development of the media generally in this century is that as 
impersonal relations with machines and lor physically removed strangers characterize 
ever-larger areas of work and private life, more and more personal and subjective means 
of expression and ways of virtually interacting with machines and I or distant strangers 
are elaborated. (Ibid., p5) 
She states further that 'the very impersonality and lack of context that are 
fundamental to information are far too sterile a basis on which to build the human 
relations' (ibid., p5). She suggests that in this 'imperceptible realm of data' the user 
needs to 'reengage' the data object through an 'embodying' and 'inhabiting' thereof 
(ibid., p5). What I understand her to propose here is the idea of a re-materialisation 
of the virtual data object in the digital via the perception of the subject. It is the 
subject that perceives the abstract data object in his/her interaction with it, and in 
this perception produces the object as real. However, despite thereby invoking the 
idea of digital interactivity as quasi phenomenological intersubjectivity, which would 
equate perception in the digital with perception in the analogue, she later 
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problematises such a straightforward identification between the two. 
Morse questions the idea that purely operational interactivity, via input device, 
renders the computed object intersubjective. In her terms interactivity and 
intersubjectivity are not unconditionally equivalent. For Morse, the disparity is based 
on two points: one is the 'murky' status of subjectivity that is attached to machines, 
and the second is their differing relationship to causality.116 The discourse we are 
engaged in when conversing with a digital subject, a subject on screen is, according 
to Morse, not wholly reciprocal. The digital 'I' of the computer screen or the 
televisual image, the 'machine subject', is not reciprocal with the user 'I', in that the 
analogue'!' does not constitute the digital'!' as 'you' in discourse beyond 
operational changes. Discourse however, is dependent on reciprocity, where both 
the'!, and the 'you' constitute each other. Intersubjectivity relies on such reciprocity. 
Interactivity by contrast, in her terms, does not: the 'subject machine' of the 
computer constitutes the analogue subject, interacting via input device, without 
adapting its own 'subjectivity'. And whilst the intersubjective exchange in the real 
world implies a causality, the digital interaction has no origin in, nor consequence 
for, the real world. Consequently, although she states that instrumental relations, 
understood as metaphors, can enrich artistic and social imagination, their lack of 
historical causality and subjective reciprocity for her distinguishes them from 
analogue relations. 
Morse's argument is based on an understanding of the digital and the analogue as 
disconnected realms. According to her, 'virtuality is a little-understood fiction of 
presence that operates on a different plane' (ibid., p20). A space can be 'cyberised': 
marked by 'bubbles or pockets of virtuality in the midst of the material world' (ibid., 
p7). These virtualities 'can enchant spheres of everyday reality' (ibid., p7), but they 
remain but a bubble within it.117 The digital is identified by Morse as a virtual 
116 Morse considers the machine subject 'murky', since, for her, it is not a complete subject. 
She argues how 'subjectivity is characterized by the reversibility of "I" and "you", as shifters 
or empty positions.' (Ibid., p9) However, the digital 'I' of the computer screen or the 
televisual image, the 'machine subject' is not reciprocal. 'I' am constituted as a listener, a 
'you', by the 'machine subject' 'I', which is however not rendered a 'you' by my listening. It 
always retains its authority as an 'I', whilst my subjectivity is rendered incomplete vis-a.-vis 
this authority. 
117 The actions of the subject in the virtual do not, or at least should not, according to Morse, 
impact on the real world. There appears to be an ethical interest in her effort of separation. 
This ethicality is apparent in her choice of description of the digital language as a language 
of 'magic tricks' in relation to a supposedly sober analogue language of description. Later in 
her text she clarifies the motivation for this separation in her identification of a 'telepresent 
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language that produces fictions (generative), in opposition to an analogue language 
that describes (analytically) a pre-existent reality. The digital does not represent, but 
only presents itself. For Morse, the virtual presentation stands in no causal 
relationship with the real world. This barrier between reality and virtuality, what she 
terms a 'membrane', renders her notion of a reengagement by the subject only 
partially useful for my critique of a dialectic oppositionality between the digital and 
the analogue. Her argument still pre-supposes an oppositional relation between both 
realms, even if an experiential rather than a technological one. The referentiality and 
nominality of the experience in the real is confirmed vis-a-vis the experience in the 
unreality of the virtual bubble. However, Morse's text is useful in that it stages the 
oppositionality from an experiential angle. Thereby it allows for an argumentation of 
reality, real or virtual, in relation to its production by the subject. 
Morse does acknowledge that analogue 'reality' is not unproblematicaly non-
ideological but 'rather [presents] a problematic social construction that is contingent 
and historical.' (Ibid., p9) 
The claim is not that television and a computer supported cyberculture are less authentic 
than "real" discursive exchange between human beings. It is rather that socially 
constructed reality is already fictional and the virtuality is an aspect of that fictionality that 
has come to be more and more supported and maintained by machines, especially 
television and the computer. (Ibid., pp1 0,11) 
She argues the fictionality of any reality, which is always a social and hence an 
ideological reality. Despite this acknowledgement however, she does not stage the 
digital as another socially constructed reality, but maintains that due to its a-
historicity the virtual fiction retains its status of unreality. This identification is argued 
in the differentiation between 'fictions of past', as present representations of things 
that stand in relation to a potential 'having been there' a fa Barthes, and 'fictions of 
presence', that have no such originary authenticity and hence can claim no 
causality.118 'Once the photographic realism is no guarantee of "having been there", 
danger of engagement with the image world at the cost -ethical and psychic- of 
disengagement or remoteness from the actual effects of one's actions.' (Ibid., p23) 
118 In his text Rhetoric of the Image, which is referred to here by Morse, Barthes sets up the 
differentiation between an image that refers to a notion of a 'having-been-there' and 'things 
being there'. Barthes talks about the reality value of photographs as a 'real unreality'. 
Photographs are, according to him, real not as a present reality, but in their evidence of a 
past reality. In relation to this the digital image, which has no such past, but is a production 
without a moment of 'this is how it was' to relate to, becomes understood as an unreality by 
Morse. (Barthes, 1986, p33) 
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the credibility the photograph nevertheless possesses is undermined.' (Ibid., pp11-
12) For her there is a danger in (mis-}understanding fictions of presence in relation 
to a historical causality. She believes that: 
The convention of fiction as representation (as in books of films) are more sophisticated 
and better understood than the fictions of presence, that vary in mood from persuasive 
performance to subjunctive presentation to outright lies and deception; such utterances 
or performances include images meant to shape or invent a world, not represent it. 
Virtualities become problematic when they are misunderstood as fictions of the past in 
which actions have no direct consequences for the material world. (Ibid., p21). 
This quote reveals her belief in a notion of a true, historical reality, however 
ideological, which is betrayed and attacked by a virtual reality. It points to an anxiety 
of the digital to destabilise and corrupt the nominality of the analogue world through 
its continuous present production without a past. Morse fears the destruction of a 
present reality which she sees to be 'more and more compromised by algorithmic 
image processing that erases the difference between having been there then and 
being here now.' (Ibid., p15) The digital understood as a continually present virtuality 
presents a threat to the material certainty of the analogue world understood as 
verified by the notion of a past. For Morse, "'virtuality" is a dematerialized, and for 
that reason, ontologically uncertain mode of presence.' It presents a threat to 'Iong-
term cultural notions of reality as well as systems of belief and identification.' (Ibid., 
p24) 
Therefore, for Morse, the digital and the analogue realm and their respective notions 
of subjectivity continue to be argued and constituted in opposition to each other. Her 
investigation of the digital and analogue subject and its perception remains bound 
up in a dialectic dynamic. By contrast, I propose that an investigation which 
compares rather than opposes the reality of both realms, argued via the perception 
of the subject, problematises the dialectic understanding of reality and unreality on 
which her argument is based. 
To substantiate this proposal I invest her notion of a 'reengagement' of the abstract 
data object through its 'inhabiting' by the subject, and test the criticality of this idea 
beyond her anxiety of 'a-historicism'. In the next part of this chapter, then, I attempt 
to develop her interaction in the digital outside of its dichotomous relation with an 
analogue intersubjectivity. This investigation is pursued via Merleau-Ponty's notion 
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of 'intersubjectivity' and his 'life-world' continually produced in 'motility'. Merleau-
Ponty's ideas are discussed through the work of conceptual artist Mel Bochner. Via 
this conjunction I argue for an understanding of reality, virtual and real, as social 
constructions. 119 This allows me to place the digital and the analogue in comparison 
rather than in opposition to each other. Thus I can critically compare their 
materiality; dynamic of production and perception; and the status of the subject 
involved in this dynamic. 
I recognise what Morse fears as a threat to ontological certainty and 'cultural notions 
of reality', as exactly the stimulus of conceptual art of the '70s exactly: to work 
against material representation established through a history and theory of art, by 
concerning oneself with processes of 'dematerialization', which foreground the work 
as continually present productions. I follow Tony Godfrey's suggestion here. In his 
essay 'The Dematerialized Object Almost' he writes that in the conceptual art work, 
'the withdrawal from the traditional art object often led to an examination of bodily 
experience.' (Godfrey, 1999, p128) I read this statement in relation to Morse motion 
of reengagement of the digital data object. In this sense I understand Godfrey's 
statement to support the idea that informationalisation, understood as 
dematerialization, engages the subject in a process of re-materialisation via a 'bodily 
experience'. Dematerialization forges an involvement of the subject in the production 
of the work. To investigate this conjunction I pursue the strategy of dematerialising 
the material object into an informational object in the digital, in relation to conceptual 
art's emphasis on processes and time. The effort of reengagement I consider 
outside the notion of a historical causality; not as a reengagment, but a continually 
present engagement. 
For conceptual artist Robert Smithson the emphasis on time and continual presence 
over spatial materiality, does not present a frightful and disturbing fiction, a 
'language of magic tricks'. Rather, it grants the material artwork its status as 
process, and thus presents a recognition of the subject engaged within it. Smithson, 
in his essay 'A Sedimentation of the mind: Earth Projects' remarks: 
119 The notion of the social as construction is examined in chapter 3. There I argued for an 
understanding of the social not as contract but as 'tendential' quality which is actualised 
through the desire to be social, thus rendering sociality contingent and particular rather than 
contractual. This argument is developed here in relation to digital and the analogue notions 
of sociality vis-a.-vis Merleau-Ponty's intersubjectivity and his notion of doubt. Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenological sense is motivated by doubt. Doubt, I argue, foregrounds the 
desire to produce and perceive, rather than a systemic production and perception. This 
argument re-asserts the criticality of spectatorial desire discussed in the last chapter. 
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For too long the artist has been estranged from his own 'time'. Critics, by focusing on the 
'art object', deprived the artist of any existence in the world of both mind and matter. The 
mental process of the artist which takes place in time is disowned, so that a commodity 
value can be maintained by a system independent of the artist. Art, in this sense, is 
considered 'timeless' or a product of 'no time at all'; this becomes a convenient way to 
exploit the artist out of his rightful claim to his temporal processes. The argument for the 
contention that time is unreal is a fiction of language, and not of the material of time or 
art.120 (Smithson, 1979, p90) 
In the next part of this chapter I query the status of digital informationality, as staged 
by Morse, in comparison with the challenge to material substantiality (supported by 
art history), announced by conceptual art, which seeks to emphasis temporal 
processes. The above quote from Smithson demonstrates that this comparison is 
not arbitrary. The conceptual artist, although working with substantial material, tries 
to emphasis not a material stability, but a notion of the (art-)object as process. 
Through the juxtaposition of the conceptual and the technological process of 
informationalisation, I aim to query the practical consequences and the ideological 
background of either strategy. The question I am asking in such a comparison is 
whether or not the digital object realises the conceptual artist's desire to produce a 
process-based artwork that manages to challenge aesthetic conventions and values 
tied to a notion of materiality as spatial and fixed. In other words, I am trying to 
enquire whether or not the digital offers an actualisation of the ideological premise of 
conceptual art. In the course of this investigation I promote the signifying practice of 
temporal-collage in relation to dematerialization and reengagement. This correlation 
further develops and clarifies issues of materiality, subjectivity, as well as ideas of 
intention (authorial production) and extension (imaginative perception) as they are 
staged in previous chapters. 
In order to stage this investigation I am initially concentrating on the work and ideas 
of Mel Bochner. The careful position this artist takes vis-a-vis notions of materiality 
and process, beyond a dialectical negation, in a more contextual position, I 
understand to allow for a critical evaluation of both terms and their correlation. This 
120 According to Smithson the artwork as process, as temporal production rather than spatial 
product, manages to escape commodification. The paradox of Smithson's own practice in 
respect to his argument against the monumental in favour of entropic processes is discussed 
in chapter 2. In chapter 5 I problematise the easy dichotomy on which such an 
understanding of space as commodity versus time as non-saleable fluidity, is based. This 
investigation further queries the dialectic dynamic of the oppositional differentiation between 
time and space. From the hindsight of computational dematerialization and exchange, time 
and space, are rethought and thereby an easy logic of temporal criticality re-considered. 
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follows an investigation of Bochner's motivation and mechanism of dematerialization 
in the light of the informational 'immateriality' of the digital, and in respect to the 
dialectic dynamic between notions of materiality and information as immateriality. 
My investigation of conceptual art, and Bochner's practice in particular, focuses on 
the status of the audience (spectatorship) in the production of the work. 
Mel Bochner: Analogue Object as Information 121 
Richard S. Field, in his foreword to the catalogue of the retrospective 'Mel Bochner: 
Thought Made Visible', at the Yale University Gallery in 1995, introduces Bochner's 
work by writing: 
His art examines the conventions, codes, and grammars we routinely use to grasp the 
external world. Beginning with the simplest cognitive strategies - counting, measuring, 
stacking, or rendering - he gradually moves on to equally basic investigation of the 
language of relationships: prepositions, verbs, and simple logical propositions. The 
questions he deals with in his conceptual works, like the materials he uses, are familiar 
to everyone -fundamental givens in our culture. But their surface simplicity masks a 
serious questioning of all systems of representation, both visual and verbal. (Field, 1995, 
p7) 
Field identifies Bochner within the general concerns of Conceptual Art. However, 
Bochner himself critiques the ideational premise of this categorisation. Despite 
scrutinising and working against formal notions of materiality, Bochner opposes a 
straight forward dematerialization as a viable strategy for art practice to critically 
assess and challenge a substantial aesthetic. Both his stance against the 
categorical conceptual a priori and his position against strategies of 
dematerialization, formulate a critique of the dichotomy within which any such 
categorisation and strategy takes place. This twofold critique is expressed in the 
following passages quoted from 'Excerpts From Speculation [1967-1970]': 
121 I want to signal here clearly that my observations of Bochner's work are, analogous to my 
consideration of Smithson's film-work 'Spiral Jetty' in chapter 2, and my examination of 
Tarkovsky's film 'Stalker' in chapter 3, not primarily concerned with the author's intent. Nor is 
my argument conducted as an art historical study of his work in relation to an oeuvre. My 
observations do not formulate a comprehensive study, but focus on the particular 
relationship between materiality and dematerialization as observed in his work. I foreground 
the notion of fundamental givens and their systemic representation as critiqued in his work 
and writing. In this sense, this consideration of Bochner's practice presents an estimation of 
particular written and visual works, from my focus on materiality and subjectivity to facilitate a 
critical elaboration of my own concerns. 
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For a variety of reasons I do not like the term "conceptual art". Connotation of an easy 
dichotomy with perception are obvious and inappropriate. The unfortunate implication is 
of a somewhat magical/mystical leap from one mode of existence to another. The 
problem is the confusion of idealism and intention. By creating an original fiction, 
"conceptualism" posits its special nonempirical existence as a positive (transcendent) 
value. (Bochner, 1972, p50) 
My disagreement with dematerialization goes beyond a squabble with terms, there is no 
art that does no bear some burden of physicality. To deny it is to descend to irony. 
Words set up circumstances for understanding. And this particular one only perpetuates 
old confusions. It is misleading to the intentions of artists finding different ways for art to 
come into being ... and both how and how long it stays there. (Ibid., p57) 
Both, the conceptual in its dichotomy with the actual, what he calls 'empirical', and 
the immaterial in its opposition to materiality, is understood by Bochner not to 
present a strategy away from 'the burden of physicality'. Immaterial conceptuality 
does not, according to him, sufficiently dispute the referential stability of visible 
boundaries. However to challenge such a positive notion of stability as a 
fundamentally given reality seems nevertheless the motivation for his art practice. 
Following Field, Bochner's work examines systemic conventions and relationships to 
emphasise experiential knowledge above referential knowledge and to question the 
material beyond a deterministic ideal of empirical reality. His motivation to critique a 
substantial aesthetic without forging a dialectic oppositionality, I understand to 
propose a complex evaluation of the notion of systemic reality, actual and 
conceptual, beyond dialectical reversibility. This, I argue, renders a discussion of his 
practice useful in relation to Morse's contentions of digital informational ism 
(immateriality) encouraging interaction, versus analogue materiality producing 
intersubjectivity. 
Bochner asserts his challenge to a systemic, representational art practice by writing 
that: 
A fundamental assumption in much recent past art was that things have stable 
properties, i.e., boundaries. This seemingly simple premise became the basis for a 
spiralling series of conclusions. Boundaries, however, are only the fabrication of our 
desire to detect them ... a trade-off between seeing something and wanting to enclose it. 
For example, what we attribute to objects as "constancy of size", during their 
progressive diminution when we walk away from them, is not a set of snapshot images 
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gradually blending together. Concentration produces the illusion of consistency. ( ... ) The 
problem is that surrendering the stability of objects immediately subverts any control we 
think we have over situations. (Ibid., p50) 
Bochner voices a critique of the substantial aesthetic which he sees to dominate 
recent art practice, and takes it away from its ideology of intrinsic material properties 
by considering its perception. Thus the notion of consistency and stability becomes 
identified as an illusion of consistency, fabricated in 'our desire to detect'. His 
critique is not settled within the framework of this illusion, a sense of a positive 
materiality, nor in opposition to it, as an immaterial negativity. He does not allow the 
immaterial to marginalise itself in fictionality, nor does he want to reaffirm material 
reality by providing an illusion of consistency. By contrast, he focuses on the 'desire' 
to understand, stabilise and enclose the object in perceptual contracts and 
referential norms. It is then neither the object, the material itself, nor an immaterial 
negation thereof that his work is focusing on. Rather, he emphasises the perception 
of the work as a conceptual interaction, along certain, referential, lines, producing 
'the illusion of consistency', or, if free of referentiality, producing perceptual non-
certainties 'beyond our control' .122 123 
I understand his sense of a surrendering of stability, this loss of control in relation to 
the non-referential object, to stage the artwork in particular, and the world in general, 
as a perceptual and hence contingent non-certainty in the sense of a 
phenomenological world in accordance with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's life-world.124 
122 Following Merleau-Ponty's use of the 'non' in his articulation of a phenomenological non-
sense I use the term 'non-certainty' rather than 'uncertainty' in order to avoid a dialectical 
recuperation via a negative identification vis-a.-vis certainty. 'Non-certainty' aims to stress the 
phenomenological production of certainty as 'uncertainty in perception', rather than identify 
an empirical certainty in direct opposition to a dialectical uncertainty. In this sense non-
certainty dismisses the notion of empirical certainty and proposes certainty as always 
experiential non-certainty instead. 
123 I read Bochner's notion of the 'illusion of consistency' in conjunction with Lyotard's 
'illusion of totality' as articulated in chapter 3. Both, I argue, suggest that (Hegelian) totality is 
not achievable in the object, the material, but is only an illusion of a referential evaluation. 
This, I contest, implies a critique of aesthetic judgement for its closing down of the generative 
process of perception in analytical totality. At the same time I understand Bochner's notion of 
'control' in relation to the idea of the contract, the game-rules or lexical register, as discussed 
via Lyotard and Kristeva in chapters 2 and 3. I discuss this conjunction later on in this 
chapter. There I bring my assertions of a tendential symbolic-semiotic (sociality) and its 
realisation through desire together with ideas about imaginative intersubjectivity and 
programmed computer interaction respectively. 
124 Merleau-Ponty's notion of an intersubjective life-world describes the world as produced in 
the correlation between subject and object, who are in the world and are through their being 
in the world and the world through their being in it, in the present continuously. 
Intersubjectivity describes the world as produced in reciprocal relations between the subject 
and his/her environment. The intersubjective subject perceives the 'things' around him/her, in 
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In this life-world the subject and the thing are constituted in relation to each other. 
The intersubjective subject perceives the 'things' around him/her, in his/her 
movements and gestures towards them, as much as these movements and 
gestures themselves are determined by the way these things are perceived. This 
perception is practical and present: it produces the subject and the object in 
continual motility. 
However, Bochner's emphasis is not initially on the intersubjective motility which 
produces the object in such a life-world. Rather he focuses on rendering visible the 
invisible norms that limit perception to detection. The notion of phenomenological 
intersubjective motility is only involved once the object has been rendered an 
informational object. Freed from its normative referentiality, via a literal rendering 
thereof, the object allows for a conceptual production. Bochner's description of an 
non-certain, non-referential object, I argue, emphasises conceptual perception not in 
opposition to the detection of a referential (actual) product. Rather, it highlights the 
normative context through which the object is referential, rather than 
phenomenological, in order to then, in a second step, enable a production of the 
object as a conceptual object in its phenomenological perception. 
Bochner's piece 8" Measurements (image 2) from 1969, presents us with a piece of 
graph paper, on which are drawn two arrows pointing from the middle, where the 
measure of 8" is noted, to either side of the sheet. This referential note pre-empts 
the detection of size, which at once makes it apparent as a normative measurement 
and allows us to think about the 8" beyond certainty of measurement into much less 
his/her movements towards them, as much as the movements themselves are determined 
by the way these things are perceived. The intersubjective 'I' is reliant on the action of 
perception for the continuous production of the self, which in turn is determined by the 
gestures of the other, produced continuously in the movement of perception, sensory-motor. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, this intersubjective creating, in sensory-motor actions, happens 
in time, but not in a historical linearity, but as complex spatio-temporal events. The life-world 
is produced continually through perception, rather than sought and closed down in an 
empirical detection: the referential recognition of one object, the pre-programmed 
combination of one past definition/ signifier with one object, phenomenon/ signified perceived 
in the present. In this sense my experience of an object, phenomenon or another subject is 
not a discovery of that object, phenomenon or subject, but a perceptive operation that 
produces the object, phenomenon or subject in the present, and at the same time produces 
my own subjectivity, at every moment anew. The perceptual production is practical and 
present, it is in continuous present motions and gestures, what Merleau-Ponty terms: in 
motility. 
It is I who bring into being this world which seemed to exist without me, to surround and 
surpass me. I am therefor a consciousness, immediately present to the world, and 
nothing can claim to exist without somehow being caught in the web of my experience. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, p29) 
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certain and doubtful terrain. The 8" are clearly signalling the objective size of the 
paper. The paper is at once described and abandoned in that measurement. The 
focus shifts immediately from the material of the paper onto the re-thinking of the 
appearance and veracity of the 8" of its description. It is the description that is the 
object, an uncertain informational object. 
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Image 2, Mel Bochner, 8" Measurements, 1969, black ink on graph paper, 11" x 8,5" 
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In relation to this work I understand Bochner's statement on the dominant 
preoccupation of the artwork with a substantial consistency that produces, in his 
sense, an illusion of consistency or a loss of control respectively, to question what 
has earlier been talked about in terms of Morse's 'ontological certainty'. Morse sees 
this 'ontological certainty' to be rendered uncertain in the virtuality of digital 
immateriality. She talks about the virtual as an 'ontologically uncertain mode of 
presence', that undermines our notions of reality and its concurrent systems of 
belief, due to its existence without a past (Morse, 1998, p24). I earlier argued how 
this highlights her sense of a true, normative and referential reality whose primary 
position is being threatened by a virtuality based on abstract information, 
constructed continually in the present. This 'fiction of presence' for her threatens the 
status of a real substantiality verified in its empirical and historical description. I 
contest that Bochner's work undermines the certainty of such a substantial reality. 
8" Measurements at once presents and devastates the primacy and certainty of an 
empirical description. However, his work stands not in an obvious opposition to such 
substantiality. He does not present the immaterial dimension of the paper in order to 
shatter its ontological certainty. Rather, his work presents any notion of ontological 
certainty to be an illusion in the first place. 
I find proof for this observation in his designation of the measurement not as an 
immateriality but a 'nonmateriality'. Instead of dwelling on the immaterial description 
(conceptual), verifying the dialectically opposed material object as actual, he 
perceives them both as 'nonmaterialized components' (Bochner, 1972, p56). The 
piece of paper might not be 8" after all. Not because we do not trust the paper to be 
paper, or of a specific size, but because our belief in a consistent notion of 8" has 
been shattered in this conceptualisation. It is the description, the information about 
the object, that has been transposed from being an attributal, normative device, 
describing the certainty of the material, into the production of itself as non-certain. 
The subject is invited to perceive 8" Measurements not in relation to its status as an 
empirical measurement, but in his/her contingent production of it as an uncertainty. 
In this engagement, I argue, the subject re-thinks the conception of any materiality: 
The description/ measurement, the 8", is clarified as information, and information is 
verified as a (conceptual) object rather than a description of an (actual) object. The 
8" are not a representation of something else, but are produced as a conceptual 
(nonmaterial) object in the perception of the subject performing a generative 
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interpretation.125 Thus, I argue, description/representation is articulated as 
generative information rather than analytical information. In his sense the 8" are a 
data-object, a measurement in time, which brings 'the very situation (it) describe(s) 
into being' (Morse, 1998, p8). This generative nonmateriality, I argue, stands not in 
opposition to a referential materiality but is the material in perception. This leads me 
to parallel the processes of Bochner's nonmaterial object with the textual 
mechanisms of an informational-digital-object. In this sense I propose the 
conceptual artwork as iterative information. 
I contend my understanding of Bochner's use of non-certain and generative iteration 
in relation to Merleau-Ponty's identification of doubt as the central motivator for Paul 
Cezanne's work. Merleau-Ponty's text 'Cezanne's Doubt' (in Johnson ed., 1993), 
outlines a notion of 'doubt' in the objective perception as a motivation for artistic 
practice. In this essay the painter's doubt of the singular and fixed perspective is 
identified as the drive for his continuous and continuously re-evaluating production 
in the sense of an intersubjective motility. Merleau-Ponty sees Cezanne's work to 
question the anthropomorphic functionalism through which we detect a referentially 
determined world, and ourselves as determined in it, from one predetermined view-
point.126 
We live in the midst of man-made objects, among tools, in houses, streets, cities, and 
most of the time we see them only through the human actions which put them to use. We 
become used to thinking that all of this exists necessarily and unshakably. Cezanne's 
painting suspends these habits of thought and reveals the base of inhuman nature upon 
which man has installed himself. This is why Cezanne's people are strange, as if viewed 
by a creature of another species. Nature itself is stripped of the attributes which make it 
ready for animistic communions. (Merleau-Ponty in Johnson ed., 1993, p66) 
The identification of 'habits of thought', I see to articulate the referential frame which 
renders the image tautological, providing a notion of ideality, which determines and 
encompasses the object in totality. With the idea of a 'suspense' of these habits in 
Cezanne's work, Merleau-Ponty points to a critique of such a habitual referentiality, 
125 I understand this process of conceptualisation to resonate with the trial of the subject and 
materiality in the mis-en-scene of the Zone, articulated as the condition of temporal-collage, 
and staged via Kristeva's fourth signifying practice of the text in chapter 3. 
126 The notion of 'anthropomorphic functionalism' suggests the experience of the world as a 
detection of historically pre-determined referentialities according to human needs 
(tautological reality). With his challenge to such a functional understanding Merleau-Ponty 
critiques the idea of its organisation and suggests that perception in doubt can stretch 'to the 
root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity.' (in Johnson ed., 1993, p67) 
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and hence of totalising ideality. I understand the statement 'creature of another 
species' to articulate subjectivity outside categorical identities and to hint at a 
complexity of production in perception rather than a fulfilment in detection vis-a-vis 
fundamental givens. Instead an 'alien' and new object is produced in the incessant 
doubt of the subject vis-a-vis the thing seen. There is no recourse to a referential 
frame against which the object can be measured and no known category within 
which the subject can be identified.127 Rather, everything/one is produced anew all 
the time. 
Merleau-Ponty understands Cezanne's paintings to work on the doubt of anyone 
reading as an absolute reality, an ideal totality. I hold Merleau-Ponty's statement to 
suggest that systemic referentiality ties the work and the subject to a structural 
certainty and disables a more complex production. I contest that in this suggestion, 
ontological certainty and causal referentiality are critiqued as paralysing the artwork 
in totality. By contrast, doubt is staged to provoke a continually present production in 
perception: 'Cezanne's Doubt' sketches the notion of doubt as a desire for practice; 
motivating the continuous action of producing the world in our perception of it. When 
the motivation of the work is its doubt, then, its effect is the intersubjective 
production of the world and the self in that world, in intersubjective motility. 
Merleau-Ponty's intersubjectivity is wholly reciprocal. This stands in clear contrast to 
Morse's notion of interaction in the virtual-world. For her the 'machine subject' 
(computed subject) does not adapt beyond operational changes, and hence only the 
analogue subject (the human subject) gets produced by the computer, which is 
consequently identified as a 'subject machine'. Bochner's work, understood as 
producing informational objects, comparable to Morse's digital data-objects, 
identified via Merleau-Ponty's intersubjectivity, presents a critique of Morse's notion 
of interaction. Merleau-Ponty does not propose the idea of an ideal state verified 
127Merleau-Ponty's intersubjective '1', is not known to itself as a rational, in reference to a 
category pre-existing, identity, and hence cannot discover the other through his/her self-
certainty. The 'I' in this intersubjective motor-operation produces the certainty of itself and its 
environment, the life-world, through continuous production as uncertainty. In the reciprocal 
relationship between the life-world and the '1', doubt implies self doubt as well as doubt about 
the world. I read the doubt that Merleau-Ponty understands to drive Cezanne to paint, to be 
the doubt through which subjectivity as well as objectivity is produced provisionally and 
continually in an intersubjective life-world: 'Only one emotion is possible for this painter- the 
feeling of strangeness- and only one Iyricism- that of the continual rebirth of existence.' 
(Merleau-Ponty in Johnson ed., 1993, p68). 
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through a 'fiction of the past', nor does he suggest that there is an ideal state to be 
aimed at in the future. Rather, the subject and the object are produced as 
nonmaterial non-certainties, reciprocally and continually in the present perception. It 
is in reference to this argument that I refer to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of 
intersubjective perception when trying to articulate a critique of a Morsian separation 
between virtuality and reality, and its consequent claims of a true referential reality 
and certain subjectivity. I understand it is between an agreement with her notion of 
'inhabiting', and a critique of her insistence on causality and historical referentiality, 
via Merleau-Ponty's present intersubjectivity, that temporal-collage can be confirmed 
as a non-dialectical signifying practice. 
I understand Bochner's recourse to the referential frame, the emphasis on the 
measurement of the object rather than its functional aim or aesthetic appearance, to 
propose an insistent engagement with the object in doubt. 8" Measurement 
proposes doubt in the referential and normative data framing the stable object for 
detection. I contest that it is not doubt in the object as material but as nonmaterial 
information which motivates my perception of his work. The focus of this work is on 
the systematisation of the object as (objective) actuality, articulated as the illusion of 
consistent measurement and the control of description. Bochner's work doubts the 
status of the referential system and thus introduces doubt into the certainty of an 
empiricist actuality. Thereby it destabilises the notion of actual materiality and 
proposes the extension of the referential as a conceptual nonmateriality instead. I 
articulate this conceptual extensionality in reference to Merleau-Ponty's 
understanding of the world as a place produced in my consciousness of it. 
According to Merleau-Ponty there is no empirical or theoretical meta-( or ante-) 
position: 
That the world could pre-exist my consciousness of the world is out of the question: is it 
not obvious that every world without me that I could think of becomes, by the very fact 
that I think of it a world for me. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p47) 
This 'thought of world' is a conceptual extensionality as articulated above. Thus I 
understand the engagement in the art-object, which Bochner's work proposes, to be 
articulated along the lines of Merleau-Ponty's notion of a non-causal and continually 
present intersubjective production in perception. Doubt in a referential objectivity is 
the trigger and motivation for Merleau-Ponty as well as Bochner's notion of 
extension as a 'thinking which becomes'. However, in distinction to Cezanne, read 
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via Merleau-Ponty, I contend that Bochner is not motivated to alleviate that doubt, 
even if temporally, in a phenomenological embodying.128 As a consequence of my 
argument for a particular sense and identity realised in the desire to be social, as 
staged in chapter 3, I understand this motivation to be realised in the desire for 
certainty, not in certainty itself however.129 Rather, doubt leads to the desire for 
certainty and, I argue, it is this desire rather than its fulfilment that is the focus of 
Bochner's work. 
I argue that Bochner's conceptual art-object does not propose to alleviate doubt 
through certainty. Rather, it produces non-certainty as a particular and contingent 
conviction of 'a world for me'. The conceptual is a contingent generating of the art-
object by the subject. It does not negate any previous perception, nor does it 
contradict any future production. Measurements: Group B, (image 3), from the 
Room Series, produced in 1969 for the Heiner Friedrich Gallery in Munich, I believe, 
exemplifies this point. 
128 According to Merleau-Ponty, Cezanne's paintings are painted in doubt. Their production is 
motivated by the doubt of the author in the appearance of the landscape distended in front of 
him. The motivation to paint is the doubt in the veracity of what he sees. However, the 
painting itself is not in doubt, it is maybe a result of doubt but is in itself a certain object. The 
painting is the higher order synthesis of the body of the artist and the doubt in his perception. 
In comparison I understand Bochner's emphasis on doubt not to express uncertainty in the 
piece of paper as a material object in front of him, but rather in the accuracy and reliability of 
its measurement. His doubt is a doubt in the system of a referential certainty. His work does 
not render the measurement certain through the production of an (ideal) artwork. Rather, it is 
made doubtful through its existence as an artwork. 
129 The notion of the artwork realised as desire for certainty but not in an actual fulfilment of 
this desire, a certain denouement, brings the argument of chapter 3 into this chapter. In the 
last chapter I outlined the notion of an autonomous and generative subjectivity and sense. I 
discussed the idea that what we share is not a social contract nor a symbolic register, but the 
desire to be social, to realise sociality in the tendential (symbolic) qualities of materiality and 
subject. Thus I argued, the tendential is the realisation of an autonomous subjectivity and 
sense. In this phenomenological 'non-sense', I argued, subjectivity and sense are neither 
produced in a negative relation to a contractual meaning and identity (collective sense), nor 
are they rendered irrelevant in a relative identification (nonsense). This argument is pertinent 
in relation to my use of Merleau-Ponty: I do not employ his 'Phenomenology of Perception' in 
order to come to certainty, but in order to focus on its process of perception as a perpetually 
doubtful producing of generative non-certainty instead. As a consequence of the argument 
staged in the last chapter, the certainty of this non-certainty lies in the conviction of the 
subject about his/her own generative interpretation. 
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The architectural space of the room has been rendered visible in relation to its 
measurements. The walls and doors have been measured, drawn out and labelled 
in feet and inches. A blue-print is added to the room, which at once adds the 
certainty of measurement and exposes its futility and illusionary sense of 
consistency and control, understood as objective reality, to the subject thinking the 
room. The space of the room is not actually changed by these measurements. My 
position within it is not really made more secure and certain through knowing its 
data. However, I argue that the obvious measure allows me to at once recognise my 
experience as detection as well as to question its reliability. Through this process of 
perception, I argue, the condition of objectivity, as encompassable by an empirical 
description, is put into doubt. From this doubt I produce the room in intersubjective 
motility. 
Bochner's work highlights the referential structure and thereby generates doubt in 
the belief that any referential category can support the object, the room-space, as a 
true object, room-space. Instead, his work provokes the subject to inhabit the room-
space. I understand this process to resonate with Morse where she is talking about 
the inhabiting of the informational object in the digital: Bochner's room 
measurements are abstract data objects which oblige the subject to engage them in 
a mental inhabiting. Via a referential abstraction, the data, he provokes an 
intellectual engagement with the viewer. He/she extends the room and its 
description, in a mental interaction beyond its empirical actuality, into a more 
conceptual existence.13o However, I contest, that whilst for Morse the interaction of 
the digital data object is a reengagement, Bochner's work produces an engagement. 
And whilst Morse's reengagment is a not wholly reciprocal interaction, Bochner's 
130 Manuel Caste lis in 'the Rise of the Network Society', under the chapter heading 'The 
Culture of Real Virtuality', talks about the Greek invention of the alphabet as a conceptual 
technology. As mentioned earlier in the text, he articulates the notion that it is the material 
and spatial certainty provided by the alphabet, which renders a conceptualisation of the 
object possible. Similarly I understand Bochner's use of measurements and data, in their 
spatial and material certainty, to allow for a conceptualisation of the object beyond its visible 
certainty. However, his work drives this process a step further: the conceptualisation made 
possible through the visualisation of the object in reference to the alphabet, the measuring 
data, makes it possible for him to question the reliability and certainty of the measuring data, 
even. This putting into doubt the object and its referential frame, gives the notion of the 
stability of the alphabet, which offers the object for conceptualisation, a different spin. The 
description is no longer an attribute, describing and hence fixing a correlate object, rather it 
is itself an object, and it is now only the context of perception which stabilises both these 
objects in time. What is produced is a double conceptualisation (of actuality and 
conceptuality) in contingency, which produces not a conceptualisation as transgression of 
the referential frame: the alphabet, the measuring data, describing an actual object, but 
rather an acknowledgement of the actuality of the object as contingent. 
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work engages in a reciprocal dialogue: the room, the measurement and the subject 
are all constituted as mental extensions in the contingency of their engagement in 
dialogue.131 
I understand the conceptual extensions Bochner's work is forging to agree with 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of intersubjectivity rather than with Morse's idea of a non-
reciprocal interactivity in the separate realm of the digital. Bochner presents as 
equal the measurement object and the object of the room. He does not present 
them as existing in different realms but to be produced equally, in the intersubjective 
dialogue of their perception, as data objects. The informational object of the 
measurement, and the actual object of the room, are both constituted in the mental 
extension of the subject as nonmaterial. The subject in turn is constituted in relation 
to this nonmaterial. All three 'elements' are thus produced intersubjectively as 
'conceptual extensions'. 
I understand this notion of 'conceptual extensions', staged in his proposal for 
'imagination', to produce the perception of the material as real, or fictional. 132 
Bochner talks about the term imagination as a word excluded from the concurrent 
discourse of art. He suggests that 'imagination is a word that has been generally 
banned from the vocabulary of recent art. Associations with any notion of special 
power reserved for artists or of a "poetical world" of half-dreams seem particularly 
unattractive.' (Bochner, 1972, p54) He argues that imagination is conventionally 
131 The production of the work as mental extensions is continually in the present and does 
not insist on a historical causality. Merleau-Ponty's intersubjectivity, through which I am 
staging Bochner's work as an engagement, includes the notion of memory, and hence of 
past. However, Merleau-Ponty does not differentiate memory from present perception. 
Instead, he understands the past to culminate in the present without its reference to the past. 
Merleau-Ponty explains the 'contribution of memory' to a present perception in the sense of 
an added value (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p20). Perception is always in the present, a 'having 
been there' is thus no measure of veracity, but becomes part of and is constituted in the 
continually present engagement in the 'now'. 'Le passe de fait n'est pas importe dans 
I'aperception present par un mecanisme d'association, mais deployer par la conscience 
presente elle meme.' ('The past event is not imported into the present perception through 
association, rather it is deployed by the present conscience.') (Merleau-Ponty, 1960, p9, my 
translation) There is therefore no notion of a past context which the data object is reengaged 
from. Rather, the data object is produced continually in the subject's contingent engagement. 
132 I understand Bochner's 'imagination' producing 'conceptual extensions' in relation to the 
generative imagination practised in the centrifugal signifying of temporal-collage as argued in 
the previous chapters. Particularly in chapter 3 I contended the practice of temporal-collage 
via Lyotard's use of the term imagination. This identification is re-staged and developed here 
via Bochner's use of the term. In relation to this, the cautions articulated in the last chapter 
regarding the issue of imaginations relative irrelevance and their immanent recuperation in 
the negative, are being restaged via Bochner here also. 
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understood as an ephemeral immateriality, and as such stands in direct opposition 
to a material certainty. In this sense it is perceived as not serious, it can be 
marginalised as irrelevant and loses its criticality. Positioned in such clear opposition 
to a serious and substantial world, it is easily dismissed as nonsense and then 
recuperated in a dialectical move, to affirm a referential, material certainty and 
objective sense. 
From this articulation of marginalisation Bochner goes on to formulate a notion of 
practice of imagination that refutes such a dismissal by stating that: 
There is, however, within the unspecified usage of the word a function that infuses the 
process of making and seeing art. The root word "image" need not be used only to mean 
representation (in the sense of one thing referring to something other than itself). To re-
present can be defined as the shift in referential frames of the viewer from the space of 
events to the space of statements or vice versa. (Ibid., p54) 
Thus Bochner clarifies the term 'representation' as empirical (analytical) information, 
which positions the image as a translation of 'something other than itself'. Such 
representation, I argue, confirms the image (the artwork), within the notion of a 
causal referentiality of an analogue reality as described by Morse. By contrast his 
term 're-presentation' re-considers this (analogue) referentiality. The notion of a 
'shift' 'from space of events to the space of statements', or back again, I understand 
as a shift from a referential image to an image generated in intersubjective 
articulations. Through this shift Bochner (re-)introduces imagination into art 
discourse. For him, 'imagining (as opposed to imaging) is not a pictorial 
preoccupation. Imagination is a projection, the exteriorising of ideas about the 
nature of things seen.' (Ibid., pp54-55) In imagination the image is not an empirical 
description of the thing seen (analytical interpretation). Rather, its description is its 
production in a generative interpretation. 
Would anything change if sensible things were conceived of as "across" rather than "in" 
space? First, objects would cease to be the locus of sight. Then, no longer centers in 
themselves, they would demand to be perceived as the organization by everything 
around them. What might result from this conjecture is a sense of trajectory rather than 
of identity what common sense has always presented as a unity (objects) become only 
the negatives in a field of determinants. Opaque, yet fragmented, what is seen is only 
what stops my view beyond ... it is in front of me but without being in depth. Profiled in 
this way, matter surrenders its obstinate chunkiness to reveal only a position in a cross 
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section of orientations and levels, these levels merge on but one plane into dimensional 
sense data. And even on this plane, thought can efface them. (Bochner, 1972, p55) 
Imagination in Bochner's sense, then, renders the work a trajectory rather than a 
'locus of sight'. It is produced in perception, rather than perceived as a product of 
sight. Bochner's 'image' is not a stable substantial image but an image in iteration. It 
is a discursive image. It is the object as concept, not in contradiction to an actual 
state, but as an extension thereof constituting its actuality anew all the time through 
imagination. Thus I understand his notion of the 'image' to articulate the artwork as a 
signifying complex, continually produced between its material actuality and a 
conceptual articulation thereof by the (intersubjective) subject viewing the work.133 I 
will call the actuality of this object a 'conceptual actuality'. It is neither a concept 
extending a pre-existing substantial reality, nor is it an actual materiality, dialectically 
opposed to such a conceptuality. Rather, and in accord with Bochner's earlier 
refusal to accept the categorical nominalism of some conceptual art due to its tied-
upness with a straightforward dichotomy between materiality and immateriality, the 
notion of a 'conceptual actuality', proposes a material perception that includes and is 
constituted through the 'nonmaterial'. 
In relation to Measurements: Group B, the room is continually produced between the 
actuality of the measurements painted along the walls and on the doorframe, and 
the doubt about the veracity of these measurements. This doubt provokes the 
subject to generate the room in 'imaginative' extensions (non-certain). In this sense 
the room is discursive, it becomes an event produced in its description performed in 
a generative interpretation by the viewing subject. The non-dialectical relationship 
between the actual measurements and their performance in a conceptual 
extensionality render the room a 'conceptual actuality'. 
I argue that the subject viewing this Measurements: Group B room, produces the 
room in a forever present engagement. The recognition of Bochner's art-object, 
room-space, is a 're-cognition ... thinking it again', rather than a recognition of a 
'having thought it before' (ibid., p53). In relation to the works discussed, I understand 
it to be the motion of imagining that renders the work conceptually actual. Imagining 
formulates a conceptual extensionality of the actual material which in turn becomes 
133 Bochner's notion of the 'image', I argue, resonates with Lyotard's petit recit, the little 
narration, as articulated in the last chapter. Thus, viewing understood as an imagining 
process confirms perception as a narrating process; generative and intersubjective. 
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the object as nonmaterial in its context of time and place. 'The specific nature of any 
result is contingent on the time and place of implementation, and is interesting as 
such. It is the "proceeding" that establishes it.' (Ibid., pS6). It is in this sense that the 
materiality is neither fixed as an actuality, nor in opposition to a conceptual 
extension. Rather, the actual is identified as a contingent nonmaterial 
implementation of the artwork in its conceptual 'proceedings'. I find concurrence for 
my notion of the artwork as a conceptual actuality produced in the contingent 
context of its perception in Bochner's statement that: 
Perception of an object is generally preconceived as taking place within a point-by-point 
time. This disconnected time, a lingering bias of tense in language, restricts our 
experiencing the conjunction between object and observation. When this conjunction is 
acknowledged, "things" become indistinguishable from events. Carried to its conclusion, 
physicality, or what separates the material from the nonmaterial (the object from our 
observation), is merely a contextual detail. (Ibid., p52) 
The term conceptual actuality, I argue, at once summarises Bochner's efforts and 
allows me to consider the signifying practice of temporal-collage in its 
circumscription. 
Despite his criticism of Conceptual Art, then, I understand Bochner to be a 
conceptual artist, who performs a notion of dematerialization. His idea that all that 
separates the material from the nonmaterial is its contextualisation, identifies the 
conceptual as the 'belief' in materiality rather than in opposition to an actual 
materiality. This acknowledgement of materiality as an ideological rather than a 
physical concern, makes him, to me, an even more interesting conceptual artist. His 
emphasis on belief rather than systemic referentiality resonates with my proposition 
for temporal-collage to foreground the perceptual conviction before the contracts of 
production as critically assessed in the last two chapters. I understand my 
interpretation of his work to perform a complex signifying practice as articulated in 
the term temporal-collage: Bochner's motion of exteriorisation in imagination 
resonates with the centrifugal practice of temporal-collage; my intersubjective 
engagement with his work can be articulated in relation to a transitive subjectivity on 
trial; and his identification of the artwork as ideological nonmaterial rather than 
actual and referential, re-cognised rather than recognised, is what I understand 
temporal-collage to be proposing also. Therefore I contest that his work and critical 
writing enables me to re-assess and re-assert the criticality of temporal-collage. 
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I contend my argument for the artwork as a signifying complex, temporal-collage, via 
Bochner, in relation to this idea of a conceptual actuality. As a consequence of my 
articulation of this term as a nonmaterial extension of 'the actual' produced in 
Bochner's 'imagining', temporal-collage is elucidated to continually produce the 
artwork as a contingent imagining. This process is identified as a reciprocal 
engagement. Bochner's practice stages the artwork and the subject as nonmaterial 
perceptualities, produced continually and contingently in mental engagements. The 
fact that Bochner's work produces a conceptuality without referring to a simple 
dialectical position of actuality, makes my observations on his practice particularly 
useful to my attempt at articulating an art practice that exists through a conceptual 
imagining, which allows for a reflection back onto its actuality as a concept.134 
The difference between temporal-collage and my understanding of Bochner's 
practice, I argue, lies in the dynamic which forges such conceptualisations: the 
motivation for my strategy of temporal-collage is not a purely mental engagement, 
rather I understand it to be a mental and visceral engagement that constitutes the 
134 Brenda Richards in her essay Mel Bochner: Numbers and Shapes, writes that after the 
piece Axiom of Indifference (image 4) ... 
The shapes had been generated. The potential for combinatory shapes had been 
clarified. The artist almost immediately eliminated the infrastructure (points and 
connecting lines) and concentrated on the shapes. What followed was an extraordinary 
series of severe and powerful drawings in charcoal and gouache, permuting the two 
shapes explored in the "point" drawings (the triangle and the square). (Richards, 1976, 
p37) 
In relation to this shift from an emphasis on the outline, the number, to the drawing of the 
shape, Richards quotes Bochner: 'To continue meant a re-involvement with issues primarily 
visual in nature, concerns which I had bracketed out of my work for some time. (However, I 
have always considered my work to be visual art, no matter how far I deviated from or 
stretched traditional modes of presentation.), (Bochner in Richards, 1976, p37). The fact that 
Bochner's own work becomes increasingly visual after 1971, after having, according to 
Brenda Richards, reached a peak in terms of a practice which worked with the referential 
background of shapes, manifests to me, that once Bochner had freed himself of the notion of 
measured rationality, via an overstatement of that rationality exactly, he could go on 
producing visual work without thereby returning to a material, rational logic. In other words, 
once it was clear that the conceptual is not in opposition to, but is in fact the actual as 
imagining, a material practice could (again) be pursued that would work with material on a 
nonmaterial sensitivity. 
This shift I understand can be observed in the development from Axiom of Indifference and 
Rules of Inference (image 5) to Three, Five, Four (image 6). Although Axiom of Indifference, 
and more clearly the drawing Rules of Inference, which I understand as a kind of blue-print 
or rework in sketch of Axiom of Indifference, clearly highlights and works with the referential 
frame of the object, the dots, displayed or drawn, Three, Five, Four abandons the referential 
and produces the visual shapes, created by the referential frame in the first two, only. In 
connection to the series, and extending the sensitivity of its informationalisation, I understand 
the Three, Five, Four piece not as a re-instalment of a visual actuality. Rather, it enables the 
thinking of its materiality as a conceptual actuality (nonmateriality). 
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collaged material as a conceptual actuality. To be more particular, unlike Bochner, I 
do not differentiate between a mental and a physical engagement since that simply 
proposes but a new dialectical relationship. 
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Image 4, Mel Bochner, Axiom of Indifference (south side), 1972-73, 
felt-tip pen on masking tape and pennies on floor; each square 12" x 12" 
Image 5, Mel Bochner, Rules of Inference, 1973, charcoal and gouache on paper, 38" x 50" 
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It is from a complex non-dialectical relationship between actuality and conceptuality 
that I aim to debate the notion of an analogue non materiality in relation to the idea of 
a digital nonmateriality. I am undertaking this investigation in order to try to answer 
the question asked in the introduction to this chapter whether the critique of a 
referential materiality, as forged by conceptual art, is realised actually by the digital 
artist or not? 
In the next part of this chapter I am working through this question via an 
investigation of the status of materiality and the subject, in the painted graphic works 
of Ed Ruscha and the computer graphics of John Maeda respectively. In doing this, I 
attempt to confirm my suggestions about conceptual extensions producing actual 
non materiality vis-a-vis digital virtuality. My engagement with both these artist's work 
aids me to further develop my notion of a conceptual actuality. In the juxtaposition of 
their work, the assertions about a conceptual analogue materiality producing and 
produced in intersubjective imagining, (introduced via Bochner's work and discussed 
via Merleau-Ponty), is brought in contact with ideas of participation and production in 
the digital artwork. Operational interaction via an input device in the digital is brought 
in contact with my notion of extension in contingent participation in the analogue. 
What is being tested is the notion of the artwork as perceptual and contextual rather 
than substantial and referential. In conclusion, notions of conceptuality, actuality and 
partiCipation are brought in contact with my idea of materiality and subjectivity in 
temporal-collage. At the same time, interaction in digital art practice is discussed in 
relation to notions of a 'new' (inter-)activity in 'real virtuality'. 
Conceptual and Actual Digital: John Maeda and Ed Ruscha 
In a comparison between the digital artist John Maeda and the analogue artist Ed 
Ruscha, I attempt to illustrate and verify the relationship between an actual and a 
conceptual materiality and its involvement of the subject. I understand both artists' 
work to incorporate notions of actuality and conceptuality defined earlier in the text. 
The parallel discussion of their work helps me to further articulate these terms in 
relation to an analogue materiality and to develop them vis-a-vis the digital. In this 
way I further articulate and develop my notion of a conceptual actuality; the subject 
engaged in its production; as well as the relevance and criticality thereof in relation 
to the signifying practice of temporal-collage. 
The introduction of these issues into the digital realm aids me to critique the 
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dichotomous digital theories outlined in the first part of this chapter. The simple 
relation between word and 'thing' on which foundation the digital attains its status of 
'newness' and criticality, is critiqued via a complexification of its terms in the 
dynamic of a conceptual actuality. I contend that the notion of an extensional 
imagining, producing a conceptual actuality, helps me to develop the articulation of 
a digital nonmateriality, a la Bochner, rather than a digital immateriality, a la Morse. 
The basis of this critique is the position and role of the subject perceiving Maeda's 
and Ruscha's work. The emphasis on the perceptual subject allows me to articulate 
the digital as an imaginative virtuality: a digital conceptuality, and distinguish it from 
the technological virtuality, a digital actuality, that seems to persuade theorists of the 
radical novelty of digitality. 
The assumption in concurrent contentions of the digital is that virtuality is an 
immateriality that allows for autonomous and infinite interactivity, which transforms 
the so far passive spectator into an active producer, an autonomous subject. 
According to Druckery: 
Dimensional interfaces and "tactile" feedback represent a powerful possibility, 
robotics medicine, design, simulation, the idea of spatial integration is a tremendous 
benefit. For the arts, access to technologies that wholly engage the participant and, 
could be a final blow to work traditions of images. (Druckery, 1993, p23) 
This statement shows Druckery to be very optimistic about digital interactivity. He 
presents a euphoric argument around the liberating possibilities of digital interactivity 
in relation to existing norms of image making. His text argues digital interactivity to 
propose a critical opposition to a totalized notion of (analogue) art, due to its 
emphasis on participation. His understanding of the digital as formulating a critique 
of (modernist) traditions of art practice via interactivity is useful in relation to the 
aims and strategies of my research project. In chapter 3 I discussed how the focus 
on spectatorship is critical for a complex art practice. My argument for a subject 
spectatant on trial producing the artwork as individual non-sense, beyond the 
intention of the artist, and beyond a total understanding of the artwork (through 
objective sense), seems to parallel Druckery's motivation for an engaged 
participation in the digital. However, I am cautious of his oppositional identification of 
this digitality. I investigate instead his euphoric notions of digital interactivity and its 
supposedly 'wholly engaged' subject via the notion of a conceptual participation in 
the analogue. Although my correlation between an analogue and a digital notion of 
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materiality, and its engagement of the subject, supports Druckery's critique of 
totality, I critically evaluate his oppositional contentions through the same objections 
of negativity sustained up to now in this thesis. 
I understand the following comparison of Maeda's and Ruscha's artistic practices to 
problematise the easy differentiation between a digital and an analogue expression 
as staged by Druckery's digital theories. My discussion of their work shifts the 
emphasis from the distinction between a digital virtuality and an analogue materiality 
towards ideas of a technological materiality in relation to a more experiential and 
imaginative materiality, and also re-emphasises the subject on trial in relation to 
them. Rather than a dichotomous relation between virtuality and materiality, the 
connection of either, or any, practice, to its conceptual production in perception, is 
being highlighted. The focus on perception colludes the argument between the 
analogue and digital artwork with my concerns for temporal-collage. 
John Maeda: close to you, 2000 (image 7) 
John Maeda's work is actual digital work, in the sense that his digitality, his pixels 
and their production, are supported by the soft and hard ware of the computer. In 
Maeda's digital work, we can actually make the writing move. The cursor enables us 
to play with the words and their letters on screen, combining them in all their 
potentialities. Imaginative possibilities, conceptualities, are realised as mathematical 
probabilities. Any assemblage of his letters is an actuality. However, due to the 
frame on screen and the technological possibility of the soft- and hard-ware 
constructing and supporting the production, there are only so many actual 
possibilities of movement the subject can produce. The movement of production, I 
argue, is a representation of motion. The production realises pre-existing 
parameters, resulting always in a pre-determined outcome. The interaction is a real 
interaction in the sense of an actual interaction, conforming to rules and limits of a 
pre-existing technical parameters, and is limited within them. 
Read via the simple language philosophies on which digital theories are seen to be 
based (Druckery and Castells), this, I argue, shows the contradiction inherent in the 
digital claim of critical newness via orality. If, as outlined in the beginning of this 
chapter, the digital artwork reaches its critical novelty as an iteration, in opposition to 
an analogue art-object identified in accordance with written language as descriptive 
of a thing, then, I argue, the actual realisation of the digital as a digital actuality, 
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forfeits the claims to criticality on its own grounds: the programming language fixes 
the digital iteration within the parameters of its description. It is the simple dichotomy 
on which digital theories are based that allows me to argue against their criticality. If 
I understand the written, stable object in a dialectic opposition to an oral, fluid non-
objective expression, then, any notion of actuality, however temporal and fluid, is 
recuperable into that state of stability and hence does not transcend, but rather 
reaffirms its ideological basis. I argue that my observation of Maeda's work 
substantiates this argument. Maeda's writing presents stable objects: his letters are 
multiplicitous rather than singular, and time-based rather than spatial. However, their 
production remains limited to a pre-programmed actuality. As such I identify them as 
actual objects, which confirm in their material limitation, an ideology of substantiality. 
Ed Ruscha: Words ... Go, 1991 (image 8) 
By contrast, Ed Ruscha's painted writing does not represent movement, but involves 
the viewer in the making of movement in-between the letters. The word, or series of 
words, first reveal and then abandon their illusory stability. His letters are temporal 
conglomerates of discrete pixels rather than parts of a whole word. They invite the 
docking on to other pixels as well as onto their own pixelation. They do not, 
however, work towards the re-organisation of a pre-existing whole, towards a 
consensual sense and objective ideality (according to a prior computed 
programme). Rather, the analogue docking follows a contingent and singular desire 
to imagine, to produce subjective non-sense. 
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Image 7, John Maeda, close to you, 2000, computer typography 
close 1 ou. 
Image 8, Ed Ruscha, Words ... Go, 1991, acrylic on paper, 152,6 x 76,2 cm 
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Ruscha's paintings are dynamic surfaces, which exist as a multiplicity of potential 
actualities -conceptual actualities. I contend that they are performed and used 
differently by each individual viewer in his/her own time and place. The words as 
pixels trigger a generative image, its actuality is forever conceptual, in that it is 
produced continually in the imagining of the contingent subject 'interacting' with that 
actuality. I understand Ruscha's use of words to enable production, rather than 
realise a product. The letters offer themselves for the continual construction of a 
nonmaterial object. In this perceptual modality, the 'real' object of the painting is not 
the artwork, indeed the painting is in doubt as an object, its existence as a 
substantial, total object is illusory. Rather, the artwork is its continual motion of 
extension. This motion of production happens in a continually present engagement 
of the subject. The letters are not a fixed state of writing, an alphabet, a 
measurement, but a conceptual nonmateriality. They involve the subject as a 
transitive individual producing n-numbers of potential actualities, which are not 
actual in relation to an empirical actuality. Rather, they are conceptual actualities 
produced in centrifugal imaginings; their generative interpretation. 
Ruscha's writing painting, his words and letters- as pixels, I argue, render the re-
presented linguistic objects conceptual. The assemblage of letters constructing 
Ruscha's words 'press' towards extensions in imagining. His analogue work does 
not provide us with an actual mouse-click. Instead the whole surface is dynamic, 
pushing for a conceptual extension. I contend that the pixelations and the 
nonmaterial extensions that are forged by my transitive viewing of Ruscha's work 
allow me to articulate his work as producing a digital sensibility. This notion of a 
digital sensibility is articulated in relation to the definition of the digital object as a 
command in time. According to Dibell the digital exists as 'a kind of speech that 
doesn't so much communicate as make things happen' (Dibell quoted in Morse, 
Virtualities, 1998, p8). Ruscha's work is not actually digital, in the sense of 
technologically constructed and supported by digital soft and hard ware. However, 
his work is digital in that it works conceptually along the lines of the digital promise 
of virtuality and interaction. Ruscha's words work as imaginative virtualities, they are 
conceptually digital. In this conceptual digitality the individual produces the motion of 
writing in his or her contingent perception of the analogue material. Thereby the 
viewer pushes the notion of material limits, stable actualities, beyond the idea of a 
stable objectivity and subjectivity into a conceptual stability, a conceptual actuality. 
This conceptual participation I argue describes a reciprocal intersubjectivity: the 
subject as well the artwork are constituted in the mobile imagining of its viewing. 
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John Maeda, by contrast, affords the viewer an actual participation via a mouse-
click. He presents an actual, technological virtuality, enabling an operational 
interactivity. Maeda's work seems to fulfil the digital promise as it appears to realise 
the conceptual actuality staged by Ruscha's work in digital actuality. However, the 
actual mouse-clicks in Maeda's work limit extensionality to a programmed set of 
motions in a pre-given and programmed field of exteriority. Thus, I argue, it presents 
a recuperation of the digital into a substantial aesthetic due to the inevitable 
limitations, which encumber the conceptual digital in its actual rendering. In their 
soft- and hard-ware limitations, Maeda's words have become ideal in relation to the 
determination of the programme, in relation to the intention of the artist as 
programmer.135 
Maeda's virtual writing, I contest, is limited by the technological framework and 
concurrent possibilities of production, (aesthetic and technological), in the same way 
that Ruscha's actual writing, the analogue object understood as a substantial 
actuality, is limited to the framework of a grid of reference, of measurements. The 
ideology of analogy complies to a frame of reference, which defines the analogue 
object as an actual material. This ideology remains intact in Maeda's writing. What 
has changed is not the ideology of stability and certainty, but the frame of reference. 
In the actual virtuality of the digital, defined by pre-given technological and aesthetic 
possibilities, the nonmateriality is an immateriality. It is a fixed state, a real actuality 
rather than a fluid conceptuality. Instead of a material stability we have an 
immaterial stability. This, I contest, does not present a critical shift, but a dialectical 
reversal. The immaterial actual digital has been recuperated and presents the 
certainty of a real substance in the immateriality of its expression. It exists in the 
same ideological mould it proposes to move away from.136 
135 Ruscha's work I argue does not intend an ideal totality. He does not attempt to forge an 
objectively ideal reading of his work. Rather, I understand his intention to lie in the enabling 
of an intersubjective and contingent production of the work by the individual viewer. My 
observation articulated above is such a contingent production in perception (generative 
interpretation). This generative interpretation has a 'general contingency' in that I, as its 
subject, live in a digital world. I produce Ruscha's work as a conceptual actuality, from the 
actuality of digital technology. This affiliation with the digital, however, does in no way 
undermine any prior or future reading's veracity, and does not make any claim to present an 
ultimate understanding of his work. My generative interpretation is contingent on my 
circumstance in time and space. Its ideality lies in my subjective engagement rather than in 
an objective ideality it la Hegel. By contrast, Maeda's work achieves an objective ideality in 
the technological actualisation of the operational motions pre-determined/intended by the 
programme. Technologically his work forges an analytical interpretation. 
136 This dialectic relation is relevant to my project in the sense that my proposal for temporal-
collage aims to produce a signifying practice that works perceptually beyond the dialectic 
immanence of its material production. The dialectical reversal of the immaterial uncertainty 
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If we observe both, the materially analogue work of Ruscha and the actual digital 
practice of Maeda along the lines of an oppositional techno-theory, then, Ruscha's 
actual analogue works achieve a conceptual digitality, whilst the actual digital works 
of John Maeda attain the status of a conceptual analogue. The dichotomous starting 
point of this argument obstructs a more critical suggestion, and can only support the 
dichotomous relation it is based on. By contrast, I argue that criticality lies not in the 
use of technology or aesthetics, but in the sensitive engagement forged by the work 
through its contingent perception. A generative contingency, I argue, refutes the 
easy differentiation between analogy and digitality and instead forces the focus on 
their conception. Consequently I contest that both, the analogue and the digital, can 
be conceptual as well as actual. 
A perceptual understanding of Maeda's and Ruscha's work, I argue, shows that the 
digital as well as the analogue artwork, can be considered as conceptualities. There 
is an 'imagining' in the perception of either artists' work that extends the material, 
analogue or digital, and enables a conceptualisation thereof beyond its aesthetic 
(referential) and technological parameters. I can think Maeda's text animations 
beyond the limits of the cursor engagement, out of the sof and hard ware context, 
into my own contingent imagining. Conversely I can refuse to imagine Ruscha's 
words beyond their painted presence and stick to an analytical interpretation of the 
words within the framework of the alphabet. This, I contest, confirms that it is not a 
matter of immateriality over materiality, or vice versa. Rather, it is a question of 
problematising either condition via a perceptual interpretation. I thus affirm my 
contention established earlier in this chapter, via Morse and Bochner, that the issue 
of criticality is ideological and perceptual rather than material or technological. 137 
Of course John Maeda's virtual environments are not very sophisticated. But in their 
technological simplicity they point to a problem that even the most complex and 
sophisticated interactive digital sphere will have: the linkages that are possible in-
between pixels and sites, etc., are finite. The real virtuality of digital objects and 
environments have referential limits, and in this respect, the actual digital is always a 
into an immaterial certainty of virtuality, and the problematic of this recuperation in respect to 
the digital's claims to criticality, is further discussed and summarised in chapter five. There, 
the relation between material (or nonmaterial) and immaterial, time and space, is taken up 
via David Harvey and Doreen Massey respectively; one positioning the digital within a 
Heideggerian dialectic of fluidity and embeddedness, the other proposing a more contingent 
connection in the term 'time-space'. 
137 In relation to my articulation of temporal-collage, this confirms that any artwork, digital or 
analogue, time-based or spatial, can be produced in its signifying practice. 
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substantial and aesthetic actuality. By contrast the imagining perception of the 
subject exteriorises Maeda's virtual words and extends them in the contingent 
perception of the subject beyond such technological limitations. In turn this 
subjective imagining reflects its extensions back onto the virtual actuality producing 
it as a contingent nonmateriality: a conceptual actuality. The circle is closed; as a 
stable actuality, a conceptual analogue, the actual digital works of Maeda are 
extended in imagining, in the same way as are the actual analogue work's of 
Ruscha. The extending conceptuality forged by the exteriorising perception of a 
contingent subject renders both artists' works conceptual. In the sense of its 
perception as a conceptual actuality, the digital is thus not opposed to the analogue 
but demands and enables an equivocal engagement. 
To substantiate this equivocation and to deduce its criticality, in the concluding part 
of this chapter, I focus on the mode of participation. As discussed above, I believe 
that it is in the technical actualisation of this interaction that the difference between 
the conceptual digital and the digital of actual virtuality, becomes apparent. Therefor, 
I argue, it is through an investigation of this technical actualisation that I can 
articulate my critique of a dialectical separation between interaction and 
intersubjectivity and between the digital and the analogue respectively. This critique 
enables me to re-assert the notion of artistic production in perception as articulated 
in relation to spectatorship in postmodernism in the previous two chapters. Also, as 
a consequence of my argument for the digital as a conceptual sensitivity rather than 
a technological actuality, I re-assess and confirm some suggestions made in those 
earlier chapters regarding materiality and complexity. In conclusion I bring these 
ideas of conceptuality and subjectivity into contact with issues of production and 
perception in the (fifth) signifying practice of temporal-collage. 
Conclusion: Mouse-click Extensionality versus Knotting-Point Extensionality 
In the last part of this chapter I have identified the position of the actual digital as a 
conceptual analogue. I have discussed its obvious relation to an ideology of stability 
and substantiality, and identified its extensionality as a representation of 
extensionality, working along aesthetic and technological parameters. Conversely I 
have argued for an understanding of the actual analogue as a conceptual digital, 
forging infinite extensions in the imagination of the viewer. Subsequently I have 
staged the conceptual actuality of the analogue and the digital in a perceptual 
engagement. To conclude this argument I aim to articulate this perceptual 
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engagement vis-a.-vis the signifying practice of temporal-collage. In this way I seek 
to re-assert and clarify temporal-collage. I also aim to affirm that the criticality of the 
digital lies in achieving conceptual non-sense in individual perception, rather than 
producing consensual sense in actual material referentiality (aesthetic and 
technological). 
In relation to the idea of digital actualisation as a total ising practice, I articulated the 
operational mouse-click as an aesthetic representation. Conversely, now, I stage the 
conceptual mouse-click at the location of the 'peripheral pressures' which in 
Bochner's terms forge the extension of the object in experience. In 'Excerpts from 
Speculation [1967-1970]', Bochner states that 'ultimately, description as a critical 
method fails. Pretending to be a nonsubjective rendering of the object, it cuts off the 
peripheral pressures of experience.' (Bochner, 1972, p55) I understand his notion of 
'peripheral pressures of experience' as the force with which, at the surface of the 
supposedly actual material towards the periphery, the subject extends, in 
imagination, the work into his/her own contingent circumstance.138 I contend that 
such peripheral pressures are what pushes the object as a contingent perceptual 
object into centrifugality. In this sense the artwork is confirmed as a dynamic surface 
and the peripheral pressures are identified as its imaginary mouse-click points. I 
suggest Bochner's peripheral pressures vis-a.-vis the digital as concept, enabling an 
exteriorising imagining which produces the artwork as an intersubjective 'virtuality', 
perceptually 'real'. 
I contend that Bochner's exteriorising imagining, argued via Ruscha's conceptual 
extensionality vis-a.-vis Maeda's technological extensionality, enables me to 
138 I understand Bochners term 'pressure' in relation to Merleau-Ponty's complex philosophy 
of the relationship between the apparently substantial presence of an object, and the 
invisible motion of its production. For Merleau-Ponty it is 'the vibration of appearances which 
is the cradle of things.' (Merleau-Ponty in Johnson ed., 1993, p68) Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
the intersubjectively constituted subject and object hints at movement on either side. He 
suggests a force that pushes out of the object and extends it from the contingency of 
perception into the contingency of the perceiving subject. Both object and subject are 
constituted in this 'vibrating force'. There is no static actuality, every actuality is its vibrating 
conceptuality. Following this, I would like to suggest that Bochner's work forces its own 
production from the vibrating conceptual materiality, outward into the equally vibrating 
sphere of the subject. I understand the peripheral pressures as the bases from which and 
through which the exteriorisations of the object takes place. I mean to adopt this notion of 
peripheral pressures here in relation to my discussion of the centrifugal force at the knotting-
point and the mouse-click point respectively. With this adoption I want to stress the 
conceptual extension as a constant force, rather than a fluid opposition to a static actuality. 
This identification relates directly to my notion of a tendential quality as articulated in the last 
chapter. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty's vibrations are not the sign of an immanence but of a 
perpetual production. 
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conclude on the status of temporal-collage's centrifugal quality. In the previous 
chapters I contended temporal-collage as a signifying practice, perpetually 
producing the artwork in the perception of it as a material complex. This practice 
works through the conceptual knotting (disjointing and bricolaging) of the artwork's 
material elements. This knotting effort is staged as an extensional motion which 
produces the material beyond a totality conceived as an objective ideality 
(consensual sense), into the contingent and individual circumstance of the viewer 
(subjective phenomenological non-sense). This viewer has been identified as a 
subject spectatant on trial: a transitive subject perpetually constituted in the (non-
dialectical) here and now of its production in perception. 
Now, having discussed participation and material complexity via a (generative) 
conceptual interpretation of Ruscha's analogue and Maeda's digital work, I aim to 
re-stage this signifying practice. I seek to corroborate my ideas concerning digitality, 
nonmaterial conceptuality, centrifugal extensionality, and 
interactivity/intersubjectivity and stage them vis-a-vis subjectivity and materiality as 
produced in the signifying practice of temporal-collage. 
As a consequence of my staging of Bochner's nonmaterial work within the idea of a 
conceptual actuality, and further, due to my articulation of temporal-collage vis-a-vis 
such a conceptual actuality, in this last part of the chapter, I investigate the 
connection between operational 'clicking points', 'peripheral pressures' and the 
'knotting-points' of temporal-collage. In bringing these terms together I re-assess the 
dynamic quality as well as the participatory nature of the digital in relation to 
temporal-collage. This juxtaposition brings me to the question staged earlier in the 
text regarding the digital's realisation of the desire for a conceptual immateriality as 
proposed by some works made in '70s Conceptual Art. Does the digital argued as a 
conceptual actuality, a digital sensitivity rather than an actual digitality, confirm my 
strategy of the signifying practice of temporal-collage? 
I attempt to answer this question via Johannes Auer's notion of operational 'clicking 
points' (mouse-click, mouse over or other programmed input devices). In his text on 
'Screaming Screen and Binary idealism', Auer talks about Bernd Wingert's notion of 
a "centrifugal force" at the clicking points of a computer work. 
Bernd Wingert notes a possible shift of attention in the reading of hypertext from the text 
to the actual click, which he quite correctly characterizes as the "centrifugal force". That 
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is the reader is much more interested in where the links take him than in what he actually 
sees on the screen. And so it is quite right to speak about a hypertextual zap-mentality. 
(Auer, 28.09.01, p2) 
What is useful to me about his statement is the notion of a 'centrifugal force' 
identified at the moment and place of the mouse-click. I aim to bring Auer's notion of 
'force' in to relation with Bochner's ideas of 'peripheral pressures', which I placed at 
the knotting-points of temporal-collage. Following Morse, the (actual) digital 
centrifugality, mouse-click interaction, produces an informationalisation. As a 
consequence of my development of Morse's digital theories into a conceptual realm, 
I argue that this informationalisation forges an engagement with the artwork in an 
intersubjective motility. Accordingly the centrifugality of temporal-collage 
informationalises the material, and forges a signifying engagement. This 
engagement does not produce an actualisation of the object in the sense of a 
representation. It does not enable a poetic re-alignment in the sense of Seitz' poetic 
assemblage or Kristeva's first three signifying practices of the poetic. That is: no 
aesthetic-stoppage is achieved, rather the engagement re-presents the artwork, 
again and again as a conceptual actuality in just the same way as does Bochner's 
nonmaterial (art-}object. 
The (art-}object, the (hyper-}text in the digital, is, according to Auer, drawing from 
Wingert, constituted as a 'force'. The appeal of which are the (centrifugal) linkages 
rather than the material/content of the text itself. Auer's understanding of the (hyper-
}text as triggering a 'zapping interaction', rather than an invitation for a close 
reading, I argue, articulates the work as a 'dynamic surface' to use Bochner's term. I 
understand Auer's focus on the linkages to correspond with my focus on the knotting 
of material elements in the signifying practice of temporal-collage. Consequently I 
understand temporal-collage to be practising the work as a dynamic surface in a 
zapping interaction: it is not a total, intentional artwork that is being consensually 
'read', the intent of the author is not equivalent with the intent of the individual 
viewer. Rather, the appeal is the knotting points which enable a contingent 
imaginative 'reading', through an individual (centrifugal) production of material as 
nonmaterial and vice versa. 
The articulation of the centrifugal as a 'force', as a quality, rather than an actuality, I 
argue, resonates with the tendential symbolic-semiotic quality that is realised in the 
dynamic practice of temporal-collage. The desire to produce, to open and use, such 
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clicking points, sites and linkages, I argue, compares to the desire to share the 
tendential qualities in sociality. 
The notion of this zapping as a 'mentality', I argue, articulates its production as 
sensibility. This articulation of sensibility, I contend, re-assesses the digital, 
technological actuality of this interaction, and promotes a conceptual dynamic 
instead. As a consequence of the argument staged between Ruscha and Maeda, I 
contend here, that Auer's ideas are useful to me as articulations of a conceptual 
actuality. They are less useful however in respect to the technological actuality of 
the hypertext, the actual digital artwork. Again I argue that the importance is not the 
actual interaction, but the understanding of the mentality/ sensibility produced in this 
interaction. This sensibility subsequently feeds back to analogue interactions and 
can be applied to any artwork digital or analogue. 
In relation to the argument of this chapter, the bricolaging and disjointing effort of 
temporal-collage is confirmed as contingent and intersubjective exteriorising 
imaginings in perception. The outward motion of such a generative perception is 
established via Bochner's notion of 'imagination' articulating the idea of 'the 
exteriorizing of ideas about nature and the thing seen'. (Bochner, 1972, p55) The 
notion of centrifugality is confirmed as a conceptual motion of extension via Morse's 
understanding of an actual, operational interaction, in a conceptual evaluation 
thereof in Ruscha's analogue work. The knotting-points in temporal-collage are 
confirmed as a conceptual equivalent to the operational actuality of the mouse-click. 
However, the knotting-points are not programmed mouse-click-points. Thus their 
imagining is not limited to a pre-determined programme. In this sense, rather than 
actualised by a soft-ware programme and its hard-ware platform, they remain 
continually conceptual. Thereby, I contend that the signifying practice of temporal-
collage produces the material complex from conceptual mouse-click points, knotting 
pOints, in centrifugal motions. Its transitive subject produces the work as a 
conceptual actuality in his/her engagement of its abstract material elements. 
Temporal-collage continually seduce the subject to perform contingent 
engagements, which produce the object and the subject as conceptual actualities, 
they are reciprocal. 
It is not within the actual, digital or analogue, but from the digital sensibility as 
concept, in a backwards glance at the concept of analogy, that the digital mouse-
click has a radical impact on art practice. In the referentiality of the conceptual, back 
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onto the actual, actuality is produced as conceptual actuality. The mouse-click in 
itself, as an actual click, does not hold this radicality. However, as a concept it 
forges a sensibility towards the notion of materiality as contingent nonmateriality. It 
is in this forging of a contingent sensibility that I understand the 'newness' and 
invention of the digital to impact radically on notions of subjectivity and materiality. 
Thus I assert that temporal-collage is conceptually digital in that it relies on a digital 
consciousness of temporality and extensionality. The contingent perception brings 
the material assemblage out of its relationship with the notion of either a material 
certainty or the opposite notion of an immaterial uncertainty. Instead it promotes a 
nonmaterial non-certainty. 
This conclusion suggests that temporal-collage is a digital strategy in that it forges 
and relies on a digital sensibility for the enabling of its intersubjective interactivity. At 
the same time, the digital as concept is evaluated as a critical strategy of 
contingency, whilst the radicality and novelty of the digital as a technological 
actuality is disputed. The notion of sensibility rather than technological actuality 
precipitates the conclusion that the term temporal in my practice of temporal-collage 
does not refer to the time-based character of the work. Rather, it foregrounds the 
temporality of its perceptual quality. Therefore, the term temporal-collage does not 
refer to a technological nor an aesthetic category. Instead, it describes the dynamic 
of engagement in the perception of the artwork understood as informational rather 
than substantial. In this sense any artwork, produced in the contingent signifying 
practice of a (non-dialectical) here and now, without reference to a 'having been 
there' (beyond a certain referential reality), by a reciprocal and transitive subject, 
presents the dynamic of temporal-collage. 
This understanding of the status and dynamic of temporal-collage, articulated via 
Kristeva and Lyotard in the previous two chapters, and tested in relation to the 
digital in this chapter, is further developed and tested in the concluding chapter 5. 
There, the status of temporal-collage as a conceptual digital, and the digital as a 
nonmaterial sensibility rather than a technological actuality, is re-examined. In order 
to do this, I am contextualising temporal-collage in the network age. 
Chapter 5 extends and concludes the investigation of temporal-collage in relation to 
the digital, and considers its perceptual practice in relation to a concurrent net-
working sensibility. It examines the premise of a contingent and interactive 
nonmateriality in relation to notions of 'fluidity and fixing' as they appear in current 
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contentions of the network age. I am juxtaposing euphoric notions of network-fluidity 
presented as a strategy for artistic practice to work against fixed normative values, 
with more critical views on the 'actual fluidity' of the network. Thereby the dialectic 
premise of the digital in its concurrent contestations is further investigated. At the 
same time the signifying practice of temporal-collage is tested in regards to the 
status of its temporality. In my attempt to problematise and critique a dialectical art 
practice, I have developed a perceptual approach, which challenges a dialectical 
identification of temporal and spatial practices via a conceptual sensibility. For the 
conclusion of this project, I focus on the status of temporality and spatiality in 
relation to this conceptual sensibility. 
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Synopsis 
In this concluding chapter, the central issues of this project -materiality and 
subjectivity- and related points -aesthetics, ideology, intentionality and perception-
are re-assessed and summarised via a discussion of temporal-collage in the context 
of a global networking dynamic. Theories on the network age are employed in order 
to consider the conceptual status of production and perception in a current context. I 
re-position Metz' arguments on ideological hierarchies between sound and image in 
relation to the supposed fluidity of the digital net and the apparent fixity of analogue 
relations. Time/sound and Space/image are juxtaposed, and it is argued that, when 
following Doreen Massey rather than David Harvey, they do not have to be 
understood as opposites but rather as implemented in each other as 'timespace'. 
Thus the project concludes with an observation of time and space, and by 
implication sound and image, disassociated from a dialectical oppositionality, in a 
more complex relationship. This clarifies the perceptual temporality of 'temporal-
collage' as a 'timespace' perception and stages the notion of 'timespace-collage'. 
Subsequently I clarify the subject of this 'signifying practice of timespace-collage' in 
relation to his/her individual sense making processes and their connection to a 
collective meaning. 
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Introduction 
In this final chapter I summarise my notion of a signifying practice of temporal-
collage. I conclude by outlining its characteristics and criticality via a juxtaposition of 
its perceptual sensibility with the understanding of materiality and subjectivity in the 
'network age'. Global networking sensibilities, currently theorised within the field of 
social-geography, contextualise my perceptual strategy. In particular debates 
between social fluidity and fixing, (informational [immaterial] and material states of 
sociality), are employed to end my investigation of the artwork as a material 
complex. Principally the writings of David Harvey and Doreen Massey allow me to 
re-stage the central premise of this research project: to challenge aesthetic 
orthodoxies of ideal totality and homogeneity of artistic production via individual 
perception as practice. Both Harvey and Massey deliberate on the promise of a 
'different' relationship between subjectivity, time and space in the context of a 'new' 
global connectivity. I am tracing this 'new' sensibility in order to investigate its 
ideological background, and to query, in association, the criticality of my idea of the 
artwork as generated continually in the signifying practice of temporal-collage. 
The central aspiration of this final investigation is the clarification of the term 'time' in 
temporal-collage. So far the 'temporal' has been developed from pertaining to the 
'time of the work' (time-based work; i.e. video, film, sound) to the 'time of the 
perception of the work'. In the previous chapters I have developed a perceptual 
approach, which challenges a dialectical identification of temporal and spatial 
practices via a conceptual sensitivity. As a consequence of my argument for the 
artwork as a 'conceptual actuality', time is divorced from the actual material and re-
configured as a matter of its conceptualisation, 'materialised' in individual 
imaginations. In this way any artwork is rendered 'time-based'. In this concluding 
chapter I problematise the 'time' of such individual imaginations. I acknowledge that 
perception retains time in a dialectical relationship with space, even if conceptually 
rather than actually. I aim to address this problem. Both, Massey and Harvey, in 
their theorisations of global networking sensibilities, focus on the dialectic between 
time and space. Their respective theories enable me to clarify my argument for 
perceptual temporality in regards to art practice, and aid me to re-assess its 
dialectical characteristic. 
In a sense, this final assessment recalls the ideological prejudices of sound and 
image as outlined via Christian Metz in the beginning of this research project. Metz' 
198 
essay on the hierarchy between sound and image, 'Aural Objects' ('Ie perqu et Ie 
nomme', 1975), through which I introduced the concerns of this research project, is 
re-assessed through the sensibilities of the network age. Metz discusses sound and 
image in relation to a notion of ephemerality and substantiality respectively.139 Here I 
re-focus on this differentiation between sound and image via an understanding 
thereof as time (attributal) and space (substantial), 'fluidity' and 'fixity' .140 This brings 
my investigation into the artwork as 'material complex' full circle: the relationship 
between sound and image in audio-visual artwork, which I focused on at the 
beginning and which I subsequently developed via an emphasis on perception, to 
encompass a wider field of art practice, is now re-invoked via the issue of the time 
and space of perception. 
In the last chapter I concluded, via the notion of a digital sensibility, that once 
perception is foregrounded, then, any artwork (not only audio-visual work) can be 
produced in a 'signifying practice of temporal-collage': its material generated 
continually as a 'conceptual actuality' in the individual perception of the 'subject 
spectatant on trial'. I contend now that, in order to summarise and finalise this idea, I 
need to debate temporal-collage with regard to the relationship between the time 
and space of its signifying practice. Thus, the interpretation of the spatio-temporal 
context of temporal-collage's perceptual conceptualisation is a central issue of this 
concluding chapter. In this respect, to re-consider sound and image as time and 
space now, at the end of this project, I believe, designates not a simple return to the 
problems informing this research initially. Rather, as a consequence of the 
development of the initial problematic via the notion of a generative perception, this 
139 In his essay Metz deliberates the hierarchy of the relationship between sound (attributal) 
and image (substantial) in relation to a capitalist orientation in the West. In the introductory 
chapter I outline how Metz' considers the preference for vision in the sense of a 'primitive 
substantialism', 'which distinguishes fairly rigidly the primary qualities that determine the list 
of objects (substances) and the secondary qualities which correspond to attributes 
applicable to these objects.' (Metz, 1992, p313) According to him the substantial is the 
visible and tactile, which he identifies as primary sensorial qualities. I adopt his 
acknowledgement of a primary and a secondary constitution of the object but believe that the 
valuation of 'substance' over 'ephemerality' is re-considered in the network age. To articulate 
this point I develop his differentiation between image/substantial and sound/ephemeral into 
an investigation of the relationship between time and space as 'fluidity' and 'fixity'. Also, this 
acknowledges that capitalism in the network age is Global. 
140 The term 'fixity' is adopted from David Harvey's essay 'From space to place and back 
again: Reflections on the condition of postmodernity'. In this essay he strongly differentiates 
between the fluidity of a concurrent networking society, and the fixed state of a traditional, 
geographically embedded, society. According to him 'the tension between fixity and mobility 
erupts into generalized crises' (Harvey, 1996, p7). In this conclusion, I employ his notion of a 
'crises in fluidity' in opposition to 'safety in fixity' in relation to Doreen Massey's non-
dialectical interpretation of time and space. 
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concluding investigation of time-space relations further develops and finalises the 
trajectory of my research into the artwork as a (non-hierarchical) 'material complex'. 
What is foregrounded in this development is the problem of dialectical recuperation: 
the individual into the collective; heterogeneous complexities into a homogeneous 
unity; (ephemeral) temporality of perception into, what Metz terms, the (primary) 
valuation of the artwork as a substantial product. This dynamic has been queried 
and challenged throughout this research project. Here, in conjunction with a 
consideration of networking sensibilities, I seek to reach a conclusion on the efficacy 
of this challenge. In other words, the signifying practice of temporal-collage, which I 
articulated as a challenge to substantial and consensual productions of the artwork, 
beyond a dialectical opposition, is finalised vis-a-vis current contentions of the 
network age. Thus the perceptual 'continuality' of temporal-collage; the 'tendential' 
(symbolic and social) quality, which, I argued, realises and is realised in its practice; 
as well the individual subject of this practice and its relationship to a collective 
identification, are tried in relation to concurrent socio-geographical theorisations. In 
relation to this assessment, ideas of: intentionality as authorial, forging an objective 
ideality, or perceptual, generating continually a subjective ideality, are re-evaluated 
and concluded upon also. In other words, the position of the viewing subject as 
'spectatant or 'specatateur is clarified too. 
Network Sensibilities; temporal-collage in context 
In the previous chapter I argued via Mel Bochner for the perception of the artwork as 
a 'conceptual actuality'. An actuality that is constituted through a contingent 
exteriorisation in the generative imagination of the subject (spectatant on trial). As a 
consequence of my argument for the artwork as a conceptual actuality, the material 
artwork (image, spatial practice) does not stand in opposition to an immaterial 
artwork (sound, temporal practice). Rather, both are shown to trigger a continual 
signifying practice which produces the artwork as a singular and contingent 
conceptualisation, as nonmaterial. This understanding, I contended, challenges a 
dialectical identification between material and immaterial. Consequently it 
challenges the immanent reversal this would invite. Thus the perceptual signifying of 
temporal-collage is argued to critique the ideological dynamic of a substantial 
aesthetics without re-affirming it in this critique exactly. The problem that chapter 
four uncovers but leaves unanswered in relation to this conclusion is the issue of the 
time and space of this generative perceptuality however. To ensure that conceptual 
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actuality does not simply position its ephemeral perception (temporal, 
heterogeneous) in opposition to a substantial aesthetic (spatial, homogeneous), but 
rather achieves a complication of aesthetics, ephemeral and substantial, I seek to 
clarify its imaginative extensionality in respect to the status of time and space. 
According to Bochner, 'the conceptual is a contingent rendering of the object by the 
subject in time and [my emphasis] space' (Bochner, 1972, p9). If I understand the 
perceptual practice of 'temporal-collage' as strictly temporal, then, I argue, I position 
the conceptually actual artwork thus produced again in a dialectic relationship with 
an actual piece of work: the time of perceiving the piece of work stands in direct 
opposition (antagonistically) to the space that the work inhabits actually. This, I 
believe, would undo the criticality of this perceptual practice as its contingent 
imagination would ultimately be recuperated in a dialectical overcoming of the 
antagonistic position in a higher order substantial artwork (ideologically 
homogeneous and spatial; verified in reference to an aesthetic framework). To avoid 
this recuperation and to acknowledge the (non-dialectical) complexity of the 
perceptual conceptualisation (produced in the signifying practice of temporal-
collage), I propose that the notion of 'time' in the term 'temporal-collage' is neither 
time as opposed to space nor is it time plus space. Rather, it prompts are-thinking 
of temporality and spatiality. 
Socio-geographical theorisations of the 'new' relationship between time and space 
in the sensibility of global connectivity, concerns informational (on-line, virtual) as 
well as material (off-line, 'real' world) dynamics of connectiVity. These are useful to 
articulate a critical understanding of perceptuality in terms of its spatio-temporal 
characteristic.141 I n turning to social-geography and its discussion of global 
networking, I am contextualising temporal-collage, elaborated as 'digital concept', in 
terms of its contingent relationship to time and space and also in terms of its social 
141 Without considering the particular details and context of her argument, I agree with the 
general premise of Iris Young's idea on this distinction. In her essay 'The ideal community 
and the politics of difference' (1990), she argues that difference lies not between immaterial 
(meditated) and material interaction, or what she calls face-to-face interaction. She contends 
that face-to-face interactions are not more pure than technologically mediated interactions, 
they do not ensure a more 'real' interaction per se. By contrast, according to Young, such a 
judgement would promote the dichotomy between an authentic and a non-authentic 
communication. From this follows, that difference and similarity is a matter of the 'quality' of 
communication rather than its 'form'. I develop this idea in my argument for the collective 
(communication, sense) to be produced in the desire to communicate one's individual 
perception, rather than according to rules and contracts determined outside the act of 
communication. 
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connectivity. The issues of material and immaterial social relations, I argue, amplify 
and contextualise my proposal for a heterogeneous non materiality; a reciprocal and 
generative interactivity (intersubjectivity); and the related notion of autonomous 
subjectivities, as pronounced in the last chapter. 
The choice to involve and borrow from socio-geographical theorisations of the 
network age, in the last chapter of my project, forms, I contend, a logical conclusion 
of my research trajectory. Throughout my project I have been developing my ideas 
in relation to critical changes in the practice and theorisation of art. My notion of 
'temporal-collage' has developed in response to critical moments of art history: the 
coming of sound film; the death of the author; '70s Conceptual Art's challenge to 
material values; and the invention of digital technology. The consideration of the 
network age concludes this trajectory in a concurrent contextualisation. 
The impact of digital technology enabled me to re-consider materiality and 
subjectivity in relation to concurrent notions of 'radical' immateriality and 'new' 
interactivity. This shifted the focus away from audio-visual work enabled me to 
consider temporal-collage in relation to a wider realm of art practice. The 'novelty' of 
digital technology, art and its theorisations, understood as a conceptual rather than 
a technological (actual) novelty, aided me to articulate any artwork as a conceptual 
actuality. As an example this allowed me to argue the complexity of Ruscha's 
paintings as produced in the signifying practice of temporal-collage. Now, to 
conclude on the nature and criticality of this signifying practice, I employ theories 
discussing concurrent networking sensibilities. The context of this 'new' (digital) 
sensibility, the global network, I argue, enables me to clarify the details of its 
signifying practice.142 
Some theorisations of global networking formulate a euphoric account of its 
possibilities. For Peter Weibel for instance, in the new age of (virtual) networking 'we 
142 As staged earlier, global networking, as I am considering it here, delineates an on-line, 
digital, as well as a 'real' world, analogue, context. Social-geography pre-dominantly 
considers the 'real' world as an effect of networking forces. As a consequence of my 
argument for the digital impact on the analogue artwork via the notion of a digital 
conceptuality, however, I argue, that such networking forces combine the digital and the 
analogue in the sense of a 'sensibility'. Thus the term networking 'sensibility' describes the 
context of a globally connected world, digital and analogue, as the concurrent context of 
artistic production and perception; the world as a conceptual world wide web. In this sense I 
focus on networking as a concurrent sensible context, rather than investigate particular 
geographical effects of this connectivity. Such a contextualisation of the artwork, within a 
concurrent sensibility, re-stages temporal-collage and enables me to finalise the central 
issues of my research project. 
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are able to break out of the prison of space and time co-ordinates ( ... ) The grid of 
here and now becomes malleable.' (Weibel, 1996, p343).143 Weibel celebrates the 
fluidity of place made possible by an interface sensibility of the world.144 By contrast, 
David Harvey describes the new fluidity of the network as crisis. In his essay 'From 
space to place and back again' he talks about the terror of 'time-space 
compression'. He understands the technological and organisational shifts in the 
networking age, to 'annihilate space through time' (Harvey,1996, p6). For him the 
fluid ephemerality of the networking age threatens spatial belonging and thus 
produces a reactionary 'territoriality of place' (ibid., p4). Promptly staging such a 
reactionary ideology he goes on to suggest, following Heidegger, that 'deprived of 
such roots [in a native soil], art is reduced to a meaningless caricature of its former 
self.' (Ibid., p11). 
I agree with his implicit critique of a networking euphoria, which translates and 
celebrates the networking sensibility undifferentiatedly as a sense of progressive 
complexity and radical heterogeneity (democratic, limitlessly generative and 
autonomous). However, I argue, that the oppositional basis of his argument, the 
identification of fluidity generally as crises in opposition to spatiality as certainty and 
stability, does not lead to a more differentiated and critical understanding. Rather, in 
relation to art practice at least, I argue, his view re-enforces a dichotomy between 
time and space that renders any engagement in its problematic reactionary. He 
seals the dialectic relationship between time and space. All we can ever do in terms 
of a critical art practice within this sealed unit is to oppose a temporal sensibility with 
a spatial one, and to in turn react to a spatial sensibility with a temporal subversion. 
The underlying ideologies of space and time identified in Metz' terms as substantial 
and attributal, however, remain the same. Harvey identifies fluidity as non-authentic 
and uncertain, and considers fixity to be that which is substantial, authentic, and 
143 I understand that Weibel's euphoria of a malleable and fluid global network re-calls 
Eisenstein's euphoria of montage as a global filmmaking strategy. I questioned Eisenstein's 
conception of the international potential of the montage film in the first chapter when 
exposing montage's historic and geographical specificity, 'fixity'. Now, the notion of a global 
networking sensibility re-stages his ambition. This too is not a simple return to an earlier 
problem however. Rather, to re-consider the time and place of perception with respect to a 
concurrent networking sensibility, I believe, critically develops the issue of (global) sense in 
film-making (art-making). The question here is whether or not the global networking age, and 
its primary tool, the world wide web, manages to realise Eisenstein's claims for an 
'international cinema'. 
144 Weibel considers virtual technology in particular. However, I argue that his notion of the 
'World as Interface' (the title of the essay quoted in this context), signifies that, although 
developed in relation to technological changes, Weibel assumes these to change the 
understanding and interactions of the 'real' world. 
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certain.145 Whilst critiquing a euphoric notion of network fluidity, I am differentiating 
the term of temporal-collage from Harvey's dichotomous understanding. Rather, with 
my notion of the artwork as a conceptual actuality, I seek to break away from such a 
dialectic understanding and to propose a (signifying) practice that is critical not as a 
re-action but as an (non-dialectical) action, generative in time and space. 
To argue this break successfully I need to clarify the perceptual imagination of 
145 Harvey understands the symbolic to have a hold over the notion of place. According to 
him the symbolic validates space as place, renders it authentic, stable and certain. I contend 
that Harvey's consideration of the Time Square in New York with regard to its symbolic 
significance, elucidates this suggestion. Harvey identifies Time Square as an authentic place 
because, according to him, it has a symbolic meaning that is shared in the consciousness of 
the people visiting it. Harvey states that Time Square ... 
was a far cry from that authentic dwelling in the Black Forest and on the surface at least, 
it surely ought to qualify as the most ersatz, or as cultural critics might prefer to call it, 
'pseudo-place' on earth. Yet it soon became the symbolic heart of New York City and, 
( ... ) it was the focus of a sense of togetherness and community for many New Yorkers. 
(Harvey, 1996, p18) 
What Harvey seems to forget is that even the Black Forest, Heidegger'snumber one 
dwelling, is not an 'original' place but has attained its apparent authenticity through, 
Heideggers' and Harvey's own convictions respectively. In this sense, no place is authentic 
per se, authenticity is ideological, a matter of belief. It is Harvey's belief that the symbolic 
stabilises space as place. Consequently a space not symbolically (collectively) recognised 
does not attain the description of place, and by extension it is not authentic, stable and 
certain. To complete Harvey's argument, a non-(collectively) symbolic space is fluid, 
uncertain and non-authentic, or in his terms it signals a crises. With the notion of a symbolic 
order, a collective notion of symbolism, space, according to him, is redeemed as place in 
the, 'fretful' networking sensibility. I argue that such a notion of a stable authenticity is 
dependent on a lexical understanding of the symbolic (and consequently a lexical 
identification of the subject visiting for example Time Square also). Such a lexical 
understanding, I have argued in previous chapters vis-a-vis Kristeva and Lyotard, however, 
prevents a non-dialectical conceptuality. It results in a dialectical opposition of space and 
time. Thus it seals understanding of anything in dialectically opposed absolutes: absolute 
time, absolute place. As a consequence of my argument for the symbolic not as an order but 
as a 'tendential' quality, this dialectic is disavowed. Time Square has a tendential quality that 
produces my individual practice of symbolisation. However, this practice, I argue, does not 
translate its symbolism from a pre-existent register. Rather, the symbolic place is produced 
in a continual practice of its tendential quality in the contingency of my generative 
interpretation. Thus there is no authentic place outside my generative perception thereof, 
and any place that I perceive is authentic in my perception. In the practice of the tendential 
symbolic neither time nor space have a hold over place but produce places as the time of its 
practice. 
Harvey's understanding of the symbolic, I contend, recalls Barthes' articulation of 
Eisenstein's montage theory as working along the lines of a semiotic symbolic (vertical and 
horizontal orientation, context and order). In the same sense that Eisenstein managed to 
argue for a unified propagandist meaning of his films via recourse to an underlying symbolic 
order, Harvey sees the symbolic as holding together place in a time of networking fluidity. 
For Eisenstein the reliance on a particular symbolic understanding (order) inadvertedly 
undoes his ambition for an international film-making. The symbolic order ties his work to the 
particular historical and geographical circumstance, outside of which, it does not loose 
sense, but it is unable to produce the intended propagandist meaning. For Harvey, it 
appears, the notion of the symbolic only solidifies his dialectic view point, and thus increases 
his fear of fluidity. 
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temporal-collage's signifying practice to be active in terms of time as well as space. 
To articulate this particularity I turn to Doreen Massey. In her essay 'Power-
geometry and a progressive sense of place', she critiques Harvey for his dialectical 
argumentation and proposes a different understanding in the 'combination' of time 
and space as 'time-space'. Her essay enables me to clarify and conclude on the 
nature of interaction between time and space in the signifying practice of temporal-
collage. 
Time of perception as timespace; against a dialectic identification 
Massey takes up the term 'time-space compression', denoting the 'movement and 
communication across space', as it is used and lamented by Harvey (Massey, 1996, 
pS9). She observes that the methodological basis for his argument is Heideggerian 
and that the space - time dialectic, which informs Harvey's theorisations must 
necessarily lead him to an equally dialectical outcome. This, she argues, can never 
produce a more differentiated analysis.146 To avoid such a dialectical dilemma, and 
in order to articulate time-space relations in the network age in all their complexity, 
she considers time and space not as dialectically opposed absolutes, but discusses 
them in relation to their conceptualisation. 
The second point about the inadequacy of the notion of 'time-space compression' as it is 
currently used is that is needs differentiating socially. This is not just a moral or political 
point about inequality, although that would be sufficient reason to mention it: it is also a 
conceptual point. (Ibid., p61) 
In her sense time and space are concepts rather than absolutes. They are a matter 
of perception, and also a matter of belief. Not however in relation to a dominant 
ideology but in relation to an individual ideology, or what I call a contingent 
conviction. 147 Their status depends on the position of the subject perceiving them 
rather than in relation to a collective (symbolic) authentication. 'For different social 
146 I understand Massey's critique of Harvey's dialectical 'simplicity' (undifferentiated 
oppositionality) to support my argument against Weibel's euphoria of limitless fluidity on the 
net, as well as against Harvey's fear of the networking sensibility. In relation to the research 
project as whole, her critique clarifies my motivation for the artwork as a material complex: 
provoking conceptual differentiations in time and space that are not simplyfiable in the notion 
of a 'higher order absolute' (the overcoming of the dialectic oppositionality in ideal 
objectivity). Rather, my aim is to propose the artwork as a conceptual actuality produced in a 
non-dialectical signifying practice. 
147 This notion of an individual ideology recalls and clarifies the issue of conviction in 
Tarkovsky's Zone as discussed in chapter 3. Conviction is an individual and practical 
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groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these 
flows and interconnections.' (Ibid., p61) 
Massey considers Harvey's debate of 'time-space compression' to come from a 
privileged position. According to her he is the White Male Anglo Academic, for whom 
movement always happens in relation to nice hotel rooms and the certainty of a 
home to go back to.148 In a sense she ridicules his fear of fluidity. In an elaboration 
of this critique she proposes a differentiation of time and space according to, what I 
understand to be, its 'inhabitant'. 
For different social groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in 
relation to these flows and interconnections. ( ... ) Some are more in charge of it than 
others, some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving 
end than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it. (Ibid., p61) 
Thus she distinguishes between those with control over the networking fluidity, 
those who move, and those that are fixed by the fluidity of others. Consequently 
different 'places' are produced dependent on the particular subject's conception of 
time and space. There is, then, not one condition of network sensibility, not one here 
and now of postmodernity. Rather, and breaking with the dialectical simplification, 
this here and now is dependent on the who of its practice. At the same time, the 
'place' (the here and now) thus produced is the practice of time and space, as a 
subjective and contingent conception.149 
In this sense her 'time-space' (place), in clear distinction to Harvey's (dialectical) 
space, is clarified as complex, contingent and practical. According to Massey 'form 
is process': places are generative, created by interaction, 'they do not have to have 
boundaries in the sense of divisions' and 'they are full of internal differences and 
ideology. It produces one's position and trajectory in the world, and thus it produces one's 
world, rather than positioning one within a pre-existent world from a meta-position. 
148 Ironically enough, Harvey himself, in this essay 'From space to place and back again' 
sneers at (second rate) 'white male Anglos' who have, according to him, risen to stardom via 
the 'postmodern bandwagon' (Harvey, 1996, p26.) 
149 Massey's notion of a time-space here and now, enables me to clarify the perceptual 
condition of temporal-collage. I initially articulated the circumstance of temporal-collage in 
chapter three via Lyotard's notion of the 'Postmodern Condition'. There I staged its condition 
as a (non-dialectically postmodern) 'changing-game', produced continually through the 
innovative agency of the perceiving subject. Now, I can clarify this condition, and confirm its 
non-dialectic nature via Massey's articulation of 'time-space'. The generative perception of 
the here and now, by the innovative subject in temporal-collage is neither temporal nor 
spatial. Rather, this subject produces its condition as time-space, and this time-space 
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conflicts' (ibid., p67).150 Since these 'conflicts' and 'differences' are not dialectical 
(they are not conflicts between absolutes, but generative and subjective 
differences), I understand them in relation to my articulation of collage's material 
complexity as agonistic and playful, rather than antagonistic and pressing for a 
resolution in a higher order absolute (montage). Playful differences, I argue, trigger 
the production of similarities (agonistic relationships) in the particularity of their 
perception (collage). 
To employ her non-dialectical understanding, in relation to my project, I compare her 
notion of place with my idea of the artwork as a conceptual actuality. Thus I employ 
her sense of time-space complexity to conclude on the nature of the signifying 
practice producing this conceptual actuality. In this sense I argue that temporal-
collage is not simply a temporal (immaterial) signifying perception, proposed against 
a substantial actuality of the artwork in a spatial (material, contractual) condition. 
Although I initially developed its strategy, to challenge the dominance of a visual, 
stable and substantial valuation of materiality, as articulated via Metz, now, I 
conclude that, in order for my critique not to be imminently recuperated via a 
dialectically opposed point of view (reactionary spatiality), the temporal dynamic of 
its perceptual actuality has to be proposed as a 'time-space dynamic' .151 
condition is dependent on the position of the subject producing it in his/her conceptualisation, 
his/her contingent believes. 
150 This articulation recalls Kristeva's notion of the text as process as discussed in her 
essays on the Revolution in Poetic Language (Kristeva, 1984, p102). Her notion of process I 
have shown to retain a dialectical characteristic in its separation between the semiotic 'drive' 
and the symbolic 'matter'. The non-dialectical practice of Massey's 'process', combining time 
and space (drive and matter), in a complex and reciprocal relationship, however confirms the 
form, the artwork, as non-dialectical, neither material nor immaterial but 'nonmaterial'. 
151 Peter Weibel and many other network artists and theorists consider the informational, 
immaterial artwork to present a critical subversion of material valuations. However, as a 
consequence of my consideration of Harvey's argument, it is clear that fluidity per se, as a 
technological actuality, does not propose a critical evaluation of a concurrent networking 
sensibility. Following Massey, I argue that actual immateriality (virtuality) is being normalised 
and controlled through those in charge of movement. This understanding confirms and 
brings into context, the articulation about the actual digital artwork as argued in the previous 
chapter. The different placing of individuals and groups of people in 'relation to these flows 
and interconnections' establishes and reveals (conceptual) power positions that (re-
)establish material hierarchies, however immaterially (Massey, 1996, p61). Data transfer, 
networking realities, I argue, render the informational artwork, in its global context, not more 
critical than a substantial expression. By contrast, it could be argued that the immaterial 
nature of some time-based works make them more easily compliant to an informationalised 
sensibility. In this respect it is maybe the substantial artwork, painting, sculpture, etc., that 
attains a new criticality. The substantial artwork in its fixed configuration, appears to be 
challenging the fluidity of a networking sensibility. The spatial work sits awkward and square 
in relation to fluidity. It imposes a particularity of place and transportation that video, sound 
and internet work avoids. This demand could be seen as articulating a criticality of the 
network hierarchies. However, the return to a material, substantial practice in this sense, I 
argue, establishes what Harvey terms a 'reactionary territoriality'. Thus such an 
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Massey's sense of time and space combines temporal and spatial relations and 
processes in a complex and generative conceptualisation and foregrounds the 
subject of its perception. In order to realise these two points in temporal-collage 
also, I adopt her understanding. This I believe will conclusively determine temporal-
collage as a signifying practice that challenges and breaks with the dialectical 
dynamic. Thus I replace the term 'temporal-collage' with the notion of 'timespace-
collage'. 
Timespace-Collage 
For this term 'timespace-collage' I adopt the dynamic of 'time-space' as articulated 
by Massey. However, to manifest visually her critique of a dialectical understanding, 
as argued by Harvey, I remove the dash between time and space. Thereby I seek to 
avoid a return to a dialectical understanding and to highlight the critical equivalence 
between spatial and temporal processes, 'fluidfixity', in the conceptualisation of the 
artwork as 'material complex'. 
The notion of 'timespace', I argue, promotes the equivalence between time and 
space. This is not a simple agreement or similitude, but an 'equal difference'. I 
articulate this notion of an 'equal difference' via my initial critique of Eisenstein's use 
of the idea of a 'monism of ensemble'. According to him, in a monistic ensemble, 
sound and image, or in my sense time and space, do not accompany each other, 
'but function as elements of equal significance.' (Eisenstein, 1977e, p20) However, 
Eisenstein's monism, as I have shown via Barthes, is ultimately directed by the 
intention of the author, via the symbolic order of its context, into one (homogenous) 
actuality. Thus it is a dialectical simultaneity between objects, the frames of the film, 
orchestrated toward an (ideal) similarity, the total (montage) film. The subject 
meanwhile is in a meta-position, outside the simultaneity and unaffected by its 
complexity. In 'timespace-collage' by contrast, I argue that from such a monistic 
understanding does not contribute to a critical art practice but re-creates and affirms a 
dialectical dynamic. The appreciation and practice of the substantial artwork in the network 
sensibility, I argue, cannot simply be opposed to temporal (digital) artwork on the net. Rather 
the conceptualisation of material and immaterial as nonmaterial, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, presents us with a more complex notion of materiality, in virtuality and the 'real' 
world. Massey's time-space, I argue, re-evaluates such an easy oppositionality, and thereby 
challenges the criticality attributed to fluidity or fixity. What becomes clear is that neither the 
material nor the immaterial artwork have a critical potency per se. Instead, the notion of time-
space re-focuses the process of validation onto individual and contingent perception and 
their relationships and interactions. As a consequence of my argument for a perceptual 
complexity in the signifying practice of temporal-collage as timespace-collage, the awkward 
criticality of fixity is the particularity of a fluid perception. 
208 
basis of value similarity, the differences are worked out in a signifying practice by 
the 'inhabiting' subject. The intention of this practice for the subject to experience 
the work. This experience is guided by the subject's, generative and complex, 
sensorial simultaneity with the work rather than via an authorial pressure. In this 
sense Massey's notion of 'time-space' finalises my critique of Eisenstein's monism 
as I initially stage it in chapter one. 
Consequently I argue that in timespace-collage the 'simultaneity' is a complex (non-
dialectical) simultaneity between the material elements and the subjects, who are 
producing the artwork, the place, as 'a particular constellation of relations' 
dependent on their position in relation to the dynamic of these 'intersections' 
(Massey, 1996, p66). In other words, time-space sensibility as articulated via 
Massey, enables me to articulate timespace-collage as a conceptual practice that 
involves the materials, as (non-hierarchical) equivalent non materials, and the 
subjects, as individual and active agents, inhabiting a complex actualisation of the 
artwork, performing thus what I earlier called a generative interpretation. 
In this way Massey's ideas enable me to re-visit and finalise the basic contentions of 
my research project: the challenge of (hierarchical) differentiations between 
sensorial materials and their sublimation into one homogeneous (ideal) totality 
according to the (ideological) intention of the author. These issues have been 
investigated and elaborated throughout my research project. I now conclude that the 
'signifying practice of timespace-collage' works along the sensibility of a critical 
equivalence between spatial and temporal processes. The individual subject's 
timespace sensible perception produces the film, the artwork, as a (non-dialectical) 
conceptual actuality, in relation to his/her conception of time and space. 
Consequently the timespace artwork is ideal not in relation to the intention's of the 
author, worked out in relation to a symbolic order (historical and geographical 
context). Rather, the ideality of this perceptual artwork is a subjective ideality.152 
152 The symbolic quality involved in the timespace practice of the artwork, I argue, is not the 
symbolic of an order. The fixity and hierarchical (vertical and horizontal) organisation of such 
an order, I believe, would undermine the timespace equivalence of its perceptual practice. 
Thus, instead, I contend, it is a tendential symbolic, as articulated in chapters two and three. 
This tendential symbolic is a trigger that forges my simultaneous engagement. However it 
does not forge my understanding of the artwork as an ideal totality according to an authorial 
intent. Its quality is the (timespace) realisation of its tendential symbolic in an individual 
(timespace) perception. There never is symbolism outside of this process since my 
perception realises the tendential quality in a contingent symbolisation. 
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According to Massey time-space places 'can be imagined as articulated moments in 
networks of social relations and understandings. And this in turn allows a sense of 
place which is extra-verted, which includes a consciousness of its links to the wider 
world' (ibid., p66). Applying this characteristic to my idea of a timespace artwork 
confirms my notion of centrifugality. Whereas I have argued via Eisenstein's 
montage, that a homogenous material production results in an introverted 
articulation, I can now, via Massey, conclude on my idea that the complex and 
relational dynamic of timespace-collage produces a centrifugal artwork. The 
'consciousness of a wider world', I argue, articulates my notion of an outward bound 
conceptualisation. It clarifies the contingent space of the subject's perception in 
relation to the direction of an 'outside' world. The criticality of such an 
understanding, I argue, is the notion that the artwork is actual as conceptual 
'relations' and 'intersections' rather than as either relative fluidity or as absolute 
fixity. According to Massey 'instead then of thinking of places as areas with 
boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of 
[social] relations and understandings.' (Ibid., p66) Her focus on intersubjective 
relations, I argue, locates the notion of understanding, sense, in-between the 
subjects inhabiting time and space as timespace. 
Massey's essay establishes the sense (shared meaning) of a place in the 
relationship between the subjects involved in its conceptualisation: the 
commissioners of movement, the movers and those arrested by the movement of 
the first two. It is from their relationships (rather than from the relationship between 
spaces) that a collective sense of place is being established. 
It is from that perspective that it is possible to envisage an alternative interpretation of 
place. In this interpretation, what gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized 
history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, 
articulated together at a particular locus. (Ibid., p66) 
Massey suggests that 'each place can be seen as a particular unique point of their 
[the subjective conceptualisations'] intersection.' (Ibid., p66) At this 'intersection' 
temporal and spatial conceptualisations form 'place' as a (non-dialectical) complex 
of relationships and processes. In relation to timespace-collage her understanding of 
a shared place enables me to conclude that a collective sense, a shared artwork, is 
produced at the intersection in discourse of each individual's signifying practice and 
its non-sense. Following her I argue that the generative interpretations that produce 
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the artwork as a conceptual actuality in timespace establish a shared (collective) 
sense in their dynamic intersections. In this sense rather than positioning the 
individual conceptualisation in a dialectical opposition to an actual, aesthetically and 
ideologically stabilised artwork, it is the dynamic intersections between individual 
conceptualisations that produce the 'actual' work. 
In previous chapters I have argued that the individual non-sense produced in a 
generative interpretation is not dialectically opposed to a (collective) sense. Now I 
can finalise this idea by aligning myself with Massey's emphasis on the relationship 
between subjects, as opposed to the relationships between spaces (geographical 
and historical), in the production of the artwork or, in her sense, the construction of 
place. In the next part of this chapter I adopt Massey's articulation of the centrality of 
the subjects' relationships in order to clarify the sense processes in the signifying 
practice of timespace-collage. In relation to this I conclude on the characteristic of 
the subject spectatant on trial and finalise my ideas on its involvement in the 
production of shared sense. 
The Subject in Timespace; ideality of desire versus ideality of contracts 
Morse's notion of digital dematerialisation discussed vis-a-vis Bochner's work and 
writings enabled me, in the previous chapter, to articulate the idea of 
dematerialisation not as oppositional to a materialisation, but rather in the sense of a 
(nonmaterial) informationalisation. This informationalisation, I argued, emphasises 
the subject and pulls him/her into a perceptual effort of 'engagement'. This 
engagement I argued as the fifth signifying practice of temporal-collage. In relation 
to this I established the idea that this signifying engagement is not an actual digital 
engagement (extending the work via an operational input device) but a conceptual 
digital engagement (imaginative extensionality). As a consequence of this argument, 
now that the time and space of this extensional practice is clarified as timespace, 
the subject which practices the (conceptual digital) re-engagement in timespace-
collage too is clarified beyond a dialectical opposition. 
I confirm this non-dialectical subject of timespace-collage via Massey's notion that 
(time-space) place is dependent on the who of its conceptualisation. Following her 
ideas on the centrality of the subject in the production of the here and now condition 
of a place, it is the subject spectatant on trial's contingent conceptualisation of the 
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artwork which produces the contingent condition of this artwork. This practice does 
not stand in opposition to a fixed or fluid artwork outside this practice. Nor does the 
subject of this practice stand in a dialectical relationship with a fixed or fluid subject 
outside this practice. There is no outside position which stands in opposition to 
timespace-collage's generative signifying. 
The notion of timespace disables the notion of dual subjectivity. The subject 
spectatant in timespace is not opposed to a subject spectateur. The latter position is 
rendered impossible. Since, if the time of the signifying practice of temporal-collage 
is timespace there is no meta-position: there is no position outside practice for an 
intransitive spectator, who queries the artistic material in relation to its institutional 
conventions and finds his/her answer within these conventions also. In the sensibility 
of the non-dialectical here and now of timespace the continual practice of 
engagement defines 'being' as a constant and individual practice. The subject of 
timespace-collage is a subject of practice. Its subjectivity is defined as an active 
identity. This activity produces the artwork continually in a generative interpretation. 
This timespace subject is not a relative subject however; it is not marginalisable as 
irrelevant and nonsensical and neither is it fluid in relation to a particular 'plan of the 
network', fixity. Rather the fluidity and fixing of subjectivity too are one. Following 
Massey, the position of the individual in the network is particular to the time and 
place of his/her own formation and thus his/her conceptualisation is relevant in 
relation to this particularity. Its contingency is a timespace contingency, the subject a 
timespace subject. In this sense, the timespace identity of the spectatant is 
particular and fixed. However, it is fixed in timespace rather than in relation to a 
dialectical space or time (historical or geographical). Thus its fluid (active) identity is 
particular to its own fixity, rather than opposed or relative to an absolute fixity, the 
dwelling. In other words, the motion of perception (generative interpretation) does 
not produce its 'conceptual actuality' in a dialectical relation to an 'authentic 
actuality', an objective ideality. Rather the perceptual (time, space, the artwork) 
remains a matter of individual production. Its ideality lies in the active subject's own 
conviction and commitment to this production. In this way I confirm that the subject 
spectatant's generative interpretation produces the artwork as ideality. However, this 
ideality is not validated via the notion of an objective ideality as proposed in 
Hegelian aesthetics. Rather, the perception of the spectatant produces a, to its 
timespace sensibility, ideal artwork. At the same time he/she is confirmed in the 
subjective ideality of this process. 
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As a consequence of Massey's emphasis on 'relationships' and 'intersections', this 
(ideal) practice is of 'equal difference' to other subject's practice in the construction 
of a collective sense of (place) the artwork. The consensuality of this construction is 
not established vis-a.-vis the contracts and rules of a concurrent aesthetic(-
stoppage) however. Rather, the subject spectatant produces, motivated by his/her 
desire to share, the concurrent aesthetic as a 'timespace aesthetic'. 
This conclusion allows me to elaborate and clarify my notion of 'desire' in respect to 
the articulation of a shared sense of place, a shared sense of the artwork. If, 
following Massey, I argue that the artwork is not an absolute actuality, fluid or fixed, 
but is produced in the dynamic intersections of individual conceptions, then, I cannot 
refer to a contract, historical or geographical, determining this shared sense. Rather, 
I understand her timespace sensibility to confirm my idea that it is the contingent 
desire of the individual subject to relate that produces the shared artwork. This does 
in no way assume that either this desire indeed exists, or that it cannot be a desire 
to manipulate and oppress. I certainly do not suggest a naive utopia here. Rather, 
what I imply with the term 'desire' is that the perceptual artwork (conceptual 
actuality) is 'motivationally' collective. It is shared to the extent that the individual 
subject is participating in a shared sense, rather than sharing contractually, 
assuming a pre-existent order to this collectivity. This reiterates and confirms the 
point made in conjunction with my interpretation of Tarkovsky's film 'Stalker' in 
chapter 3, that what assures the sociality (shared sense) of a non-dialectical 
subjectivity is the desire to share rather than a shared contract! order.1s3 Thus it is 
the 'quality' of the relationships between the subjects conceptual ising the artwork, 
rather than the relationship between artworks, historically, or between the 
viewer/listener and the work, geographically, which determines the collective sense. 
The collective sense produced consequently stems from the dynamic intersections 
153 In chapter 3 I argued the Zone as a space of tendential symbolism that triggers what 
Morse calls re-engagement, and what I elaborated via Bochner as engagement, in its 
generation. As a consequence of my argument in chapter 4 and its contextualisation here in 
a timespace sensibility, I can apply this tendential quality of the Zone to any artwork. Thus I 
suggest that the engagement with an artwork is triggered by a tendential symbolic. However, 
since this is not a symbolic order but a quality, my engagement does not happen in 
reference to a specific temporal and spatial register, contract. Thus I cannot produce the 
artwork collectively from a shared register of symbols. Rather, I produce a contingent 
symbolisation in the signifying practice of the tendential qualities. A contingent consensuality 
of this quality is achieved at the intersections with other conceptualisations, and depends on 
the desire to realise such relations. Thus, if we fail to achieve a shared sense of the artwork, 
we cannot blame a contract, an order, but have to consider our unwillingness to make such 
shared sense. 
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between the subjects conceptualising the artwork rather than in relation to an 
aesthetic, historical or geographical, determination. 
Conclusion: Aesthetic Theory as Terror 
In a timespace sensibility of production and perception there is only practice. The 
subject of this practice, who is a subject spectatant on trial is ideal in its active 
identity, and the artwork is ideal in its continual production in perception. A 
timespace sensible ideality is an ideality of practice. The individual sense 
(nonsense) produced in this generative interpretation is shared according to desire, 
rather than in relation to a contract (order). 
The understanding of time and space as one non-dialectical complexity (timespace) 
disavows the identity of the spectateur. The spectateur depends on theoretical 
conventions and orthodoxies, whose judgement necessitates a distance (historically 
and geographically) from the work. He/she needs the artwork to exist without his/her 
complicity, in a spatial and temporal 'over-there'. The spectateur needs to be able to 
contemplate and judge his/her perception of the work from outside its production. 
However, in 'timespace' the action of perception itself is the artwork, and any 
attempt at theorisation is but another act of perception, practice yet again. As a 
consequence of this conclusion I understand that aesthetic theory, as a hierarchical 
judgement of material elements for the purpose of a homogenous reading of the 
work, is rendered impossible. In timspace-collage there is no space outside practice 
from where to contemplate upon it. 
To name writing 'theory' signals that the reader, who produces the text in his/her 
generative interpretation thereof, is afraid of the timespatiality of his/her active 
identity. He/she seeks to anchor the work, and him/herself, beyond his/her individual 
and generative sense in a contractual arrangement. By contrast, and in response to 
this fear, I argue that the text (the artwork) does not corroborate meaning. Rather, it 
is the desire to share, the intersections of individual conceptualisations, that 
ultimately establishes a (consensual) understanding. And this understanding is only 
ever contingent, it is only ever constructed at the timespace moment of desire to 
share the timespace conceptualisations. From the tendential symbolic qualities, in a 
committed individual and generative interpretation, the tendential sociality of the text 
is being practised. The notion of a consensual belief in text as theory, meta-
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discursive, is illusory. The enforcement of the consequences of this illusion (a 
consensual aesthetic) I contend, via Lyotard, is terror. 
I conclude on the proposal that to believe one is able to articulate the artwork as a 
homogeneous whole, to define a consensual aesthetic judgement, from a meta-
position, is the illusion of control as articulated by Lyotard in his text on 'The 
Postmodern Condition'. The danger of this ideology of control is established 
forcefully in the very last passage of his text. 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. 
We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the 
reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable 
experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can 
hear the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror for the realization of the fantasy to 
seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; ( ... ); let us activate the 
differences and save the honor of the name. (Lyotard, 1994, p82) 
Following Lyotard, I argue that to believe that theory exists as an outside 
commentary, an observation and is not a production in perception, is dangerous. For 
Lyotard fascism is the expression of this danger. I agree with him. However, I 
believe that when we recognize this danger only in reference to a 'great' historical or 
geographical terror, we miss the dynamic of this terror. To refer to this terror in 
relation to a historically or geographically particular manifestation thereof re-
establishes the dichotomy between time and space. By contrast, following my own 
conclusion, the terror of homogeneity and totality is not representable in a place or 
time. This itself would affirm the possibility of meta-discourse and thus produce the 
terror of contractual consensus. Rather, the terror of homogenous totalities, 
established in meta-discourse (dependent on rules and contracts) which pretend to 
enable consensual sense, does not need a grand geo-political arena. It happens in 
the gallery, in the supermarket, the home, everywhere that I practice 'being', that I 
am a subject; in other words everywhere. The great political incidence is the 
symptomatic manifestation only of the micro level terror of a dichotomous totality. 
Finally: even if the signifying practice of timespace-collage, as I argue it in this 
research project, seems a play, the viewer a 'iouanf, playing at abandoning 
consensual rules for the time he/she perceives a work of art, the motivation behind 
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my proposition is more sombre than a sense of play.154 I propose that a timespace 
sensibility is central to challenge and continually re-evaluate issues of reality, 
materiality, subjectivity and sense. I propose that material elements trigger 
productions in perception whose reality lies in the conviction of the individual 
perceiver, whose desire to share this impression leads, at the intersection with other 
such desires, to a consensus based on contingent motivation, rather than according 
to rules and contracts (terror). Timespace-collage is a sensibility not an actuality. It 
describes an attitude toward art practice not a particularity of expression. Some 
artworks might offer themselves more readily to its signifying practice than others. 
However, I believe that conceptual (nonmaterial) complexity can be produced in any 
timespace sensible (perceptual) collage practice. 
Reflections on my Practice 
In the beginning of this thesis I suggest that the aim of my work is to 'produce audio-
visual work as "Material Complex", which escapes and challenges prejudices of 
material perception.' Throughout this project the articulation of such complexity and 
its relationship to aesthetic hierarchies is articulated in reference to the process of 
perception. Now, at the end of this investigation, I consider my own art practice in 
relation to the complexity of its production processes and the heterogeneity of its 
materiality. Without presuming any outcome, or making any claims for the work, I 
aim to reflect on my methods of production, my choices of content and material, my 
artistic intentions as well as some presentational concerns arising from my practice. 
In this way I hope to articulate how this research project, its theoretical and practical 
element, has clarified my working processes to myself, and how it has opened my 
work for new developments. 
Such a reversal of focus from the perceiver to the producer of the work does not 
undermine the claims of the thesis in regard to the perceptual autonomy and 
ideological particularity of the viewing subject. It does not refute the role of the 
spectator as spectatant in the production of the work as a timespace-collage. 
Rather, it considers the studio production as a counterpart to such a perceptual 
154 Earlier in this research project I have acknowledged that, of course, it is easy to abandon 
a sense of rules and contracts in the safe environment of the Gallery space: 'I can quite 
happily admit madness when entering a gallery. It is a very safe space to lose my rational 
sense of place and identity in'. 
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engagement. In this sense I observe and document my video and sound work vis-a-
vis the ideas of perception as staged in this project. 
The works produced during this research project consist of a series of ten short 
video pieces, three sound works and two audio-visual installations. 155 Observing this 
body of work produced over the past five years, I can broadly distinguish between 
two different approaches to its production. One method involves careful preparation, 
in which a degree of scripting, or picture boarding of the material is undertaken 
before shooting/recording. The other is the more unplanned approach of collecting 
whatever is available, in the sense of, often secretly, recording/filming a 'real' life 
event or object, or taping found-footage from film and sound archives. Reversing the 
control over the material, the tightly planned and conceptualised footage is 
subsequently worked according to a loose editing decision list, whilst the incidental 
material is controlled in tight compositions. 
At the beginning of this research project these two approaches to producing audio-
visual work remained fairly distinct. 
A good example to demonstrate this distinction is the comparison between 
Groundwork, an audio-visual installation produced in 2000, at the beginning of this 
project, and Beach a short video produced in 2001. The material of the first piece 
was shot in a, to me, very familiar location in Switzerland. It was planned and 
conceptualised through drawings, photographs, location scouting, etc. The video 
material was subsequently produced in a carefully staged and long drawn out 
shooting process. By comparison, the visual footage of the second piece, which was 
shot on a brief visit to Cornwall, is the result of carelessly putting down the camera 
next to my towel whilst relaxing on the beach. Once in the editing suite, the visual 
element of Groundwork was put together in a few brief sessions. The editing method 
was a simple selection process. The actual practice of shooting the material was 
simply re-staged. By contrast, the images of Beach were carefully viewed and 
chosen, subsequently they were manipulated digitally and more found footage was 
added. Here the actual shooting and planning process began in the editing stage. 
The beach footage became found material. My engagement with the material at the 
moment of filming had become irrelevant at this stage, the actual experience had 
been forgotten, and a new a 'possible experience' was being staged. 
155 Please find, at the end of the thesis, an illustrated list of the works produced as part of this 
research project. 
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The soundtrack of Groundwork was produced in a re-working and manipulating of 
the in-camera sounds with the aim of re-creating the event as an enhanced 
authenticity. The sounds were not simply left untouched and synched to the visual, 
which I believe would not augment the impression of the reality of the event. Rather, 
they were 'rendered' real: they were re-synched and manipulated, sounds were 
added, filters used, etc., in order to make the situation filmically, rather than actually, 
real. 
This documentary strategy of Groundwork was further pursued in the tape slide 
piece Hobbies; a Slideshow, (2001). Here again the emphasis rests on the planning 
and recording processes. I visited 14 men in their homes to interview them about 
their hobbies. This intimate engagement becomes part of the work for me. The 
editing work was minimal, only in the presentation stage did I manipulate the 
material to reflect on the recording process: a quasi factual and scientific 
undertaking which on closer inspection tilts towards the bizarre and obsessive on 
both sides of the microphone. 
In distinction to this, for the soundtrack of Beach I produced a tight composition of 
found material from effects tapes, music samples, found film material and radio 
broadcasts. This material was used with the intention to fictionalise the visual space 
on screen, to open it up for an imaginative engagement. 
This process resonates with the notion of a material complex as articulated in the 
written part of this thesis. This term, whilst informing my theoretical research, also 
offers me the vocabulary to express my desire to produce a rich texture of sensorial 
material that is tightly composed and, in its sumptuousness and intensity, produces 
different rhythms and narrative registers. The nature of this sonic material, mainly 
borrowed from other broadcast media, often from the '50s and '60s rather than from 
contemporary sources, adds another complexity. Using such material I borrow not 
only the space of transmission (film soundtracks and radio broadcasts have a very 
different sonic quality and acoustic space than CDs or location recordings), but also 
its nostalgia. This is not my nostalgia, neither geographically nor historically, 
however, and this is what gives me the freedom to play with it, pulling at it, tilting it 
and mocking it, whilst using its particularity to remain serious and grounded in 
meaning as an idea. 
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This 'disjointing' and 'bricolaging' strategy of production was used increasingly in 
most of the video pieces. Their short duration, between 2 and 6 minutes, allowed me 
to sustain the play with narrative elements without producing one distinct narrative 
and hence suturing the work in a teleological narrative sense. For the sound work 
too I employed some of these strategies. However the sonic pieces, Do you want to 
dance with me? (2002) and Moving Stones (2003) are both still based on 
documentary conventions, and both also have a different use of time. They are 16 
and 9 minutes respectively. I intentionally worked these sonic works into longer 
compositions in order to play with this durational quality and to stress the different 
sense of attention sound work generates. Sound unravels slowly in the time that it 
plays. It unfolds and creates the disembodied characters, and produces, rather than 
presents, the context of the action. Do you want to dance with me? and Moving 
Stones were designed to try and make people hear their own connections rather 
than listen to a given narrative. 
Increasingly, concurrent with the articulation of temporal-collage as a perceptual 
strategy in the theoretical element of my project, the documentary conventions and 
the complex collage strategies are used together, forging a different working 
process. 
Gallant Boy, a short video piece produced at the very end of this project, in the 
beginning of 2004, is an example of this coming together of approaches. For Gallant 
Boy I worked with incidentally shot footage of horses in a park in Wales and planned 
material of boats on the Serpentine in London. This footage was subsequently 
embellished with found visuals, digitally manipulated and juxtaposed to a tightly 
composed soundtrack consisting of a documentary voice-over, environmental 
sounds, film sounds and musical interludes. This material was brought together so 
as to produce the idea of a possible event, or indeed an impossible event, rather 
than the re-presentation of an actual occurrence. The documentary quality of the 
voice-over, a woman talking about the image of a naked man in a porn magazine, is 
juxtaposed to the genteel pursuit of boating in the park. The cold and echoing quality 
of the voice is dried by the pretty and colourful imagery of flowers and boats moving 
in a gentle and leisurely rhythm. However, my aim was not the crass juxtaposition of 
an explicit voice-over with the pretty environments of a boating afternoon. Rather 
what I sought to create is a complex expression produced in the collaging of all 
elements involved. The nostalgia reverberant in the glass cut voices of the film 
soundtrack and the comic appeal of the '40s film-music was used to distance the 
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viewer from the actual location, the actual content of the material, and to produce a 
fictional setting instead. Again, the enjoyment and generative quality of this fictional 
space is, even if paradoxically, assured by the generic particularity of the material 
used: documentary voice-overs, '40s film music, particular accents, etc. 
On the level of the media, sound and image, this complex working together of 
diverse elements plays with the temporal and spatial aspects of its apparent quality. 
The sonic is worked so as to spatialise the visual expression and the visual outlines 
the time of the sonic. The aim is not to produce a linear (narrative) development but 
to instead generate a static movement: a wobble or quiver on the spot of perception. 
In the theoretical component of this research I reference this condition as 
'timespace'. In relation to my practice this term describes my interest in holding a 
timebased artwork in the particularity of a spatial now. The theoretical articulation of 
this timespace condition has clarified my interest in the perceptual arena and has 
opened my work to a new concern of production. Current work in progress is 
engaged in the manipulation of audio-visual material for the purpose of stressing a 
time 'on hold': footage shot most recently focuses on flattening the space of the 
visual to a timespace by working with zoom lenses and diminishing the depth of field 
in order to achieve a 2 dimensional surface that is then dynamised, though in stasis, 
by a complex sound track. 
In all the pieces produced in the course of this project I worked on the material with 
a sensitivity to the particularity of each subject matter. What they share as a body of 
work is my interest in purposelessness and leisure and the awareness that to re-
create rather than represent this leisure, the composition needs to be tightly 
controlled, be that at the moment of production or in post-production. This 
relationship between controlled particularity and experiential freedom is an issue 
that is central to my theoretical research as well as to my studio practice. The 
tension it creates between experience and materiality is one of the issues that I am 
pursuing in current work. The most recently completed work, Wedding Night 
(coniferous woodland early spring) plays with this tension. For this piece I used my 
own voice for the first time. The piece was staged as an actual performance in a 
woodland, where I repeatedly called out 'I love you'. This actual life event was then 
edited and re-staged in post-production where the environmental sounds were 
augmented and manipulated, and the time of the performance was cut to 3.30 
minutes to mimic the length of a pop song. I am the author, the performer, the 
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recordist and the editor, I control every step of the way in order to allow for even 
more ambiguity in perception. 
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Appendix 1 
Antagonistic and Agonistic Relationship Between Object and Subject in Montage 
and Collage 
Relationship between objects and subject in montage: 
Object / 
Montage cell 
Object / 
Montage cell 
Antagonistic Relationship: Sublimation in obj tive totality, third 'image' which erases both 
Subject 
Fixed reader in metaposition, reading the totality as objective ideality 
Relationship between object and subject in collage: 
<r--> 
Agonistic relationship: Production in perception of collage element and of subject 
I argue that the subject produced in the antagonistic, conflictual tension of montage, 
is a fixed meta-subject, intransitive, who overcomes the conflict through a 
sublimation of both cells in an ideal totality. By contrast the relationship between the 
subject and the object of collage is agonistic: it is adversary but playfully so. This 
subject is produced in its production of the collage element. It is transitive and 
immersive, it does not pursue an objective outcome. Any outcome reached is 
forever provisional and subjective in its ideality. 
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